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NOTES

ON THE

RECENT MURDERS BY BRIGANDS IN GREECE.

"*Αἴσχρόν ἐστι σιγᾶν Ἑλλάδος πάσης ἀδικουμένης.*"

LONDON:
W. T. CARTWRIGHT, 21, NEW BROAD STREET.

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LONDON:
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enquire as to the safety of the road, and that the Greek Ministry were perfectly ignorant of the expedition until after the capture of the party.

Mr. Erskine, in his despatch of the 21st April (Parliamentary Papers, No. 3, p. 2), complains of the "Courrier d'Athènes" (a newspaper supposed to be favourable to the Greek Government), which, Mr. Erskine says, although it gives—

"A tolerably correct account of the whole affair . . . . declares most positively that no intimation was given to the authorities by her Majesty's legation of the intended excursion of our countrymen to Marathon. I have requested Messrs. Zaïmis and Valaority to contradict this statement, as they are well aware that I sent twice to the Director of Police—on the Saturday and Sunday preceding the occurrence—to ask for a military escort, which was given."

The statement complained of appeared on the 16th April, and was to the following affect (Papers, No. 3, p. 7) :—

"Des organes de l'Opposition ont dit, comme grief accusateur contre le Ministère, que M. le Ministre d'Angleterre a demandé au Gouvernement des renseignements sur la sûreté publique pour les communiquer aux voyageurs Anglais, et qu'il avait même réclamé au Gouvernement une force militaire pour les accompagner et les protéger durant leur excursion. Cette assertion des organes de l'Opposition est tout-à-fait mensongère. Aujourd'hui il est positif qu'il n'a été fait auprès de l'autorité aucune autre démarche, si ce n'est qu'avis d'une excursion à l'interieur a été donné à la police, sans doûte par le mâitre d'hôtel des voyageurs, et par la police au commandant de gendarmerie, pour qu'il donnât, suivant l'habitude, trois ou quatre gendarmes à cheval pour accompagner les voyageurs dans leur excursion. Mais ni le Ministre d'Angleterre, ni quelqu'un de sa part, ni aucune autre personne, n'a donné avis au Gouvernement que des étrangers de distinction devaient aller hors d'Athènes ; comme il n'a point été demandé non plus de renseignements sur l'état de la sûreté publique, dans le but, soit de les empêcher d'exécuter leur projet, soit de faire prendre au Gouvernement des mesures propres à les mettre a l'abri de tout danger pendant leur excursion."

To this statement the editor, it appears, objected at first to give any contradiction whatever, and we cannot very well blame him for his refusal; such a contradiction could apply, as Mr. Erskine expresses it (No. 6, p. 1), only "to the manner in which the application was made for an escort," namely, to that part of the above paragraph which states that the application to the police was made by the "maître d'hôtel." The desired rectifica-

tion, however, was at last inserted in the "Courrier," of the 1st May (No. 7, p. 11):—

"Dans notre feuille No. 90, nous avons dit, d'après des renseignements inexacts, que la Direction de Police avait été prévenue par l'hôtel où était logés les voyageurs Anglais que la Grèce pleure aujourd'hui, qu'ils allait faire une excursion à Marathon. Nos renseignements étaient inexacts ; car c'est d'un employé de la Légation Anglaise que la Police a reçu cet avis ; et la Direction de la Police en a informé le commandant de la gendarmerie, qui a envoyé des gendarmes pour veiller à la sûreté de la route."

Mr. Erskine accepts this as satisfactory, and, in fact, all he can say upon the subject, only confirms the truth of the above version of the case. In his note to Mr. Valaority, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 12th April (No. 1, p. 4), the precautions taken by him for the safety of his countrymen are summed up in these words:—

"On the 9th instant, the Chancelier of this Legation went to the office of the Prefect of Police to arrange about a military escort for the party in question."

And in his despatch to Lord Clarendon, dated 3rd May (No. 7, p. 11), he says:—

"I now again repeat that Mr. Lambros [the Chancelier] went on the subject to the police office, both on Saturday and Sunday, preceding the day on which the excursion took place."

It is clear, therefore, on Mr. Erskine's own showing, that the application was made neither to the Minister of War, nor to any other minister, but only to the Director of Police—a purely municipal authority. It is also beyond dispute that this application was not an inquiry as to the safety of the roads, but simply a demand for an escort, such as is usually granted to almost all foreign excursionists. That Mr. Erskine's application was only for an escort is furthermore established by the following communication from the police to the Mirarchy (head quarters of the gendarmerie), which Mr. Erskine encloses in his above-mentioned despatch, by way of corroboration of his statements:—

"THE DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE OF ATHENS AND THE PIRÆUS TO THE MIRARCHY OF ATTICA.

"(Translation.)

"Athens, March 29 (April 10), 1870.

"English travellers staying at the Hotel d'Angleterre situated on the Square of the Constitution, intend, as has been communicated to this direction, going to-morrow, the 30th instant, o. s., at 5 o'clock in the morning to Marathon, on a pleasure trip.

"In informing you, sir, of this, we beg you to give orders that their journey to Marathon be secured by mounted gendarmes.

"The Director, and for him, the Secretary,

"(Signed) PAPPAELIOY."

The escort was at once granted; and simply because it was granted, it has been urged that the authorities "consented" to the excursion. This is a Jesuitical argument at best; but even by construing this into "consent," it must not be forgotten that consent is one thing, and guarantee of safety is another and a very different thing.

There is nothing whatever to prove, nor does Mr. Erskine anywhere in his despatches state that either he officially, or the excursionists privately, made any enquiries of the authorities as to the security of the country. If such enquiries had been made, proof to that effect would have been produced only too eagerly. Far from such being the case, it is now conclusively established that the ministry at Athens were totally ignorant of the excursion until after the capture. In answer to Mr. Erskine's note, asking for explanations on this head, Mr. Valaority writes, on the 18th May (No. 12, p. 4):—

"Mr. Avierino (the Minister of the Interior) affirms never to have received, neither in writing nor by word, any information whatever, having reference to any excursion of foreigners to Marathon or elsewhere. It was only at eight o'clock in the evening that the Director of the Police gave him, in the presence of many others, the sad news of the capture of the unfortunate strangers, and that he learnt that foreigners of distinction had gone on an excursion."

It is also positively asserted by General Soutzo (the ex-Minister for War), in a kind of apology which he published, and which is contained in the Parliamentary Papers (No. 11, p. 11), that the demand for the escort was made—

"Without the Government knowing anything about it, and that none of the ministers, either directly or indirectly, had any knowledge of the projected excursion."

This has remained uncontradicted by Mr. Erskine, and for very good reasons; but in noticing General Soutzo's apology, in which it is also stated that the English Ambassador ought to have applied either to the Minister of the Interior or to that for War, that being the usual course in similar instances, Mr. Erskine says, by way of excuse (No. 7, p. 11):—

"If, as the General alleges, this was the proper course, why did not the Director of Police refer me to one of the Ministers in question?"

By this query, Mr. Erskine implicitly admits the omission he is charged with. The police did not refer Mr. Erskine to anyone else, for the very simple reason that Mr. Erskine asked of them for an escort, not for guidance, and because they naturally concluded that a foreign minister residing in Athens for over six years was surely in a position to know which was the proper course to follow. There may be a certain amount of red-tapeism evident in this, as in many other of the steps taken, but we do not pretend, nor as anyone the right to expect from us, total freedom from this curse, considering its prevalence even in English Institutions. It is manifest, however, that Mr. Erskine, despite his long residence in Greece, did not take the best measures to ensure the safety of the travellers, by communicating with the ministry, and ascertaining the actual state of affairs. The police are vested in Athens, as in all countries, with authority only within the limits of the city, and are not supposed to be informed respecting the security of the country from brigands, that being the duty of the Ministers of the Interior and for War, of whom, as it is now most clearly shown, no information whatever was asked by Mr. Erskine. As for Count Della Minerva, the Italian Minister, he does not seem to have given himself any trouble at this stage of the proceedings,

"Being persuaded," as he says (No. 9, p. 2), "that his English colleague would, as it was right to do, have solicited from the authorities an escort and such precautions as were necessary for the protection of the travellers."

As regards the necessity of informing the Minister of the Interior of the intended excursion, Count Della Minerva admits, although with evident disinclination, that (No. 11, p. 9):—

"It has sometimes happened, that on the spur of the moment I and some of my colleagues have written a line to the Minister of the Interior, to acquaint him in the evening that an excursion would be made next day."

It has been further urged that as the Government had, a month previously to the disaster, declared Attica to be free from brigands, they were responsible for any misfortunes that might befal those who placed confidence in such official assurances. Now, at the time when that declaration was made; the province of Attica might have been perfectly free from brigands, and yet a few days later it is quite possible that it should be insecure. In another place we will show how, on the one hand, it is easy for brigands to be hovering about, and to cross from one part of the country into the other, and how, on the other hand, it is a matter of the greatest difficulty for the authorities to be constantly well informed as to the whereabouts of the brigands. These miscreants are continually on the move, and prowl about unperceived, because the natural configuration of the country favours such movements, and renders concealment extremely easy.* To those who have seen the country, and understand these things fully, it is not a matter of surprise that a month after the declaration of the Government Attica was found to be unsafe.

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* Similar natural features of the country favoured the concealment of the band of the Arvanitaioi. In a correspondence, published in the papers of the 27th April, and entitled "The Road to Marathon," the following passage occurs:—

"But no part of the route could be better chosen for attack than this wooded dell in which we changed horses. The nature of the ground shut out all view of the country, and down to the edge of the rivulet, which was crossed by the rickety bridge, grew tall, thick bushes sufficient to conceal an army."

And Lord Muncaster, in a letter to his brother, published in the *Times* of the 29th April, says:

"We were taken in a thickly wooded part of the road."

In a place of this description the band might have remained for weeks together, and still have avoided detection.

Nor can that declaration be said to have misguided Lord Muncaster's party. In that party were included two Secretaries of Legation, who ought to know what was the actual state of affairs; and it is evident that none of the excursionists believed that the country was secure. Their very demand for an escort proves this; and we have, besides, the evidence of Mr. Thomas Cook, who was with another party of tourists at Athens, and who, in a letter which appeared in the *Times* of the 25th April, tells us how—

"On the previous night, at the dinner-table of our hotel, they (Lord Muncaster, etc.) laughed and joked about their anticipated excursion, and their exposure to the possibility of an attack of brigands."

Also, Dominio Roella, Count Boyl's servant, in his deposition before the Juge d'Instruction at Florence, states, that (No. 13, p. 3):—

"In speaking of the excursion, he told him (Count Boyl) he should not go, as there were brigands. He had heard his master himself speak of them."

They, therefore, undertook the excursion with their eyes open and in full knowledge of the danger to which they were exposing themselves; under such circumstances, it is a matter for speculation whether they would have given up their project even if they consulted the ministers, and had been warned by them.

But far from the authorities at Athens being open to a charge of supineness, it is evident that they took additional measures of precaution. In his despatch of the 3rd May (No. 7, p. 13), Mr. Erskine encloses the following order:—

"THE MIRARCHY OF ATTICA-BŒTIA TO THE COMMANDER OF THE FLYING COLUMN IN ATTICA, AT KEPHISSIA.

"(Translation. Most pressing.)

"Athens, March 29 (April 10), 1870.

"Tomorrow, at five o'clock in the morning, English travellers are going to Marathon; we therefore beg you to see that the public road leading from Athens to Marathon be secured, and you will continue so to do until next Wednesday, as some other strangers also intend visiting Marathon.

"(Signed) Z. D. BASDEKI, Sub-Mirarch."

The above order was issued on the eve of the excursion, and

on the very day of the capture the Minister of the Interior appears to have received such information as to have induced him to give the following instructions :—

"THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR (AD INTERIM) TO THE COMMANDER OF THE FLYING COLUMN IN ATTICA.

"(Translation.)

"Athens, March 30 (April 11), 1870.

"It is suspected that a portion of the band of brigands of the Arvanitis is concealed between the positions of Plexiza, Jerotsikouli, Retsina, as far as Daou in the Demos of Marathon.

"In informing you of this suspicion, we instruct you that strict search be made by an adequate detachment, placed under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Angheli Georgiou, and you will report upon the result.

"The Minister of the Interior, *ad interim*,

"(Signed) A. D. AVGERINOS."

It is evident, therefore, that as soon as the existence of brigands and their whereabouts were made known to the authorities, precautionary measures were taken. But on reading the above order, the first question suggested—and that which has already been asked—is, how is it that, whereas the Minister of the Interior was aware of the existence of the band of Arvanitaki near Marathon, neither the excursionists were cautioned, nor adequate measures taken in time? As regards the first part of this question we have already shown that the Ministers were ignorant of the excursion. Moreover, on Mr. Erskine demanding from the Greek Government, as a check of the good faith of their proceedings, an explanation as to the time when the information contained in the above order reached Mr. Avgerinos, he was informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (No. 12, p. 4), that "on the 11th April, about noon" (that is about the time when the excursionists had already arrived at Marathon), Mr. Valavani (head clerk in the Ministry of the Interior) submitted to Mr. Avgerinos the aforesaid despatch,

"Which was drawn up according to information which Captain Canellos furnished to Mr. Valavani that *very moment;* that the despatch was at once signed by Mr. Averino, and that it was as usual forwarded through the chief of the brigade of gendarmerie in Attica."

This, be it remembered, was done without Mr. Avgerinos even suspecting that a party of foreigners had left Athens for Marathon. It does not appear whether this despatch reached its destination in time, but that is immaterial, as the anterior order of the Gendarmerie (p. 13) was evidently received in good time by the detachments near Marathon, as we will immediately show. It is admitted on all hands that several detachments were met with along the road, both going and coming. Lord Muncaster, in a letter written to his brother, and published in the *Times* of the 29th April, says :—

"Several detachments of infantry were passed along the road."

And in another letter which appeared in the *Times* of the 25th, he gives more minute particulars :—

"On traversing the plain, they found a small detachment of six infantry soldiers, and afterwards a larger one of twenty-five, apparently patrolling the road. After exploring the scene of one of the most interesting events in history, they started to return to Athens. The detachment of twenty-five men appears to have endeavoured to keep company with them, but was unable to do so, and they again passed the smaller party of six men, who succeeded in keeping tolerably close in their rear."

In another letter from Mrs. Lloyd, published also in the *Times* of the 27th April, it is said :—

"According to the Minister of War's statement, we had about us forty soldiers; and the brigands say the same, but they say they would have attacked any number for the chance of capturing the party."

And in conclusion we have Mr. Erskine's own opinion, who, on the 3rd May, writes to Earl Clarendon as follows (No. 7, p. 11) :—

"Statements vary as to the number of soldiers who were at or about Pikermes when the travellers were attacked; but there cannot have been less than twenty-nine men in that immediate neighbourhood at the time, a force which ought to have been amply sufficient to prevent the disaster if, a messenger had been sent to warn the travellers, or their escort, of the impending danger."

In a subsequent despatch (7th May, No. 9, p. 12) Mr. Erskine admits that :—

"It is now shown that a gendarme had been sent specially from Athens to order this detachment to watch over their (the travellers) safety."

And, in fact, from the statements of Spiro Kamboutzi, the guide of the military detachments near Marathon—whose deposition (No. 9, p. 21), taken in Athens, and in the presence of Mr. Erskine, is very minute and clear, and bears the impress of sincerity, and which, furthermore, is in every detail borne out by the deposition (No. 13, p. 3) of Domenico Roella, Count Boyl's servant, who was examined in Florence, and in the presence of Sir A. Paget—it is clear that consequent upon the above-mentioned order of the gendarmerie to the commander of the flying column in Attica, a messenger *was* sent to warn the detachments near Marathon, to which Spiro was attached as a guide, of the necessity of watching over the excursionists. It must be here remarked that this man Spiro could have no object whatever in giving false evidence upon this point; on the contrary, it would be to the advantage of all the detachments to aver, after the capture, that they had received no warning in good time. Still Spiro says:—

"On that day (the day of the excursion), at noon precisely, the commander of the flying column informed us, by a mounted gendarme, that tourists were to proceed to Marathon, and that we were to see to their safety. This order was not addressed to me, but to the sub-lieutenant of infantry, Angheli, who commands the detachment. Upon this the said sub-lieutenant immediately ordered us to fall in, and when we approached the village of Bey, ordered Corporal Petro, with three men, to patrol from Plexiza to Yerousakouli; a sub-corporal, with three other soldiers, to patrol from Yerousakouli to the approaches of Raphina; and myself, with three other soldiers, to patrol from the road of Raphina to Pikermes; whilst the officer, with other three men, as he told us, would follow in the rear, as he (the officer) did not know that the tourists were at Marathon. As we were marching to the positions respectively allotted to us by the officer, we perceived the carriages of the strangers which were at the Soro (tumulus), and we immediately halted. Two mounted gendarmes then rode up to us to see who we were. On their approach we saluted each other, and I asked who was in command. Ath. Boulgaris told me that he was. I therefore told this gendarme to tell the strangers to stop their carriages and go on slowly, *as we had orders to escort them.* Whilst we were still speaking, the carriages drove up. Then the dragoman and the coachman called to me to approach. I had hardly approached when I perceived one of the strangers holding in his hand a 25-drachma bank note, which he handed to me. Before taking it, however, I asked the dragoman the reason why the money was offered to me, and he replied that it was for the soldiers to drink some wine; in that case I accepted it, and at the same time told the dragoman

to tell the gentlemen that we were men belonging to the flying column, and that our orders *were to escort them*, and that if they wanted us to keep up with them they must order their carriages to drive on slowly. Upon this the carriages left us and went to the well, where they stopped to water their horses, leaving us behind. Before they had finished drawing water we also arrived at the well, where we found one of the coachmen drawing water with bottles; we gave them a bucket of ours, with which they drew water and gave their horses to drink. Meanwhile, I and the corporal again told the strangers, through their dragoman, that we should go on before them, and that their carriages had better follow us slowly at some distance. I then left with seven soldiers—myself eight, and the corporal with three other men remained to follow behind; but before I came to the stone bridge near to Xylokeritza, that is, about ten to twelve minutes' distance from the well, the carriages overtook us, and I there and then again told them to stop and drive slowly, as it was impossible for us to keep up with them. Then Panagiotti, the gendarme, afterwards killed, and Ath. Boulgaris, said, 'Since they do not stop, why are you eagles to keep up with us who have four legs' (mounted)? and the carriage left at full speed, whilst we made every effort to keep as near them as was possible. When we came to the sheepfolds of Prapa we heard two shots, which must have been the last, as we heard no other. We of course suspected that something had taken place. We threw away our capotes and provision sacks, and ran as fast as we could. On our arrival at the place of the conflict we found the gendarme P. Basilaki wounded, and his horse killed, and also a corporal, with four or five men. After I had learnt from the corporal what had taken place, I took two of his men and ran in pursuit of the brigands."

This to our minds is so clear and so conclusive as to leave no doubt as to the way in which the travellers, notwithstanding repeated warnings, having outstripped the detachments, remained with only four gendarmes, and thus unprotected, fell into the hands of the brigands. The messenger from head quarters had arrived, and the officer in command of the detachment was making his arrangements for scouting the road, when the party came up to them, being on their return journey from Marathon. Spiro, on first meeting them and receiving 25 drachmas from one of the party, informs them that the men with him had received orders to escort them, and that if they wanted them to keep up, they had better order their carriages to drive slowly. The carriages then proceeded to a well some distance off, and here coming up to them again, the soldiers renew the warning; seven of them, with Spiro at their head, go on, and are soon overtaken by the excursionists, whom they for the third time request to drive

slowly. Here one of the gendarmes, who was afterwards killed in the encounter with the brigands, very properly remarks :—"Since they do not stop, what is the use of trying to keep up." The carriages are soon out of sight, and about an hour later a few shots give the sad news of the capture.

Now all these incidents—the time at which the excursionists met the detachments, the way in which the soldiers were posted here and there, who first spoke, the handing of 25 drachmas to Spiro—are all recorded in exactly the same sequence and to the same effect by Domenico, who, however, not knowing Greek thoroughly, could not understand what was said. There can be no doubt that the detachments were ordered in good time to watch over the travellers, and that they warned them accordingly. These warnings were made through the medium of Alexander Anemoyannis, the Cicerone accompanying the party. Lord Muncaster states that Alexander did not inform any of the party that such warning was given. This, with other incidents, are considered as criminating Alexander of connivance with the brigands, and Mr. Erskine, in noticing Spiro's evidence, writes to Lord Clarendon (No. 9, p. 21).

"This statement, as it appears to me, is most conclusive against Alexander."

How far Alexander is culpable or not the judicial investigation will show; but no one will be found, we hope, unscrupulous enough to make the Greek Government and the Greek people responsible for the treachery—if such is proved to exist—of this man also, whom the excursionists chose of their own accord to accompany them.

As regards the present of 25 drachmas given by one of the party (according to Lord Muncaster, by Mr. Lloyd) to Spiro, we have two remarks to make. In the first instance both Spiro and Domenico assert most positively that the money—a bank note—was given in the presence of, and with an explanation made through, Alexander, to the effect that it was for the soldiers to drink to the health of the excursionists. Between this and Lord Muncaster's version of the affair there exists a marked difference,

which we better give in Sir A. Paget's own words (No. 11, p. 18), who first noticed it, and before whom Domenico was examined :—

"I may now proceed to the point of discrepancy between Lord Muncaster's letter of the 10th of May and Domenico's statement.

"Domenico asserts that when they came up with the detachment, Mr. Lloyd took out a note (he thinks of 10 or 20 drachmas) to give to them, and that Alexander then called out to the officer or leader, 'Spiro, come and take what these gentlemen give you, and drink with it to their health;' which implies, of course, that the whole party were together; whereas, according to Lord Muncaster, it is clear that he and Alexander, being in the first carriage, and some way ahead of the other, knew nothing of what had taken place in reference to this particular, until Mr. Lloyd, in whose carriage were Count Boyl and his servant, drove up. I quoted to the witness, as near as I could remember (for unfortunately I had not taken the printed papers with me), Lord Muncaster's version of this incident, and he declared he had no recollection of Alexander having said anything but what is repeated above."

It is far more probable for Lord Muncaster to be mistaken than for two men whose depositions are almost identical on all points, and who understood the language better than his Lordship. We wish to draw attention to this because, as we shall have occasion to show in other places also, Lord Muncaster's recollection of the circumstances appears to be very dim and uncertain.

The second point is that the money was given evidently because the soldiers were believed by the excursionists to be an escort sent for their protection. 25 drachmas are about equal to a sovereign, and 20*s*. is no conptemptible *douceur* even in England, much less so to a few soldiers in a poor country. The money, therefore, was not given away as to indifferent people one meets on the way, but as to men who were rendering a service. Our conviction that the excursionists, or at all events some of them, considered those soldiers whom they afterwards outstripped, as an escort, is strengthened by the following extract from Domenico's depositions (No. 13, p. 4) :—

"We had just left Marathon, and proceeded for ten minutes, when, though the carriage in which I was was then the second one, I perceived a number of persons in hoods, and I asked my master (Count Boyl) who they were; he answered, '*our escort*.' I then asked why they had not come sooner, and my master told me they had come on before us, and would have warned us if they had met any one. My master said to Mr. Lloyd, 'Let us give these people something,' and gave the officer a note of 25 drachmas, I think."

And in another place (No. 13, p. 7) the same witness says :—

"The carriages certainly went quickly where the road was good, and I said to myself, 'If we go on like this, the soldiers will not keep up with us.'"

Mr. Erskine himself, in his note to Mr. Valaority (No. 1, p. 4) says :—

"On the way they fell in with two detachments of infantry, one of which was tolerably numerous, and which appeared to have been sent out for the protection of the travellers."

Such plain and conclusive evidence calls for no comment.

The above remarks establish, we think, in the most positive manner, (1) that Mr. Erskine applied for an escort, not for information as to the security of the country; (2) that by this means he omitted a vital precaution; (3) that the Ministry was totally ignorant of the excursion; (4) that the excursionists both were in a position to know and did know that the country was unsafe; (5) that all possible precautions were taken by the authorities, and that as soon as danger appeared, measures were devised to avert it; (6) that the troops met by the excursionists were more than sufficient for their protection; (7) that the detachments warned the travellers not to outstrip them; and (8) that either through some inexplicable oversight or inattention on the part of the travellers themselves, or through the treachery of the Cicerone, those warnings were disregarded, and the capture of the party ensued.

In any case, it is clear that the Government is innocent of the charges brought against it on this head.

THE FIRST STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

We now come to events subsequent to the capture, and will examine the line of conduct pursued by the Greek Government and the English Envoy during these negotiations.

To all dispassionate and impartial readers of the despatches published, it is patent that all the measures adopted by the Greek Government were decided upon with the full knowledge and consent of the British and Italian Ministers, and that the Greek

Government was desirous of taking no step whatever without consulting the wishes and obtaining the approval of Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva. Both the king and his ministers were from the first anxious to do all they could and to concede all that was in their power. The Italian Minister, is his despatch of the 14th April (No. 9, p. 3) states that he

"Found the king angry, most afflicted, and ready for any sacrifice, even personal."

Mr. Erskine, under the same date (No. 1, p. 5), informs Lord Clarendon that—

"His Majesty even showed the most eager wish to go and place himself in the hands of the brigands rather than that any of their prisoners should suffer harm."

And adds that Mr. Zaimis

"Assured him that the Government were prepared to make any sacrifice in their power to effect the release of the captives."

Count Della Minerva also states (No. 9, p. 3) that Mr. Valaority—

"Assured him of the earnest intention on the part of the Government to succeed in the point which is most urgent, viz., to avoid any immediate danger for the prisoners, and to liberate them as soon as possible."

And the Greek Foreign Minister, in his reply to Mr. Erskine's communication of the 12th April, very properly remarks that instead of indulging in that foible of all diplomatists—an exchange of despatches—he

"Preferred to come to a personal understanding with him (Mr. Erskine) and the Italian Minister on the measures to take to save the lives of the prisoners."

And, in fact, neither Mr. Erskine nor Count Della Minerva even hint, in the whole course of the despatches published, at any disagreement between them and the Greek Ministers as to the steps to be taken, nor do they disavow any of the measures decided upon. Count Della Minerva also states (No. 9, p. 10) that he and Mr. Erskine—

"Always agreed on all points, meeting every day and conferring together freely, and our decisions were always the result of a perfect concord in the exchange of our ideas."

And again, referring to the instructions given to Colonel Théagénis (No. 9, p. 8), he says—

"All this was carried on by the English Minister and by me with perfect mutual agreement."

They were fully aware even of the minutest details of what was going on,* and they did not simply give their consent, but, as we will presently see, actually suggested the measures to be taken; so much so that we may fairly say that the direction of the negotiations was virtually in their hands.

But that all the steps taken, either by Mr. Erskine himself or at his suggestion, were from the first clumsy and inappropriate, and sure to lead to further trouble and complication, is evident to all those who know anything of the character and the notions of that class of men—the Wallach shepherds—from which brigands are generally recruited in Greece. Mr. Erskine, despite his long residence in that country, seems to have been totally ignorant of the peculiarities of the men with whom he had to deal. They are vain, ostentatious, suspicious in the extreme, and being amenable only to firmness, at once take advantage of the least sign of weakness or of fear.

To begin with, they were allowed to discover that their prisoners were gentlemen of high position—two of them Secretaries of Legations. It is clear that at first they were in the dark as to this, for it is stated by Lord and Lady Muncaster (No. 7, p. 8) that on discovering the importance of their prisoners the brigands began "dancing and singing for joy." And the Italian Minister states in his despatch of the 14th April (No. 9, p. 3) that

"They no sooner learnt that there were two Secretaries of Foreign Legations, than they commenced dancing and jumping with frantic joy."

How they made this discovery is not stated, for Lord Mun-

* The Athens correspondent of the "Times" writes, on the 21st April:—"Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva have been now engaged with the Greek Government in concerting measures for the release of the Secretaries of Legation for ten days, and every measure that prudence could suggest has been adopted, though the excessive distrust of the brigands has retarded their success."

caster, who is about the only one capable of enlightening us upon this point, maintains a very strict, perhaps a judicious, silence. But there is very little doubt that some one of the prisoners, thinking that by asserting the official dignity of two of their number, he would overawe the brigands, rendered the bandits more exacting than they would otherwise have been, and the position of the captives more difficult than ever. In fact, the rank of the unfortunate victims ultimately proved their ruin. This was the first mistake. But the most serious error of all was the direct correspondence into which Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva entered with the brigands. The receipt of a most abject note from the representatives of England and Italy naturally inflated the minds of those miscreants, who are, in their way, as presumptuous and as bumptious as the proverbial nigger. They at once considered themselves a constituted power, recognised by and corresponding with foreign legations. In fact, Arvanitaki used Mr. Erskine as his "homme d'affaires" in Athens, requesting him, through Mr. Herbert (No. 3, p. 11), to see about the purchase of some ornaments or the return of the money he had entrusted for that purpose to a certain Naso Yani Kosta. It is a wonder that after all this exchange of polite messages with the representative of Queen Victoria, Tako* condescended to have anything to do with King George's ministers. We can fully understand how, after the first letter from the Ambassadors, the brigands went on steadily increasing their demands, and adding condition upon condition, and insult upon insult. The readiness, nay, the precipitance, with which Mr. Erskine promised that there "would be no difficulty as to the payment of the money," must have convinced them that they had asked too little, and they determined to make the most of such a rich haul—including a live Lord and two Secretaries of Legation. To their demand for an amnesty for themselves they added the condition of the release of three of their confederates in prison; and as a last

* Tako, the Christian name of the chief of the band, is a diminutive, in its second stage, so to say, of Demetrius—Demetrakos—Takos.

drop to the cup of indignity, they subsequently demanded, first the suspension of all pursuit of, and then the extension of the amnesty to, all brigands all over the kingdom. For all this we have to thank Mr. Erskine's want of tact and his complete moral prostration. If he had at all profited by his long residence in Greece, Mr. Erskine ought to have seen that his plan was to remain completely in the background, and while conferring with the Greek Government, to let the brigands understand that they would have to deal with the powers of the land, and that they could expect no exceptional immunity because they had captured an English Lord and two members of foreign legations. But once in the exulting humour in which Mr. Erskine's weakness put the brigands, it was impossible to bring them back to reason. They looked hopefully to the coercion which England and Italy would apply to their own country; for, as Count Della Minerva says (No. 9, p. 7), they

"Constantly repeated to the prisoners that their lives were valuable enough for the Italian and English Governments to use strong pressure on that of Greece, in order to make it alter both constitution and law."

They did not hesitate to demand the convocation of an extraordinary national assembly for the modification of the constitution in their favour; and failing this, they claimed that the English and Italian fleets should destroy Greece.*

We cannot quite blame the brigands for their mad demands; Mr. Erskine is responsible for having awakened such pretensions, which by the way were rapturously applauded and approved by the English press as displaying a surprising amount of "thorough good sense" on the part of Arvanitaki.†

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* Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine on the 17th April (No. 3, page 3):—

"I had better tell you what he (the chief) says you ought to do, and you will judge how impracticable his views are. He says that the representatives of England and Italy should say to the Greek Government that they do not care at all how the thing is done, whether by amnesty or no, whether an amnesty be legal or not; but that all they require is the return of their people, *faute de quoi* the fleets of England and Italy will destroy Greece."

† "L." writes to the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 20th May:—

"The man who spoke with the most sense on this subject undoubtedly was

Besides, the spirit in which these demands were put forward is much the same as the way in which Lord Clarendon urged the granting of an amnesty in their favour. And to this we now come.

THE AMNESTY.

The refusal of this amnesty which the brigands made a condition of the release of their prisoners is one of the chief accusations brought against the Greek Government. It has been said that the scruples of the administration were affected and hypocritical; the question was characterized as "miserable," and the ground of the refusal "pitiful, absurd, ridiculous." The thing, it has been urged, amounted to a "simple sacrifice of vanity," and the adherence to the constitution was nothing but "absurd punctiliousness" (*Morning Post*, 26th April and 2nd May). Astonishment has been expressed how the "weak Government of the Hellenes would have dared to hesitate" and "desire to redeem its own paltry reputation" (*Standard*, 9th May); and some have gone so far as to suggest that the amnesty was purposely refused, that the massacre of the prisoners might be brought about and the ransom saved. Such imputations are beneath notice.* We therefore come to the comparatively

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the robber chief. 'Nonsense,' said he, 'listening to what those fellows who call themselves Ministers up at Athens tell you about their laws, which they are constantly violating.' Let your representative say to them, I will not hear a word you have to say. Give me my people; you can do so, and if you don't I'll make your lives responsible for theirs."

* The *Standard* of the 27th April said that the Greek Government refused the amnesty because "perhaps the brigands had not regularly paid the ministers their *tantième*." And "LL.D.," writing to the same paper (1 May), makes the following remarks:—

"The Government has clearly made itself accomplice of the murderers. It has been the custom in Greece, so long as that *refugium peccatorum* has possessed a constitutional Government, for the ministers to eke out their slender salaries by the black mail paid to them by the robbers for immunity. In the present case the robbers and ministers could not agree over the plunder.

"When Lord Clarendon proposed to transport the brigands to a place of safety, he, with the best intentions in the world, sealed the fate of the prisoners;

more rational arguments. To us, and as we have seen from the foreign press, to all others but Englishmen, this demand on the part of the English Foreign Secretary has caused surprise not unmixed with indignation. It is inconceivable how the *par excellence* constitutional Government of England and the English press—that champion of constitutionalism all over the world—could urge upon any country, however weak or ill-governed, the infraction of its laws and of its constitutions. We can to a certain extent account for it by considering the anxiety and anguish occasioned by the extremity of the peril in which the lives of the prisoners were at the time. But, however natural this may be for the common run of men, it is certainly no sufficient justification for the dictatorial tone of the memorable despatch of Lord Clarendon—less so when it is borne in mind that the noble Lord is a member of a Cabinet who claim for themselves all that is most liberal and constitutional. Lord Clarendon declares (No. 1, p. 2) that—

"The Greek Constitution had so frequently been violated by the Government in regard to matters of internal administration, that he could not listen to a plea founded on it as an excuse for not relieving the British subjects whose lives were in imminent danger, by complying with the demands of the brigands for an amnesty as a part of the price of their surrender."

And this was echoed by all the organs of the English press.* We consider the principle contained in this despatch—namely,

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the robbers were to get safe off with their plunder, and there would be no hold upon them by Government to make them refund the share claimed by his Hellenic Majesty's ministers.

"On the other hand, let it be supposed that the amnesty had been granted, then again the lever on these ruffians would have been lost; they would have had enough to live the rest of their lives without plunder, and having an immunity for all past offences, would have lived in clover and safety.

"Again, had the amnesty been granted, the ministers foresaw that ultimately the Government would have had to repay the ransom, in which, however, the ministers would not have been able to participate.

"Lastly, there are more brigands in Greece at present than his Hellenic Majesty's ministers require. They are a drug in the market, and Government are not sorry to diminish the number; in other words, to use their own expression, 'our table is small, and there are many to sit at it.'"

* The following are only a few specimens:—The king and his ministers

that because a law was once broken, it may be transgressed again with impunity—a mischievous and pernicious one, especially when enunciated by a minister of the British crown. We also submit that the noble Lord's reasoning is neither logical nor equitable, and certainly not constitutional; and we further maintain that it is unsupported by facts. When, how, and by whom was the Greek constitution broken? Which of its articles has been violated? Who is the culpable minister who transgressed its provisions? These are questions which ought to have been anticipated when so serious a charge was made. There is nothing so easy as to put forward loose accusations unsupported by evidence. We declare that no article of the present Greek constitution was ever violated, and we challenge those who assert the contrary to point out to us a single instance in which this has been done. Lord Clarendon, in explaining in the House of Lords the course he had taken, said, by way of exemplifying such an infraction of the constitution—

"I especially bore in mind that only three years ago a large number of notorious brigands were released and sent to Crete (cheers) . . . and I did think that a similar course might be taken when the lives of my fellow countrymen were at stake."

The noble Lord has been very unfortunate in the precedent

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have the effrontery to talk of a constitution! The Greek constitution apparently admits of practices which the most imperfectly civilised nations might well be ashamed of (*Morning Post*, 29th April). The Greek Government sacrificed the lives of the unfortunate captives to their vanity, under cover of an article of the Constitution, which pretended love for constitutional forms would not permit them to violate (*Morning Post*, 27th April). What was their disgrace to us? We were demanding our countrymen, and should not have cared one iota in what coin of Greece the price might have been paid (*Standard*, 26th April).—Get the poor gentlemen out of the hands of these miscreants. Don't talk to us trash about your constitutional scruples, as though Greece were a civilised nation (*Telegraph*, 27th April).—Nothing but the most stolid indifference and profound stupidity could have induced the Greek Government to dally with the question (*Globe*, 27th April).—We treat with just contempt the affected scruples of the Greek Government (*Saturday Review*, 28th May).

he appealed to, notwithstanding the cheers with which his remarks were greeted. Some malefactors who, we admit, did go to Crete in 1867—as malefactors always flock wherever there is revolution and disorganisation—were not *released* nor *sent*. They were outlaws at large, who proceeded of their own accord to Crete, as offering at that time a field for their depredations. Of course, they went with the avowed purpose of aiding the insurgents, and endeavoured to identify themselves with the *bona fide* volunteers, for thus they had more chance both of committing outrages without being suspected, and of returning to Greece undetected. This is precisely what occurs in every revolution all over the world, and we should like to hear of a single revolt in which criminals of every description did not take advantage of the disordered state of the law to break loose and commit all kinds of violence. This was the case with these men also. The Greek Government did not "*ship*" them, as it has been often repeated.* But even allowing for the sake of argument that they were actually shipped to Crete by the Greek authorities—that is not amnestising them, but an act in every respect identical to the proposal of Lord Clarendon himself to take Arvanitaki's band, with their rich booty and with military honours, on board an English ship of war and land them at Malta. The noble Lord's parallel, therefore, which was cheered, and which was taken up and re-echoed by all the newspapers, breaks down completely.

The only other authority which assures us that such amnesties had been given on other occasions is the brigand chief whose notions upon the subject Mr. Herbert transmitted to Mr. Erskine. The English papers, which have all along expressed admiration

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* Hobart Pasha first informed the British public of his achievements over "the brigand patriots in Crete." But Hobart Pasha's stories can have no weight with thinking men. At best they are *ex parte* evidence. Hobart Pasha left the service of his country and undertook, for a consideration, to do the dirty work of Turkey—a task which he is performing with credit to his known abilities and with satisfaction to his employers. No one ever doubted the noble Pasha's capacities in that line of business.

for Tako's logic, jumped at this at once. They have not taken into consideration, however, that as Tako was pleading on his own behalf, he would not be very scrupulous to assert anything that might turn to his advantage. Since the Constitution of 1864 was voted, pardon has only been granted subsequent to judgment and conviction, in the same way that the sentences of criminals are commuted at discretion by every civilised government.

But even supposing that amnesties, such as the one demanded, had been given before, it matters nothing; for to refuse them at last was to return to the right path. And even allowing that the Constitution was sinned against on former occasions, does this afford a reason why it should be deliberately broken again at the bidding of a powerful state? Surely there is a difference between a culpable, but perhaps unpremeditated, and a cool, deliberate, and preconcerted transgression of the law.

But, it is urged, the amnesty ought to have been granted at any cost, and on the re-assembling of the legislative body a bill of indemnity might have been passed. Those who counsel this course, certainly forget that there is nothing more pernicious for a young state than to facilitate the commission of offences against the law by a guarantee of subsequent pardon. If this was done at the bidding of a band of outlaws, what guarantee would we have against the resumption of the same course for the convenience of every other minister? And where, then, would the line be drawn between an excusable necessity and the pleasure of any unscrupulous miscreant who might have the power to enforce a similar course?

The circumstances also under which Article 39 of the Constitution* has been framed are passed over in convenient silence by the advocates of a bill of indemnity. By the former constitution the King was empowered to pardon any crime, even

* "The king has the right to pardon, commute, and lessen punishments awarded by the courts of law, excepting those pronounced against Ministers. He has also the right to grant amnesty, *but only in case of political crimes*, under the responsibility of the Ministers."

before the tribunals had pronounced upon it. But King Otho made such free use of his prerogative, by pardoning brigands and other criminals, either related or friendly to men whom he desired to propitiate and buy over to his interests, that the National Assembly, in framing the constitution of 1864,—

"Forbade the crown to grant amnesties for civil crimes, that men in power might be deprived of the means of employing brigandage in order to nullify the advantages of a free government by making favour more powerful than law."

How then, we ask, could he overstep this limit for the first time in favour of that very crime, to check which this law had been framed? It would have been perfectly impossible to pass a bill of indemnity for such an act through a Greek House of Representatives. And the amnesty itself would most probably not have been valid.* Yet the effects even of an attempt at amnestising brigands would have been to demoralise and disorganise the country completely. A premium would have been set upon the head of every well-to-do citizen, and every foreign traveller; any malefactor would have only to secure his man, and, holding a pistol at his head, demand, not only a heavy ransom, but an amnesty also, both for his past and his present offences.† It would be establishing the principle that every

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* Count Della Minerva says, in his despatch of the 23rd April (No. 9, p. 7): —"The Government has declared its inability to accord what was demanded (the amnesty), and had, moreover, stated that were it to give way, its acts would be null, and without effect, when the time for putting them into execution arrived."

† On the 16th April Count Della Minerva wrote to the Italian Foreign Secretary (No. 9, p. 6), as follows:—"This circumstance may embolden some other robber-chief to attempt a capture, which may place him in the same favourable position as is now occupied by Dimitri Arvanitaki."

The Athens correspondent of the *Times*, a gentleman by no means favourable to Greek interests, but an authority considered by Englishmen as unimpeachable, writing on the 12th May, gave the subjoined opinion on the subject:—

"A review of all the circumstances which have come to their knowledge has probably already convinced English statesmen that an amnesty would have been an impolitic and dangerous, as well as an illegal, measure. * * *

"If an amnesty had been granted to the band of the Arvanitaioi, it could not have been refused to the band of Spanos; and it is the general opinion

ruffian capable of committing any atrocity was entitled, for this very reason, to amnesty. Every hope of establishing order ends,

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that in a few weeks Bank Directors, Ministers, and men of substance would have been seized in the streets of Athens openly, with a threat that if pursuit should be attempted, or a ransom not promptly paid, the captives would be murdered."

And it is quite refreshing to find one English journal bold and sincere enough to say plainly what every honest man must have inwardly thought upon this subject. But we could not expect less from the *Economist*:—

"But what can be said to excuse the deliberate proposal of Lord Clarendon to extort from the Greek Government the promise of an amnesty to these ruffians, even though it were the only chance of saving valuable English lives? Will it be said, as some have said, that the promise might have been given and then broken as soon as the English prisoners were in safety, that no good faith is due to men of bad faith? That is a mild way of saying that we were perfectly right in pressing on the Greek Government to give itself the lie, and put itself deliberately on the same footing with the brigands whom it professes to desire to suppress, rather than that three valuable English lives and one valuable Italian life should be sacrificed. We hold that if that be morally defensible, it is morally defensible to say at once that no crime should be scrupled at, at least by any Government that has not a reputation to uphold, to save English life; and that we should never hesitate to press the commission of a gross crime on such a Government with such an object in view. It is far less unworthy, no doubt, to maintain that we demanded the amnesty, meaning it to be given in good faith and its promises adhered to by the Greek Government. But what does even that course really mean except that we positively demanded from the Greek Government to add one more to the securities of brigandage, nay, to give it a vast additional impulse? What we demanded was a fresh proof that successful brigands may always ensure their own safety by making amnesty a condition of the return of their prisoners, together with a very striking fresh illustration of the reward which may accompany the immunity. Moreover, how could it ever be possible for us to blame Greece for doing for Greeks or citizens of any other nation what we tried to compel her to do for Englishmen? If we were right in considering the amnesty and reward of the robbers a mere feather in the scale against our countrymen's lives, how should Greece be wrong in applying the same rule to similar cases for the future? How could we for very shame say—'When the lives of Englishmen are at stake, all the moral considerations which restrain the Government from amnestying robbers and would-be murderers should be waived at once, but you shall not apply the same rule to the lives of Greeks without incurring our constant reproaches and remonstrances?' We confess that though Lord Clarendon's action in the matter may be excused by the strong personal feelings which must necessarily have been excited under an emergency so painful, we cannot conceive conduct less open to calm justification on any, even plausible, moral grounds. * * * * * *

if criminals are to obtain, from the very magnitude of their crime, impunity for its commission. No Christian people, no government making any pretence to civilisation, could entertain such a monstrosity. It would be legalising violence, the signing a convention, in terms of equality, with crime. But it is this very consideration that has been scoffed at. "Brigandage in Greece, it is said, is an institution; it is, therefore, ridiculous to make a show of conscientious scruples when it is a question of the lives of innocent men." It is a calumny to assert that brigandage was ever acquiesced in or tolerated in Greece. But to this we will revert more specially and in detail later on. We need only remark here that arguments such as these—if they are worth the name—prove how utterly weak and untenable is the position taken up by Lord Clarendon and his supporters.

Supposing now, for argument's sake, that the Greek Government had acceded to this demand, what would have been the result? To what conclusion would Englishmen first, of all others, arrive? Simply this—that the Government was in connivance with the brigands, that it entrapped their countrymen by false assurances of security, and that it was a preconcerted plan that the brigands should insist on an amnesty, besides a heavy ransom, to be subsequently shared. This is no exaggerated estimate of the conclusions that would have been drawn, considering that even now the Greek Government is in the same breath accused of "connivance with the brigands," and of "ill-timed display of zeal and energy."

But would the English Government—would any Government—have entertained propositions similar to those of the brigands?

This has been answered in the affirmative by a certain journal,

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"All we wish to point out now is, that whether Greece be liable or not to us and to Italy for what has occurred, public opinion in this country is hardly in a calm or healthy state when, instead of excusing Lord Clarendon from committing a very great error in a very great emergency, it openly endorses all he did, without taking the slightest account of the immorality of the proceeding, and then cries out for a species of vengeance, which, however striking and theatrical, would probably greatly enhance the evil."

and as a proof, Broadhead was mentioned, "who was pardoned simply to obtain evidence." This is nothing to the point. Broadhead was in the hands of the law, already judged and condemned, not defying it at the head of an armed band, and dictating his own conditions. An analogous case would have been, if a body of Fenians had carried off to the mountains of Kerry a couple of Americans, and, as the conditions of their release, demanded an amnesty in favour of themselves, and of other Fenians in prison—say Rossa—both for past crimes and for that offence. Would Englishmen grant it, and how would they answer any remonstrances of the American Government, urging such a course? But we forget the bitter truth that there is one law for the strong and another for the weak!

It is a question for Englishmen themselves to answer whether, under exactly the same circumstances, a similar course would have been pursued towards a stronger Government. Evidently the Greek Government had already uncomplainingly tolerated an amount of interference which other governments have been known to forbid, and which Englishmen, above all, would have stoutly resisted. Nevertheless, in pressing his demand for an amnesty, Lord Clarendon declares (No. 1, p. 2):—

"That her Majesty's Government consider that they are justified in calling on the Greek Government to consent to *any measures* for the release of the prisoners."

Upon what exceptional grounds such justification rested we are not informed, but we naturally conclude that it is the strength of England and the weakness of Greece. We can only retort that had that despatch been addressed to a stronger government, it would have been followed by an apology for interference on behalf of civil criminals; and we will remind our readers that in the case of Mr. Moens, when the Italian Government distinctly forbade foreigners to treat with the brigands of the country—such a course being considered inconsistent with the position and dignity of an independent government—and peremptorily refused a pardon, no such demands were made upon that country by England.

Also let Englishmen not forget that it is only a few weeks since Mr. Motley's house was leisurely broken into by a party of burglars, who carried off his plate and other valuables. Now, supposing these men, on being pursued, to have hid themselves, and to have made it a condition for restoring the property, that they should receive a full pardon; and supposing that on your refusal, the American Minister publicly proposed to carry them off in an American ship of war—what would the English Government have answered? Would they have tolerated such interference with their police. The English public would have resented the very mention of such an indignity, and condemned the proposal as insulting to the dignity of this country. They would have appealed to the most fundamental principle of international law—that every nation is omnipotent within its own territory. Greece, however, meekly ceded the demand of England to carry off the brigands to Malta. And yet England has no more to complain for the want of security in the high roads of Greece, than America has to reproach this country with negligence and inefficiency in the police of its greatest and most opulent city.

Such were some of the objections which Lord Clarendon characterised as "futile, and under the circumstances miserable."

We may justly retort that the noble Lord argued apparently with no more regard to justice and propriety than Arvanitaki himself; that he was anything but fastidious as to the choice of means; that his policy was one of conspicuous and unscrupulous selfishness (and unfortunately this is not the only instance in which we have found the action of the English Government abroad to be such, when English interests are concerned); and that, while striving to protect the lives of his countrymen from the dangers of brigandage, he deliberately attempted to set a premium upon the commission of such crimes, and to give a vast additional impulse to brigandage in Greece.

It is, therefore, satisfactory to find that even the members of the British Legation in Athens, implicitly confessed the demands of their superior to have been glaringly unjustifiable and quite

untenable. Mr. Erskine, in his first letter to the brigands (No. 1, p. 6), said :—

"You must not insist on an amnesty, which the Government have not the power to grant."

And to Lord Clarendon he wrote, on the 14th April (No. 1, p. 5), that the amnesty

"Unfortunately *is absolutely* prohibited by Article 39 of the Constitution."

Count Boyl also appears to have confessed that—

"What the brigands demanded could not be given." (No. 13, p. 6.)

Mr. Lloyd, who, be it remembered, was a lawyer, says (No. 3 p. 4) :—

"This (the amnesty), in the legal sense of the word, the King has no power to give."

And Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 2, p. 1) :—

"I have explained to him (the brigand chief) that the first (the amnesty) is impossible."

Englishmen might take a lesson from the noble self-restraint evinced in the last letters of poor Mr. Herbert. These letters breathe a spirit of almost punctilious respect for the self-esteem of the Greek Government, and even intimate candidly that there are certain sacrifices which could not possibly be asked for, even as the price of the English prisoners' lives.*

We would also ask Englishmen to compare the moderate language of the Italian despatches to the overbearing and dictatorial tone adopted by Lord Clarendon. Yet the Italians were as keenly interested in the safety of their countryman, as Englishmen in the release of theirs. Signor Visconti Venosta instructs Count Della Minerva (No. 9, p. 2) simply

"To urge the Greek Government to provide means for hastening the liberation of Count Boyl."

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* A correspondent of the *Scotchman*, a countryman of the victims writing, on the 13th April, from the scene of these events, says :—"It is difficult to suppose that any Government can be so weak or so wicked as to accept the demand for an amnesty."

And the Italian minister at Athens unhesitatingly owns (No. 9, p. 3), that

"To grant an amnesty is contrary to the Constitution, which neither the Chamber nor the Ministry are able to infringe, *nor can any modification be introduced into it till four years hence.*"

This last and very important provision contained in the Greek Charter has been completely ignored by those who advocated a bill of indemnity, and those who applauded the suggestion of Arvanitaki for the convocation of an extraordinary National Assembly, that it might alter the Constitution so as to suit his pleasure.

But the more we look into the matter, the more we see the ridiculous absurdity of those demands. We could go on piling argument upon argument against such untenable pretensions, but we think that even what we have already submitted completely falls into the shade and becomes of secondary importance, when we remind Englishmen of one great fact that must remain before them, an insurmountable obstacle and an unassailable rampart—their own country's honour and the sacred word of the Brother of their future Queen. When in 1862, the throne of Greece was vacated, and British diplomacy took upon itself to find a king for us, the crown was offered first to the Duke of Coburg, who made two conditions for its acceptance—1st. That Otho should be induced to resign; and 2nd. That a few British regiments should be placed at his disposal. What did England then reply? She rejected the Duke's conditions as inadmissible, for they infringed upon the constitutional rights of the Greeks to dispose of their own destinies. And when, later, the Ionian Islands were handed over to Greece, England laid one condition—That Greece henceforth should be governed constitutionally. It was under this condition that King George ascended the throne, and took his oath to the New Charter. Is it, then, a minister of this same England which lays but one condition as the price of a rich gift, that now at the bidding of a handful of ruffianly miscreants, peremptorily asks us to transgress our solemn com-

pact with her, and teaches our young King to violate his oath ? *

For the sake of Englishmen, let us no longer dwell upon this subject. Would that we had to defend ourselves but upon this count alone, and that our position throughout the whole case were equally strong. The unfortunate issue of the negotiations ought not to decide this part of the question, nor ought it to be allowed to influence our judgment; and it is hard to lay it as a crime to any Government that it has not broken one of its most fundamental laws at the command of the representative of a foreign state; and has not offered a premium to every malefactor in the land. No one, therefore, who looks at the matter dispassionately, and has any regard for justice, will hesitate, not only to justify the refusal of a pardon, but to compliment the Greek Government on the firmness it displayed under circumstances the most trying, and under pressure the most hard to withstand. As for Englishmen, we have no doubt but that, long before this sad event fades out of sight, they will heartily wish that Lord Clarendon's despatch was never penned, and that no argument was afforded to their opponents whereby to assert that their vaunted respect for constitutional government, and adherence to parliamentary usages, is but superficial and self-

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* We subjoin an extract from a recent letter of the Athens correspondent of the *Times*, and it is with just pride that we can point to the noble conduct of our young King, and his resistance to Lord Clarendon's demands :—

"It is generally difficult to ascertain what is really public opinion in Greece, for publicity is so rarely and so tardily given to authentic sources of information, that party passions are roused before public opinion can be formed. But on this occasion public feeling was so strongly affected that public opinion was pronounced decisively, and it was against granting an amnesty. The first objection ought to be conclusive in England and all law-governed countries. An amnesty would have been an illegal act. . . . The King was called upon to decide the question for himself, for he could easily have found politicians at Athens who would have accepted office, and signed a decree of amnesty. He decided that he could not violate the law, and all his peaceful subjects are persuaded that he acted wisely."

This fact has been passed over by the English press with convenient silence.

interested, and that as soon as it is to their immediate advantage to break through those rules, they do not scruple to do so.

Before we leave this subject we have one more remark to make.

Who first suggested the amnesty? The first conditions for the release of the prisoners, of which Lord Muncaster was the bearer, were made before the brigands had any of the alleged communications with persons in Athens. The bargaining was carried on between the captives and the brigands, and a few hours after the ladies were released, it appears that they agreed upon either an amnesty or £25,000. Mr. Erskine says (No. 1 p. 5):—

"It now appears that after the departure of the ladies on Monday night, it was discovered that there had been a misunderstanding as to the sum fixed as a ransom, which was £50,000, and not £32,000, as had at first been supposed. After much negotiation, however, the brigands agreed to reduce their demand to £25,000, or a free pardon by Government."

And Lord Muncaster, in the letter to his brother, published in the *Times* of the 29th April, relates the circumstances thus:—

"After several hours' talk between our dragoman and the two captains of the band, the ransom was fixed at £25,000 or a full pardon. The five of us then consulted who was to go to Athens, and with a most generous self-sacrifice they chose me, chiefly on Constance's account. I was to get or send either the ransom or amnesty."

It is plain that the captives endeavoured to lower as much as possible the exorbitant ransom demanded. They must have used all those arguments which they thought most likely to influence the minds of the brigands, and the more we look into the matter the more we are convinced that, as there were amongst them two members of the Diplomatic Body, they supposed that the Government would be anxious to effect their release, even by exceptional means. It must have therefore occurred to them that an amnesty for twenty-one malefactors would not have appeared a disproportionate price to pay for an English lord, two Secretaries of Legation, and an English

lawyer. Lord Muncaster, therefore, seems to have proposed to the brigands the alternative of an amnesty, and was entrusted with carrying the proposal into effect.

Domenico, in his deposition (No. 13, p. 6), says :—

"I had heard it said that the brigands in the first instance demanded £50,000 sterling, without speaking of the amnesty."

The brigand, Alexis Tzonnis, deposed (No. 7, p. 9) :—

"That at first Tako had accepted Lord Muncaster's proposal to have either the ransom of £25,000 or the amnesty, but afterwards he repented, and imposed both the conditions for the release of the prisoners.

The evidence of the brigand, Costa, is to the same effect :—

"That the idea of the amnesty was first given to the chiefs by Lord Muncaster himself."

This is certainly the evidence of men charged with a heinous crime, but that does not prove that their depositions are in every particular false; nor do we see of what advantage it would have been to them to attribute the suggestion of the amnesty to one of the captives, unless they were convinced that that was actually the case.

Lord Muncaster has, up to this, been very eager in contradicting any misapprehension that existed in the despatches; but to this he has given no denial whatever. This is a serious question, and so long as the matter is not cleared up, the very grave responsibility of involving the whole question in a difficulty which has proved fatal, rests upon his Lordship.

THE PROPOSED EXPATRIATION OF THE BRIGANDS.

THIS measure, notwithstanding all that has been written to the contrary, was first suggested by Mr. Erskine, who at the very outset of the negotiations telegraphed to Lord Clarendon, inquiring (No. 1, p. 2)—

"Whether her Majesty's Government, if the consent of the Greek Government could be obtained to such a course, would consent to allow the brigands, or, at all events, some of them, to be conveyed to Malta, or some other place of safety, in a British ship of war."

To this Lord Clarendon answered, on the 21st April :—

"I authorise you to say that, if the Greek Government would consent to it, you might make known to the brigands that a safe conveyance would be afforded to them to Malta, should they desire to avail themselves of it, on board a British ship of war, if the prisoners were immediately released, and arrived in safety at Athens."

And in noticing Mr. Brailas-Armeni's intimation that

"The Greek Government were perfectly willing to close their eyes as regards any measures which the British Legation might take for inducing the brigands to give up their prisoners, by engaging, if they did so, to afford any of them who might wish to seek their safety in leaving Greece, the means of doing so in a British ship;"

the noble Lord added :—

"I told M. Brailas-Armeni that such a contingency had already been provided for, and that Mr. Erskine had applied for and obtained authority to give, with the consent of the Greek Government, a passage to Malta to all or any of the brigands who might desire to leave Greece."

The Italian Minister gives, as usual, a far more straightforward account of the matter. In his despatch of the 23rd April (No. 9, p. 7), he says :—

"Then the English Minister, in order to overcome these demands [for an amnesty, etc.], proposed to convey the brigands to a place of safety by means of an English war steamer, which was expected to arrive every moment, and he telegraphed his intention to his Government."

So that this measure evidently originated with the English, not the Greek, Government.

It is edifying, however, as an eminently characteristic circumstance, to compare the levity with which a deliberate violation of the Greek constitution has been urged, to the great hesitation and all but insurmountable scruples with which it is decided to accept, on board an English ship of war, the valuable cargo of Arvanitaki's band. In directing Mr. Erskine to use this means of solving the difficulty, Lord Clarendon writes on the 21st April, that

"Her Majesty's Government could not conceal from themselves the extreme and unusual character of the steps they were taking."

And in his first speech in the House of Lords (29th April), the noble Earl said :—

"I assure you I was fully sensible of what I may call the indignity and humiliation of consenting to convey away in safety these brigands."

On the 21st April (No. 3, p. 8), Mr. Erskine informed Lord Clarendon that "he assumed the *grave responsibility* of treating with the brigands" on these terms, and that it was only on Mr. Erskine's "responsibility and requisition" that Commander Prowse of the "Cockatrice" would receive those scoundrels on board, and adds :—

"I trust that your lordship has not refused to sanction this measure, but an immediate decision on my part was indispensable to save the lives of the captives, and if I have done wrong, I can only appeal to the indulgence of her Majesty's Government."

Writing to Mr. Herbert (No. 5, p. 3), he expresses a fear that he "may be disavowed and blamed for this"; a fear which, in his despatch of the 28th (No. 5, p. 2), he explains to Lord Clarendon by saying :—

"I trust you will bear in mind that I had not then the least reason for supposing that her Majesty's Government would sanction the proposed embarkation of the brigands. In fact, the measure was one of so unusual a nature that I hardly hoped it would be permitted."

And yet these same gentlemen, whose conscientious scruples, as to a comparatively harmless and a most necessary measure, are so great, calmly insist upon a far greater enormity being perpetrated by others. This is "straining at the gnat and swallowing the camel." In fact, the whole argument was this :—

"We are holy, righteous, and immaculate, and we must not stain our spotless hands; but you—you are of no account; we rule that you have sinned before; we disapprove of it, and whenever we think fit we rate you soundly for it, and admonish you to follow our own sacred example; but just now it suits us that you should sin again, and as it is a question of interest with us, you must do so."*

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* We subjoin an extract from an article in the *Times* of the 29th April.

"Undoubtedly the scheme was questionable, as may be seen at once, if we consider what would have been the effect if it had been successful. We are afraid there would have been no end to the ridicule excited by the transport of a whole band of brigands with £25,000 of British money and their settlement on British soil."

PARDON AFTER TRIAL BY DEFAULT.

EVEN the brigands appear to have been convinced that an amnesty was impossible, and they therefore suggested that they should be tried by a Court of Assize, to be specially convoked at Oropos for that purpose. They do not seem to have had quite clear ideas as to how it was to be done; but as they would not surrender nor trust themselves to the authorities, even on a promise being given by the King that they would be pardoned, if they submitted to a regular trial, we conclude that they meant the court to assemble at Oropos, and they either to watch the proceedings from a distance, or to put in an appearance at pleasure, provided with arms and munitions of war. Colonel Théagenis, in his report of the interview with Tako, says (No. 3, p. 11):—

"Finally, we came to speak of the plan of giving them a pardon, and I assured them that this was possible, pardon being one of the royal prerogatives, but their previous arrest was necessary. 'Then let a Court of Assize come here and try to condemn us,' replied they, 'that the law may be fully carried out.'"

And on the same subject, Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine on the 16th April (No. 3):—

"You mentioned that the king would pardon them, if they were tried in Athens. They say they might be tried in their absence and pardoned."

And on the 20th again he wrote (No. 3, p. 8):—

"He (Tako) and his band will not make submission at Athens or to any force of the Greek Government. What they demand is, that a *procureur du roi* should be sent to them, and that they should be tried and condemned here, and then pardoned. Such trial would, of course, be a farce, if ever it could be arranged, though in substance it is no more a farce than their trial at Athens would be, if they had the promise of a pardon. This is what I understand them to say now."

To this Mr. Erskine replied on the 21st (No. 5, p. 3), as follows:—

"In the first place the idea of a special Court of Assize at Oropos, is, as you must have foreseen, altogether out of the question. You say yourself that

they would not surrender to the authorities or a day, whereas all the usual forms would have to be gone through, and, in short, M. Privilegios, the first lawyer in Greece, has declared the thing impossible."

Count Della Minerva, in his despatch of the 23rd April (No. 9, p. 7), says :—

"The pardon cannot be granted except after a formal trial, and on the condition that the culprits give themselves up. Both the English ministers and I had given the assurance that the royal pardon would be granted, but we added that a trial was necessary."

Mr. Erskine wrote to Lord Clarendon on the 21st (No. 3, p. 1), as follows :—

"The latter (the pardon) is unlawful, as the crown cannot grant a pardon until the accused person has appeared before the competent tribunal, and been tried and convicted—a process in which these men have not the least intention to acquiesce."

And again, in a later despatch of the same date (No. 3, p. 7) :—

"M. Della Minerva and I immediately met the ministers in council. M. Privilegios, the Procureur-Général of the Court of Cassation, was sent for,* and he concurred with the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior that the proposal made by the brigands that a Court of Assize should be held at Oropos for the trial of the brigands was altogether out of the question."

From the above, it is evident that granting a pardon after trial by default was not possible, and in this the Foreign Ministers concurred; but that the King was ready to pledge his word that the brigands would run no danger in surrendering, but that they would be pardoned, provided they first submitted to a regular trial.

A specimen of the manner in which the English press treated the matter is shown by the following extract from a leader in the *Morning Post* of the 2nd May :—

"Under other circumstances it would be difficult to advocate such mockery of justice; but graver interest [that is English interest] than the dignity of Greek justice were at stake . . . and, therefore, the Greek Government should have consented to the demands of the brigands."

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* In this instance again Count Della Minerva is more accurate; in his despatch of the 23rd April, he says, "At my instigation Mr. Privilegios was called."

We subjoin Mr. Privilegios' most able and exhaustive report upon the subject (from Papers, No. 11, p. 8) :—

"(Traduction.)

"*Athènes, le* $\frac{9}{21}$ *Avril*, 1870.

"A M. le Président du Conseil des Ministres.

"Sur les questions sur lesquelles j'ai été invité à donner mon avis, et qui sont les suivantes :—

"'1. Est-il possible de convoquer une Cour d'Assises au village d'Oropos?

"'2. Les brigands qui s'y trouvent pourraient-ils y être jugés contradictoirement par la Cour d'Assises qu'on y convoquerait, quoique restant en armes et se tenant en distance?

"'3. Enfin, ces brigands, jugés par contumace et condamnés par une Cour d'Assises quelconque, pourraient-ils être graciés après?'

"Sur ces questions, dis-je, j'ai l'honneur de donner mon avis par écrit, de même que je me suis prononcé de vive voix en présence du Conseil des Ministres :—

"1. Aux termes de l'Articles 410, paragraphe 2, du Code d'Instruction Criminelle, le Gouvernement peut, pour des motifs graves, convoquer une Cour d'Assises en quelque lieu qu'il le juge convenable, pourvu seulement qu'en ce lieu il y ait tout ce qu'il faut pour le fonctionnement d'une Cour d'Assises, c'est-à-dire, un dépôt où les accusés puissent être transférés et gardés jusqu'au jour de l'audience, un local tant soit peu approprié aux besoins de la Cour qui y siègera, et, avant tout, un assez grand nombre d'habitants, de ceux qui, aux termes de la loi, ont qualité pour remplir les fonctions de jurés, afin que l'on puisse prendre parmi eux autant de personnes qu'il faudrait pour compléter, au besoin, le nombre voulu de jurés ordinaires et supplémentaires, conformément à l'Article 63 de la Loi sur l'Organisation des Cours et Tribunaux. Or, je pense qu'il n'est pas possible que tout cela se trouve dans le village en question.

"2. Les brigands ne sauraient être jugés contradictoirement par une Cour d'Assises, tant qu'ils demeureraient sous les armes et tout en se tenant à une certaine distance de la Cour, puisque l'un des actes les plus essentiels de l'instruction préalable en matière criminelle est l'emprisonnement préventif des accusés (Articles 207 et 216, paragraphe 1, du Code de l'Instruction Criminelle), et que, en comparaissant à l'audience, les accusés ne sont pas chargés de chaînes, il est vrai, mais se trouvent néanmoins placés sous la garde de la force armée ; les Articles 374 et 422 *in fine* du Code d'Instruction Criminelle sont formels à cet égard. Dès lors il est incontestable que les accusés doivent non-seulement être sans armes, mais encore être sous la main de la justice criminelle et à son entière disposition.

"3. Les brigands dont il s'agit peuvent certes être jugés par contumace et condamnés par n'importe quelle Cour d'Assises, mais des individus condamnés par contumace ne sauraient être graciés, attendu que, d'abord, celui qui en court une condamnation par contumace pour ne s'être pas rendu à l'appel de la justice, et qui dès lors est 'rebelle à la loi,' suivant l'expression des

jurisconsultes Français, n'est pas digne de la faveur du Souverain, et que, en outre, la grâce, à la différence de l'amnistie, qui met fin à toutes poursuites, n'a d'autre effet que de soustraire le condamné à la peine qu'il a encourue, quand l'arrêt qui l'en a frappé est devenu définitif et irrévocable. Or, un arrêt rendu par contumace ne le devient qu'à l'expiration du délai fixé pour la prescription, à savoir, vingt ans à partir du jour où il a été rendu. C'est pourquoi, dès que, avant l'expiration de ce terme de vingt ans, l'individu condamné par contumace s'est présenté volontairement ou a pu être arrêté, il est de plein droit jugé contradictoirement par le juré (Article 470 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle). Les lois Françaises sont, sur ce point d'accord avec notre législation. (Voir Bonneville, page 127; Morin, 'Dictionnaire Criminel,' *in verbo* 'Grâce;' et Dalloz, 'Répertoire,' au même mot 'Grâce,' page 19).

"Pour ce qui concerne l'amnistie, je crois toute application inutile en présence de l'Article 39 de la Constitution, qui porte, en termes formels, que 'le Roi ne peut accorder d'amnistie, si ce n'est pour crimes politiques.'

"Le Procureur-Général prés l'Aréopage (Cour de Cassation),

"(Signé) C. PRIVILEGIO."

THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS.

HAVING disposed of such questions as would impede a connected examination of the subsequent events, we now resume the thread of our investigation.

On the 16th April, Mr. Erskine wrote Lord Clarendon (No. 2, p. 1):—

"The emissaries sent by the Greek Government to treat with the brigands returned yesterday morning, without having been able to induce them to release their prisoners. . . . . But Mr. Zaïmis sent back his emissaries last night to resume negotiations, which he does not doubt will eventually be successful, and even he hopes that they will return to Athens this evening with a satisfactory answer."

This was while the brigands were at Keramides, their first halting place, about thirteen miles from Athens. But at the end of the same despatch Mr. Erskine adds:—

"This morning the Minister of War, General Soutzo, called upon me to say that a gendarme had arrived with a message to the effect that in the course of yesterday the band had been observed near a place called Agios Mercurios, making towards Oropo, a village about twenty-five miles due north of Athens, near the channel between Eubœa and Attica, and General Soutzo presumes

that their intention is to place their prisoners under shelter in the neighbourhood of Oropo, where they will have greater facilities of escaping than they had at Keramides. Two of the prisoners were on horseback, and I do not feel the least apprehension for their safety, as the brigands are now aware that they can, when they choose, obtain an exorbitant ransom, with liberty to convey it beyond the reach of the Greek authorities."

The brigands established themselves at Oropos, and negotiations were resumed. Mr. Erskine writes on the 21st of April (No. 3, p. 1):—

"The difficulty still is that the brigands insist on either an amnesty or a free pardon after trial and conviction by default; whereas the Government say that the former is directly contrary to an article of the Constitution, and the latter unlawful, as the Crown cannot grant a pardon until the accused person has appeared before the competent tribunal, and been tried and convicted; a process in which these men have not the least intention to acquiesce. If the brigands will content themselves with the exorbitant ransom which the prisoners have already consented to pay, the Government will give hostages who would accompany the band to the frontier, or until they feel completely safe. But neither Mr. Herbert nor the Government emissaries have been able to induce Arvanitakis to accept these terms. . . . . Complaints having been made by the Arvanitei that the agents employed by Government were not of sufficient weight and standing. I persuaded M. Zaïmis to send off Colonel Théagénis, the aide-de-camp of General Church, a gentleman of high character, who is intimately acquainted with the country and with the peculiarities of the people with whom he will have to deal."*

Now, before proceeding, we wish to draw special attention to this fact,—that the appointment of Colonel Théagénis as final negotiator was suggested by Mr. Erskine. He says he "*persuaded*" Mr. Zaïmis to send *him*, and no other, to the brigands. This we wish to be clearly understood, as the failure of the negotiations carried on by Colonel Théagénis has been turned into an additional ground of complaint against the Greek Government, who were made, with the scrupulousness evinced throughout this discussion, responsible for the choice of that

* As a proof of the conscientious attention with which these matters were treated by English journalists, we may here mention that the *Standard*, in its leader of 25th March, designates Colonel Théagénis as "an actual member of the Cabinet," and a "colleague" of M. Soutzo, Minister for War. Yet these gentlemen have guided public opinion upon this subject!

officer. We do not mean to blame the choice, for it appears to have been such as to give satisfaction to the brigands,* and to have enjoyed the confidence of Mr. Erskine; but if the English public find fault with that choice, let them thank their envoy at Athens. The Italian Minister is, if anything, clearer as to the responsibility of the choice. In his despatch of the 23rd (No. 9, p. 7), he says:—

"Mr. Erskine proposed Lieutenant-Colonel Théagénis, aide-de-camp to General Church, a gentleman who enjoys a good reputation. The Ministry agreed to the choice, and the Colonel was instructed to repair to the house of the English Minister, whither I also went, and was present when the instructions issued by the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, *with our sanction*, were given to him."

But Mr. Erskine is responsible, not only for the choice of the envoy, but also for the instructions given him. The Italian Minister positively states that these were given at Mr. Erskine's residence, and "*with our* (his and Mr. Erskine's) *sanction*."

And Mr. Erskine, in his above-mentioned despatch of the 21st April (No. 3, p. 1), gives the following account of the circumstances:—

"Before starting, Colonel Théagénis received his instructions from the whole Cabinet in my presence, and I am bound to say that complete latitude has been left him as to the terms to be granted, except on the two points to which I have already adverted, either an amnesty or a free pardon after trial and conviction by default, and on which the Government cannot give way. In all other respects he is to be most conciliatory, and he was good enough to promise that he would himself accompany the brigands as a hostage, in case they could be induced to liberate the captives. He left Athens on the 19th instant, and reached the neighbourhood of Oropos the same evening, when he found that the brigands had taken possession of the three best houses in that village, where they had established their captives, threatening, however, that they would carry them off to Thessaly unless the Government complied immediately with their demands. In addition to his letter of credence, and the verbal directions I have already mentioned, Colonel Théagénis is to be guided by an instruction, of which I enclose a translation, and which authorises him to warn the brigands that they will not be allowed to carry off the prisoners from Oropos. A reasonable time will be given for negotiation; but they will be told very positively that the impunity they have hitherto enjoyed must not

* Mr. Lloyd to Lord Muncaster (No. 3, p. 9), "The present envoy is all that could be wished, but he has not done much."

be considered as indefinite; and M. Della Minerva and I did not think that we should be justified in requiring the Government to persist in the conciliatory course they have hitherto pursued, after it had proved abortive. The weather is so unfavourable that I fear the captives would be exposed to such severe privations whilst being dragged about the country day and night, in wet clothes, that we were reluctantly compelled to admit that a firmer tone must now be taken with these miscreants."

The instructions given to Colonel Théagénis, with the concurrence and sanction of the English and Italian Ministers, were these (No. 7, p. 10):—

THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THÉAGÉNIS.

(Translation from the Greek.)

"Athens, 6-18 April, 1870.

"M. Théagénis,—You are aware of the sad event of the capture of two Secretaries of Legation and other travellers. The Ministers of England and Italy have demanded that all pursuit against the Arvaniti should cease, and the Government has been obliged to consent to this whilst the captives remained near Athens. However, in place of remaining at Keramidis, the Arvaniti, taking their prisoners with them, have moved away from the capital, and gone towards Oropos. Emissaries sent to the Arvaniti have persistently declared and explained that the Government could not grant them an amnesty, the constitutional charter not having recognised this right. The Arvaniti persist, however, in demanding that the ransom should be paid, and they should be granted, at the same time, the benefit of an amnesty. Trusting in your skill, we beg you to proceed to Oropos, and give to these men the following assurances and explanations. In the first place, that according to the information which the parties concerned have furnished to us the ransom is ready to be paid to them, and they may take it and go out of Hellenic territory, by land or by sea, even, by embarking on an English ship of war, if this can be done; secondly, that an amnesty is impossible; thirdly, that they should take good care lest any of their prisoners suffer the most trifling injury, that not even the finger-nail of one of them should be hurt; for otherwise the Government will treat them with the utmost rigour; fourthly, that they must on no pretext move from Oropos, in order that the prisoners may readily communicate with their respective Ministers; that if the band should quit Oropos, the Government would be freed from the obligation entered into with the foreign Ministers to suspend all pursuit against the Arvaniti. For the rest, we commit it to your prudence and your skill.

(Signed) "TH. A. ZAÏMIS. G. TOMBASI.
TH. P. DELYANNI. D. SARAVAS.
S. VALAORITY. S. SOUTZO."
A. D. AVGERINOS.

The above is the letter of credence containing the original

directions. But besides these, additional instructions (of which Mr. Erskine attaches a copy to his above despatch, No. 3, p. 4) were sent on to Théagénis after his departure, and consequent upon information received from him to the effect that he suspected a move northwards on the part of the brigands. The following is a copy of these supplementary instructions :—

M. ZAIMIS TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THÉAGÉNIS.

(Translation.)

"M. le Lieutenant-Colonel.—We have noted the letter which you have addressed to Captain S. Apostolides, in which you state that you are afraid of the departure of the Arvanitéï. We hasten to send you instructions, in case of the refusal by the Arvanitéï to deliver up the prisoners on receiving their ransom, to give orders to the military detachments to form a blockade of Oropos, and to prevent with all their forces the escape of the Arvanitéï with their captives. As soon as they are closely shut up in Oropos, you will again make the offer to the Arvanitéï, that they may, after having received the ransom and delivered up the captives, retire whither they will."

Now, we repeat that all these instructions were given to Colonel Théagénis in the presence and with the sanction of the English and Italian Ministers.

Colonel Théagénis, thus instructed, proceeded to Oropos. At the same time Mr. Erskine had requested Mr. F. Noel, an English gentleman residing near Chalcis, in the island of Eubœa, to proceed also to Oropos with a servant of his, who was a brother of the brigand chiefs, and endeavour to come to terms for the release of the prisoners. On approaching Oropos, and on the evening previous to his conference with Tako, Colonel Théagénis says, in his detailed report to Mr. Zaïmis (No. 7, p. 13), that he received

"A letter from Mr. Noel, requesting him, in conformity with the orders which he had received from Mr. Erskine, not to have any communication with the brigands before meeting him."

Mr. Noel, in his letter to his father (No. 13, p. 1), confirms this. He says :—

"I was also informed of the arrival of M. Théagénis at another village, about six miles in the opposite direction, called Marcopoulos. I immediately wrote to him a note informing him of my arrival, and expressing my desire to see him previous to his having an interview with the brigands."

These were evidently precautions dictated by diffidence to every Greek and everything Greek. We ourselves are glad that such precautions were taken, for thus Englishmen cannot impute any trickery in the prosecution of these negotiations.

On his arrival at Oropos, Colonel Théagénis found Mr. Noel already there; and he says, in his report (No. 3, p. 11):—

"After having interchanged some words, I went to Tako Arvaniti, who called himself the chief of the band, and with M. Noel, in a room by ourselves, and I commenced with them negotiations for the liberation of the prisoners. I represented to him on the one hand all the difficulties in the way of agreeing to their demands, and on the other all the means which the Government was willing to place at their disposal for their material interests as well as for the safety of his band, showing him at the same time certain perils, and his complete destruction, if he insisted upom impossible demands, and if he continued to detain the foreigners. I read to him my instructions, and commented upon them from more than one point of view; but all was in vain. Neither he nor his brother, Christo, who took part in the conversation, would consent."

He goes on to relate the pretensions of the brigands for the convocation of an extraordinary National Assembly, and the formation of a Court of Assize at Oropos, to which we have already alluded; and then refers to the warning given to the brigands as to their movements:—

"When I told them at last that they must stay at Oropos, as well on account of the foreigners as for their own safety—for there they were not pursued, while, if they risked leaving Oropos, they might meet detachments which might not altogether respect the inviolability which they enjoyed at Oropos—they became angry, and said, 'We see it very well. Snares are laid for us; but we will kill the prisoners.'"

And in his more detailed report of the 25th of April (No. 7, p. 13), Colonel Théagénis, reverting to the same subject, says:—

"I informed them that at least for the sake of the prisoners they (the brigands) should remain at Oropos; *for it was on that condition that the Government consented not to pursue them;* whereas if they left they might meet with detachments, for the Government regarded as no longer existing the engagements it had taken towards the Ministers and at their request."

But it was all to no effect. The brigands were inflexible; and the reason of this stubbornness is well accounted for by Colonel

Théagénis, and fully carries out the opinions we have already expressed (p. 24). Colonel Théagénis says : –

"So far as I have understood their expressions, I am convinced that they hope that the Government will be obliged by the foreign Ministers to accept their proposals, although I endeavoured to explain to them the opinion of the Ministers who approve of the decision of the Government.

"It appears that they have the intention, or rather the determination, to advance towards Bœotia, and even further, and an attack upon them could but expose the lives of the prisoners to an inevitable danger—a peril which is fully understood by those gentlemen."

And he is so thoroughly convinced of the intractableness of these ruffians, that he concludes his report as follows:--

"In this village I will await the orders of the Government, who will probably think with me that my mission is ended, after what I have had the honour to state to them."

That Mr. Noel also, who was present at the conference of Colonel Théagénis and the brigand chiefs, quite coincided then with the view taken by Colonel Théagénis, is evident from the following letter which he wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 10) :—

"Oropos, April 8-20.

"My dear Sir,—I have been here since the morning, and after every endeavour I am unable to come to any understanding with the brigand chiefs ; they persist in being amnestied. They will not agree to deliver themselves up to the authorities, notwithstanding the King's promise of pardon after the trial. From my acquaintance with the country and the people we have to deal with, some prompt measures must be taken in order to save the lives of the captives."

Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 8) :—

"Noel arrived last night and the Colonel this morning. They have had a good deal of conversation with the brigands, but have failed to come to any understanding."

And Count Della Minerva informs Signor V. Venosta (No. 9, p. 7), that

"Colonel Théagénis, in company with M. Noel, had an interview with the brigand chief, who would not listen to reason."

After the departure of Colonel Théagénis from Oropos, Mr. Noel, as he relates in his letter to his father (No. 13, p. 2), remained with the prisoners

"The whole of Wednesday, the day of the negotiations, and left at eight

o'clock on Thursday morning—the day of the catastrophe. I persuaded the brigands—he goes on to say—that it was impossible to obtain an amnesty, and that trial by default was, I feared, not possible. They said privately to me, 'If we cannot obtain what we have demanded,* we will accept the terms you offer, namely, to receive the ransom and leave the country.'"

At the same time the brigands informed him that they intended that day to move to Sykamenos, a village about two miles further inland, and towards the north of Oropos. It does not appear to have struck at all Mr. Noel, as it did Colonel Théagénis, that the real design of the brigands was, not to expatriate themselves, but "to advance towards Bœotia, and even further;" for being evidently tricked by the "private" confidences of Tako, who, by the way, from the first "greeted him cordially," and who had every interest in duping Mr. Erskine's confidential envoy, Mr. Noel at once starts off to Chalcis, and the following telegraphic messages are exchanged with Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 10):—

"MR. NOEL TO MR. ERSKINE.
(Translation Telegraphic.)
"Chalcis, April 21, 1870, 1.40 p.m.

"Brigands this evening at Sykamenos, quarter of an hour from Oropos. Detachments must not pursue. Brigands will consent. Answer."

"MR. EBSKINE TO MR. NOEL.
(Telegraphic.)
"Thursday, April 21, 1870, 3.30 p.m.

"The Government consents not to disturb them in Sykamenos. Go to Oropos with the Aphroessa, and treat for the embarkation on board an English ship of war."

"MR. NOEL TO MR. ERSKINE.
(Translation Telegraphic.)
"Chalcis, April 21, 1870, 4.13 p.m.

"I have this moment received your telegram, and start for Oropos."

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* It must be remembered that Colonel Théagénis told them clearly that the Government declined to accede to their other demand. So that this "private" assurance to Mr. Noel was nothing but a feint.

(We request our readers to pay particular attention to the time noted on each of these messages, as it is a very important item in the considerations to which we shall come presently.)

These negotiations are summed up by Mr. Erskine, in his despatch of the 21st April (No. 3, p. 7) :—

"My Lord,—Since I addressed your lordship this morning, a messenger has arrived from Colonel Théagénis, who is the bearer of a letter to M. Zaïmis, containing so positive a refusal of the conditions he was authorised to propose to the brigands, that he considers his mission at an end, and requests leave to return to Athens. If a translation of this letter can be prepared in time for this mail, I will forward it in a postscript; but in the meantime I enclose copies of letters from Mr. Herbert and Mr. Lloyd, as also one from Mr. Noel, which will give your lordship a sufficiently detailed account of the state of affairs.

"M. della Minerva and I immediately met the Ministers in Council. M. Provelegios, Procoureur-Général of the Court of Cessation, was sent for, and he concurred with the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior that the proposal made by the brigands, that a court of assize should be held at Oropos for the trial of the brigands, was altogether out of the question. There remained nothing, therefore, but the slight hope held out by Mr. Lloyd, in his letter to Lord Muncaster, that the brigands might after all consent to leave the country in a British man-of-war.

"I consequently saw Commander Prowse, of the Cockatrice, and having ascertained that he would, on my responsibility and requisition, receive these scoundrels on board, for removal to some place out of Greece, I made up my mind to sanction the arrangement.

"A quarter of an hour afterwards a telegram arrived from Mr. Noel, from Chalcis, of which a translation is herewith enclosed, saying that the brigands were to go this evening to Sykamenos, a quarter of an hour from Oropos; that they must not be molested by the troops, and that they would give way. I at the same time heard from M. Zaïmis that he had also received a telegram from Chalcis, which explained that what the brigands intended to accept was that they should leave the country in a British vessel of war.* All this may be a mere feint, to enable them to get to a place where escape would be less difficult than from Oropos; but, at all events, I have, without awaiting your lordship's orders, assumed the grave responsibility of treating with the brigands on the terms I have mentioned. * * * * * *

"By Mr. Noel's last telegram your lordship will perceive that he has now

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* This information was from the identical source as that from which Mr. Erskine derived his, namely, Mr. Noel, as will be seen by the document we print at once after this.

come back to Oropos to negotiate, and I hope soon to be in a position to inform your lordship that the ransom of £25,000 has been paid to the brigands, that they have embarked on board the Cockatrice and are on their way to Malta, and, finally, that the captives have been released."

How cruelly that hope was deceived we all know. The brigands had set out for Sykamenon long before Mr. Noel could have returned from Chalcis, and before the instructions which the Government issued to the troops not to molest them could possibly reach the officers to whom they were addressed. Mr. Zaïmis, on being informed by Mr. Erskine of the telegram received from Mr. Noel, at once issued the following orders (No. 11, p. 4) :—

"THE GREEK MINISTERS TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL THÉAGÉNIS.

"Athens, 9—21 April, 1870.

"M. le Lieutenant-Colonel,—The Mayor of Peraea has telegraphed from Chalcis that the Arvanitéï are *en route* for Sykamenon, and that, according to the information furnished by Mr. Noel, it is likely they will place themselves under the English flag. Mr. Erskine, the English Minister, has telegraphed to Mr. Noel to go to Oropos and to negotiate with the Arvanitéï on the subject of this intention which they may have. In informing you of these details, we beg you to stay where you are until this unfortunate affair is ended; meantime, we send you these orders. If the brigands move to the village of Sykamenon, you will not attack them, for there is hope of coming to an understanding with them. You will concentrate at Sykamenon all the detachments placed under the orders of Captains Apostolides, Liacopoulo and Ladapoulo; you will invest the village closely and narrowly, so that the brigands cannot leave it, and if they attempt to leave it, you will attack them. It is needless to say that before directing the attack you will renew the offers to the Arvanitéï, which you already comprehend from our former instructions."

TH. A. ZAIMIS,	CH. SOUTZO.
A. D. AVIERINO.	A. TOMBAZIS.
D. SARAVAS.	S. VALAORITIS.

This order was sent on the evening of the 21st, and did not reach its destination in time; and although, even in its absence, Colonel Théagénis took upon himself, as we shall see, not to molest the brigands, the tragic end was consummated, because the real designs of the brigands were far different to their pretended intentions, and because they were not actuated with the singleness of purpose and fairness of dealing with which the

English press has so goodnaturedly credited them. This we will show before we come to the incidents attending the collision with the troops.

THE REAL DESIGNS OF THE BRIGANDS.

In reviewing the negociations of which we have just given only the mere dry facts, in the first place we find that all the measures taken were adopted with the full knowledge, consent, and concurrence, nay, even at the suggestion, of the English and Italian ministers The emissary upon whom devolved the difficult task of carrying on the negociations after the brigands moved to Oropos was chosen by the English minister as possessing the necessary qualifications for such an undertaking—that of being

"A gentleman of high character, and intimately acquainted with the country and the peculiarities of the people with whom he would have to deal."

He also offered the additional guarantee of being aide-de-camp of, and well-known to, General Church, an English Philhellene, who fought in the War of Independence, and who has since remained in the Greek service, honoured and revered by all. But besides this, Mr. Erskine took the additional precaution of having an English negotiator in the person of Mr. Noel. He had therefore every guarantee that his wishes and instructions would be carried out faithfully, and that there would be no underhand plotting on the part of the Government. The instructions by which Colonel Théagénis was to be guided were given in the very residence of the English Minister, in his presence, and with his sanction. These instructions, as we have seen, were to assure the brigands that the ransom was ready, and that they might take it and leave the country either by sea in an English war-ship, or by land, hostages for their safety being given them. They had also the option of surrendering, on the King's pledging his word to the Ministers of England and Italy to accord them a full pardon after trial. But in case they refused these terms,

they were to be warned that they could not enjoy immunity from pursuit for an indefinite length of time, nor would they be allowed to perambulate the country or carry off their prisoners into the interior or across the frontier into Turkey.

The necessity of adopting a more decided tone towards the brigands was evident to all, even to the prisoners themselves. Mr. Vyner, in a letter to Lord Muncaster (No. 5, p. 5), says :—

"These scoundrels should be told what they can and what they cannot have, and not be put off by shuffling."

Mr. Erskine wrote to Lord Clarendon on the 21st April (No. 3, p. 1) that

"We (Count Della Minera and himself) were reluctantly compelled to admit that a firmer tone must now be taken with these miscreants."

And to Mr. Herbert he wrote (No. 5, p. 4) :—

"In your interest, believe me we must now be firm."

And the Athens correspondent of the *Times* (6th May) says :—

"To hasten the release, it was necessary to make the brigands understand that they could not carry off their prisoners into the mountains."

And the reasons for such firmness being displayed were these : (1) because the brigands, abused of the leniency and forbearance with which they were treated (and this, as we have shown, was to be expected from these scoundrels), broke the agreement they first entered into to accept £25,000 with the alternative of an amnesty, and insisted upon having both the one and the other ; (2) because the danger to which the health of the prisoners would be exposed by being dragged from one part of the country to another was most serious ; and (3) because the intentions of the brigands were evidently to carry off their prisoners to the mountains of Agrapha in Turkey.

As regards the first of these propositions, it has been urged, with the usual disregard to truth which has characterised the criticisms of the accusers of the Greek Government, that they broke faith with the brigands by withdrawing their promise given to them through the foreign ministers, that they would not be pursued. This charge can only be the result of a set purpose to

make the worst of the case. In the instructions which the Greek Government gave to Colonel Théagénis, in the presence of Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva, it was clearly stated that that immunity held good "while the captives remained near Athens," so as to be able to communicate readily with their respective ministers. It is simply preposterous to suppose that this immunity was meant to be indefinite. But what is the opinion of Mr. Erskine, Count Della Minerva, and the prisoners themselves? In his despatch of the 21st April (No. 3, p. 1), Mr. Erskine says:—

"They (the brigands) will be told very positively that the impunity that they have hitherto enjoyed must not be considered as indefinite; and M. della Minerva and I did not think that we should be justified in requiring the Government to persist in the conciliatory course they have hitherto pursued, after it had proved abortive."

And in his letter to Mr. Herbert (No. 5, p. 4), he again says:—

"I really cannot enter into a discussion with Tako as to whether we have or whether we have not kept faith with him. Surely he cannot suppose that the Government ever meant to allow him to wander about the country with impunity. . . . It appears to me that as long as he is not molested where he is [at Oropos], he ought not to complain."

Count Della Minerva's opinion was (No. 9, p. 15) that

"It was impossible to accede to their (the brigand's) pretentions, viz., that they should be allowed to traverse freely the provinces of Greece, in the enjoyment of an impunity, which was to be guaranteed not only by the Greek Government but also by the Ministers of England and Italy. I do not know how far such a proceeding could be admitted by a recognised Government."

Mr. Herbert wrote thus to Mr. Erskine on the 20th April (No. 3, p. 8):—

"He (Tako) seems to think himself entitled, so long as he treats us well, to take us where he pleases; but there must, of course, be some limit to this."

And on the 21st (No. 3, p. 10), he again repeats:—

"Obviously that promise (of immunity from attack) could not be meant to be without limits."

It is evident that the Greek Government was bound, in the interest of the prisoners themselves, to put some limit to Tako's perambulations. If they had failed to do this, and the prisoners

were injured either in health or otherwise, they would have been blamed as bitterly for the omission as they are now for the adoption of firmer measures. But the English press, on this occasion also, are enthusiastic advocates of Tako's pretensions. Apparently the ludicrousness of the position did not strike them. Tako having obtained his first advantage by treachery and surprise, is now extremely sensitive and scrupulously careful on the subject of good faith!

That there was serious danger to the health of the prisoners is evident both from Mr. Erskine's despatch of the 21st (No. 3, p. 1)—

"The weather is so unfavourable that I fear the captives would be exposed to severe privations whilst being dragged about the country, day and night, in wet clothes;"

and from his letter to Mr. Herbert (No. 5, p. 4):—

"It (to wander about the country) would infallibly ruin your health, if it did not kill you."

And Mr. Lloyd's opinion was (No. 3, p. 9) that

"If the Government did not come round in the end, I do not see that we should be any better off than now, perhaps worse, with the further risk of illness, etc."

It is therefore simply untrue to assert that the measures taken were adopted without any regard to the interests of the prisoners.

But that the real intention of the brigands, as soon as they were convinced of the impossibility of an amnesty, was not simply to wander about the country, but to carry off their prisoners to their mountain fastnesses in Turkey, was evident to all who came in contact with them, except to Mr. Noel, who appears to have been completely overcome by the "cordial greeting" of Tako, and to have taken the "private" revelations of that worthy as thoroughly reliable. The brigands themselves made no secret of their intention, and intimated their plan to the prisoners.

Mr. Vyner wrote to Lord Muncaster on the 16th April (No. 5, p. 5):—

"At present we are comfortable, but I think he (Tako) means moving North."

And again on the 19th (No. 8, p. 9) :—

"I am much afraid that we shall have to go north."

Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 4) :—

"P.S. (In letter of April 17th, but probably written on the morning of April 19th, Tuesday.)—The captain has made me add another postscript, to say that if things were not settled to his satisfaction quickly, he means to take us into Thessaly."

On the next day, the 20th, Mr. Lloyd wrote to Lord Muncaster (No. 3, p. 9) : —

"The brigands have promised Mr. Noel to take us off to the mountains, and keep us safely there for six months, if necessary.*

Colonel Théagénis, who was well qualified to form an opinion, says, in his report of the interview with the brigand chiefs (No. 3, p. 12) :—

"It seems that they have the intention, or rather the determination, to advance towards Bœotia, and even further."

And Mr. Erskine informed Lord Clarendon (No. 3, p. 1), that the brigands had established their captives at Oropos—

"Threatening, however, that they would carry them off to Thessaly, unless the Government complied immediately with their demands."

From the depositions of the captured brigands, we also gather that their intention in moving from Oropos was to reach the Turkish territory; and it is evident that they could have no object of giving false evidence on this point. Alexios Tossini stated (No. 4, p. 2) that—

"Thence (from Oropos), by a concerted plan, they set out with a view to reach Agrapha with their captives."

And the brigand, Costa, deposited (No. 7, p. 8) :—

"That, having decided to proceed to Sykamanos, they intended to continue their march upon Levadia, and thence by Phtiotis towards Turkey."

After this mass of evidence from all sides there can remain no

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* And yet Mr. Noel, in his letter to his father (No. 13, p. 2), avers that the brigands were ready to accept the ransom, and leave in an English ship of war.

doubt that the brigands' intention from the first was, for reasons we shall presently explain, to repair to Turkey, if they failed in their demand for an amnesty.

Mr. Erskine, therefore, on receiving Mr. Noel's telegram from Chalcis, advising him of the pretended acquiescence of the brigands to leave in a British ship, very justly expressed doubts, in his despatch of the 21st April (No. 3, p. 8), as to the sincerity of such promises. He says :—

"All this may be a mere feint to enable them to get to a place where escape would be less difficult than from Oropos."

For as he very justly argued in his letter to Mr. Herbert, written the evening of the same day (No. 5, p. 3) :—

"If he (Tako) is in earnest, he is far better at Oropos or Sykamenon than he could possibly be elsewhere. . . . Why should he care to move away, except for an evil purpose?"

And it might still more justly be asked, how is it that, while Tako was prepared to leave by sea, he removed that very day further inland—from Oropos to Sykamenon? How can these things be reconciled? It is clear that poor Mr. Noel, despite his "acquaintance with the country and the people we have to deal with," was hopelessly duped by the crafty Tako, who, knowing that Mr. Noel's advice would go a long way with Mr. Erskine, endeavoured, through him, to dispel all fears of his moving northward, and thus to have his road clear of troops.

But it will be asked, why should Tako insist upon an amnesty, when he could otherwise secure his safety; and why refuse to leave the country in a ship of war, when, as he repeatedly affirmed, he had every confidence in the word of the English Minister. In another place we will show that the ransom without the amnesty was worse than useless to the brigand chiefs, and that on such a large sum of money being handed to them, their followers would have at once risen against them, and most likely murdered them in order to secure the booty. Therefore the safeguard of an amnesty was absolutely necessary to the preservation of their ill-gotten earnings. Failing to

obtain an amnesty, the next best move for the chiefs was to repair to their native lairs at Agrapha; and there, being amongst their own relations, feel secure from their band, defy all attempts at pursuit, and be able to augment at pleasure their demands upon the friends of the captives. To this point we shall revert in another place. But coming to their disinclination to expatriate themselves, this is explicable to all those who know anything of the character and habits of these men. Like all the lower orders of creation, they are not easily acclimatized to a foreign land. In their native fastnesses they flourish, and in their primitive mode of life they thrive, but being transported to a foreign country, nay, even by adopting in their native land, a more civilized diet and a more sedentary life, they have been known to literally fade away and die in a few months. This they knew, or rather they instinctively felt, and as the result has proved, they preferred risking their lives in an open fight, to accepting expatriation. Their disinclination to such a measure was evident from the very first.

Mr. Erskine, in his despatch of the 21st April (No. 3, p. 1), says:—

"In one of my recent letters to Mr. Herbert I asked him to sound the brigand chief (as if from himself) as to whether he would be disposed to leave the country on board a British vessel of war, but Mr. Herbert tells me that he showed no inclination to quit Greece, if he can help it."

And Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 4):—

"He (Tako) does not seem to entertain the idea of expatriation."

And Mr. Lloyd to Lord Muncaster on the 20th April (No. 3, p 9):—

"They have not absolutely declined the plan of expatriation, but I have much doubt if they would adopt it."

On the same day Mr. Vyner wrote to Lord Muncaster (No. 8, p. 9):—

"The proposition of being sent out of the country they, at present, will not agree to at all."

This was on the evening previous to the massacre. How then can we believe for an instant that they all at once changed their minds, and the next morning assured Mr. Noel that they would

accept expatriation? As we have said, there is everything to prove that that assurance was nothing but a feint, and that the real motives of the brigands were to appease all fears of their carrying away their captives, so as to evade the vigilance of the troops, and in the meantime escape into Turkey.

THE COLLISION AND THE MURDER.

NEGOTIATIONS having failed, through the unreasoning obstinacy of the brigand chiefs, and it having been made evident that their intention was to carry off their prisoners to the interior, there remained nothing for Colonel Théagénis to do but to follow the instructions he had received from the Greek Government, and the foreign ministers. These, as we have seen, were to warn the brigands not to move from Oropos, and after investing that place with the troops at his disposal, "to prevent, with all his forces, the escape of the Arvanitéï with their captives," in case they ventured to leave. Mr. Erskine, in his despatch of the 21st (No. 3, p. 2), said :—

"M. Zaimis has assured both my Italian colleague and myself that upwards of 600 troops are collected in the immediate neighbourhood of Oropos; and although there is not the least intention on their part to provoke a collision, they are fully authorised to employ force, should it unfortunately be necessary to prevent the escape of the brigands and their captives."

And Count Della Minerva wrote on the 23rd (No. 9, p. 7) :—

"In order to prevent the brigands from carrying out the plan they had formed of taking their prisoners into Thessaly, troops were moved up on all sides, and were so placed as to be at two or three hours distance from Oropos."

These measures were resolved upon with the concurrence of the two foreign ministers, who fully approved of the line of conduct adopted.

That this was the only available course was evident to all—to the captives themselves. Mr. Vyner wrote to Lord Muncaster on the 21st, the day of the catastrophe (No. 5, p. 5):—

"I have the faintest hopes that their progress being arrested north, and being forced to remain here, they might come to our terms sooner."

And Mr. Herbert, in a letter to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 8), says:—

"If the Government could grant these terms, I believe we should be all right: if not, our only chance is that when they (the brigands) know the troops are sent out in force in Bœotia, they may wish to save their lives."

And that this course was a necessary one, and under similar circumstances would have been adopted by any Government, is proved by the sanction, nay, the full approval given it by the English and Italian ministers, who, being cognisant of the measures adopted, relate them to their respective Governments as a part of their own endeavours in the release of the captives. The French minister also was so convinced that such a measure was desirable, that even before the Greek Government adopted it, he proposed it, and offered to co-operate in it. Mr. Erskine says (No. 3, p. 2):—

"I think it right to mention to your lordship that the French Minister has informed M. Valaority that Admiral Chevalier is most desirous to do anything in his power, to facilitate the release of our countrymen, and he has even offered to land 300 men to assist in surrounding the brigands; but the Hellenic Government have not as yet accepted this offer, because they do not wish unnecessarily to alarm the brigands, and, perhaps, drive them from a comparatively accessible part of the country."

The last sentence of the above extract is another proof of the forbearance and circumspection with which the Greek Government acted in the matter. So long as there was hope no violent measures were adopted; but when it was evident that the brigands needed no "alarming" to stir them, but that without any provocation they had made up their minds to move, the troops were ordered to hem them in, and they were clearly warned not to stir. As Mr. Erskine explains to Lord Clarendon (No. 3, p. 1), Colonel Théagénis' instructions were to give that warning:—

"Colonel Théagénis is to be guided by an instruction, of which I enclose a translation, and which authorises him to warn the brigands that they will not be allowed to carry off the prisoners from Oropos."

And to Mr. Herbert he wrote (No. 5, p. 4):—

"But I am again authorised by all the Ministers to say that, let him (Tako)

not attempt to go away, and he will be allowed a reasonable time to complete his bargain."

As we have already seen, Colonel Théagénis gave the brigands this clear warning, and that he did so is borne out by the testimony of the captives.

Mr. Herbert, in his letter to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 8), says:—

"The Colonel tells me that the disposition of the troops is such as we cannot go north without a collision."

The last entry in Mr. Lloyd's note book (No. 5, p. 5) is this:—

"Thursday.—Messenger fr. Athens. Armistice partly withdrawn. Troops *en cordon*. We not to move. Chief says he will go to a place a quarter of an hour off on Ocyoupos. Know troops are in force; danger impending."

And that in Mr. Herbert's journal (No. 10, p. 3) is to the same effect:—

"Wednesday.—Noel appeared very early, having slept at the Scala, it being too wet to come up. Then arrived Colonel Théagénis with instructions from Athens. Terms rejected by brigands, as usual. The Colonel announced termination of armistice, which A.* considers breach of faith. We wrote to Athens accordingly.

"Thursday.—Noel left. Letters from Athens = nil. Captain determined to cross over in spite of yesterday's warnings."

After such evidence as this—the last solemn depositions of men who felt themselves in imminent danger—can there remain any doubt as to the real cause of the disaster? It was the determination of the brigands to move into the arms of the troops,† not Colonel Théagénis' "criminal impetuosity," that brought about the collision. The troops did not "attack" the brigands. "Attack" is a misnomer in this instance, designedly made use of by those who are determined to cast the blame and responsibility of the whole affair upon the Greek Government. Colonel Théagénis simply put into execution the orders he had received from the Government, with the concurrence and approval of the English and Italian ministers. This we will

* Arvanitakì.

† Mr. Lloyd wrote to Lord Muncaster (No. 3, p. 9):—

"Our great danger is that they may determine to move into the arms of the troops."

We need no more conclusive testimony than this as to the accuracy of our views.

prove by narrating *seriatim* the occurrences as we find them in the official despatches. But before doing so, in order to more easily understand the position, we may state that Oropos is situated about four miles inland on the northern coast of Attica, almost opposite Chalcis, and about twelve miles to the north-west of Marathon. The river Asopos flows from south-west to north-east, and separates Oropos from Sykamenon. The troops were posted on the south-west of Oropos and Sykamenon, on both sides of the river. It was to this village of Sykamenon that, notwithstanding the repeated warnings given them, the brigands moved on the 21st, at about half-past 2 P.M., after despatching Mr. Noel to Chalcis, that he might telegraph to Mr. Erskine their readiness to leave in an English ship of war. In the meantime, after the rejection by Tako of the terms offered, Colonel Théagénis busied himself, in compliance with his orders, to dispose the troops in such a way as to shut in Oropos completely. He was still engaged in this, when the brigands unexpectedly moved.

The evidence we have as to the events which followed upon this move consists of the depositions of Colonel Théagénis himself, who was in command of the troops, of the dragoman, Alexander, who was still held by the brigands with their other prisoners, and of those of the band who were captured alive. As regards the trustworthiness of the first of these witnesses, we need hardly say that there can exist no doubt. Colonel Théagénis had only to prove that he followed his instructions, and he is at once clear of all responsibility. We believe that he has done this—in fact, it is the execution of his instructions which is laid against him—and he can, therefore, have no object in garbling his evidence. It must also be borne in mind that he was chosen by Mr. Erskine as "a gentlemen of high character," and that Mr. Erskine never expressed the least doubt as to the trustworthiness of his reports. As regards the depositions of the brigands, no one can accept them as unbiassed upon this point, as it is only natural that, being accused of the murder of the prisoners, they should endeavour to cast the responsibility of

the collision upon the action of the troops. Lastly, Alexander stands charged with general complicity with the brigands, and especially with wilful negligence in carrying back to the brigands the message entrusted to him by Colonel Théagénis. That part of his evidence, therefore, which refers to this matter may be considered doubtful, but there is nothing which could induce him to falsify the facts relating to the occurrences from the time the brigands started from Oropos, to the moment of his meeting Colonel Théagénis.

As far as these occurrences are concerned we are almost wholly dependent upon the evidence of this man. In his deposition (No. 6, p. 2) he says :—

"On Thursday, about two o'clock p.m., we left Oropos. The Captain of the brigands, Takos, told me that we were to leave shortly that place ; *he had, however, no knowledge of the existence of the troops*, as we had not seen a single soldier.* We forded the river on horseback, which operation lasted for some time, directing ourselves towards the village of Sykamenos, which was in front of us ; *from thence only we perceived the military*. The distance which separated us from the troops was about half an hour."

And Mr. Erskine, in his minute of the examination of this witness (No. 6, p. 2), says :—

"On being asked to describe what had occurred on the 21st April, he stated that he had left Oropos for Sykamenos, with the brigands and their captives, on that afternoon, at about half-past two o'clock. That although the distance might be performed in a quarter of an hour, it took them on this occasion upwards of an hour, owing to the River Asopos being much swollen by rain. They crossed it just opposite Sykamenon on four horses—ten brigands remaining on each side of the river."

Here we will remark that if, as is alleged, there was a premeditated determination on the part of Colonel Théagénis to attack the brigands, this was a very favourable moment for doing so. Still the troops held aloof, and the brigands crossed the

* As another evidence of the scrupulous adherence to truth with which these matters have been discussed by the English papers, we subjoin the following extract from a leader in the *Morning Post* of the 11th May :—"In fact, the chief of the Arvanitéï had accepted the terms offered, and but for the apprehension which the close vicinity of the troops caused him, he would probably never have thought of carrying the prisoners away from Oropos."

stream leisurely. On arriving at Sykamenon the brigands observed the troops. Mr. Erskine goes on to say:—

"After an anxious scrutiny of these soldiers, Takos desired Alexander to go off to them with the paper given him by the English Minister, and warn them not to approach any nearer. Alexander at once did as he was desired, and in about twenty minutes was able to communicate with the officer apparently in command—Krikeropoulos (?)—who was on the opposite side of the river. This officer declined, however, to take upon himself any responsibility, and referred Alexander to a group of persons who were advancing on his own (the left) side of the stream, and who proved to be Colonel Théagénis, an officer of rank (probably Colonel or Captain Apostolides), and their escort."

Now, it will be remembered that although upon the receipt of Mr. Noel's telegram, and on Mr. Erskine's request, the Government had issued orders to allow the brigands to remain unmolested at Sykamenon, yet these orders had not at this time reached Colonel Théagénis (*see* p. 54). Still, even in the absence of such instructions, this officer determined not to disturb the brigands provided they remained there: and, as he says in his report (No. 7, p. 14),—

"I told him (Alexander) to hasten back and inform the brigands that they might remain tranquilly and without fear at Sykamenos, for the soldiers had orders not to fire upon them; and that there they could receive the money and go out of the state on the conditions of safety which the Government had promised them."

This message was not conveyed to Tako, for according to Mr. Erskine's minute of Alexander's examination—

"Alexander in the meantime went back to Sykamenos, where he found the people in great distress at the violence which had been used towards their relations, some of whom had been carried off to screen the retreat of the brigands, and others from motives of personal vengeance. The brigands in the meantime were running up a steep acclivity in front of the village, and shortly afterwards Alexander, according to his own account, followed to convey Colonel Théagénis's message to Takos."

This is Alexander's version of the affair; but Colonel Théagénis states (No. 7, p. 14):—

"He (Alexander) showed a desire to execute this message; but, on the other hand, he pretended he could not rejoin them (the brigands) on foot, and directed himself towards the village, in order to find a horse. Nevertheless, he did nothing. I think he evaded it through fraud. I say through fraud, because I have other anterior reasons to suspect his sincerity."

And Mr. Erskine, writing to Lord Clarendon (No. 7, p. 12), says :—

"From this statement (the above) I infer that if Alexander had been in earnest, and had hastened to rejoin the brigands, they might possibly have been induced to retrace their steps to Sykamenon, and to believe in the assurances of Colonel Théagénis that the terms originally offered were still open to their acceptance; but as Alexander did not make any effort to overtake the brigands before the fatal collision had taken place, it would now be a waste of time to discuss what they might, under other circumstances, have done."

The fault or the criminality of Alexander for not returning to the brigands with Théagénis's message is a very serious one, and will meet at the hands of justice with thorough investigation. But we cannot allow the consideration of the other question to be passed over as easily as it is by Mr. Erskine. We insist that there was no intention whatever on the part of the troops either to attack or in any way molest the brigands as long as they were willing to remain at Sykamenon. It is admitted on all hands that Colonel Théagénis expressed this determination, and pressed upon Alexander to transmit his message to Tako. Further, in his report (No. 7, p. 14)—a document which bears upon the face of it the proof of honesty and outspoken sincerity—Colonel Théagénis says :—

"Both before and after the soldiers fording the river, I had given orders to the officers *not to fire a single gun*, but to restrict themselves to preventing the flight of the brigands by endeavouring to intercept them (*leur couper la route*), hoping thus to shut them in at Sykamenon."

But all these precautions were of no avail; nor do we see that much good would have ensued by Alexander overtaking the brigands. Their message to Colonel Théagénis was "not to follow with his men" (No. 6, p. 2), which evidently meant that they did not apprehend an attack, but feared pursuit, and that they intended not to stop at Sykamenon as they had led Mr. Noel to believe, but to proceed towards the Turkish frontier. They did not even wait for Alexander's return and Colonel Théagénis's answer, but carried off some unhappy peasants from Sykamenon so as to screen their retreat; and as the Athens correspondent of the *Times* relates :—

"They then made their arrangements for escape, and divided the band into two parties. The one, under Chrestos Arvanitaki, was to pass through the troops before them on the road from Sykamenos, guarding Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Herbert; the other, under the chief brigand, Takos Arvanitaki, with Count de Boyl and Mr. Vyner, was to move round the left of the troops, seeking to evade notice, and taking the direction of Skoimatari. The soldiers opposed the passage of the party under Chrestos; an engagement commenced, and the brigands, seeing that each must provide for himself, and that they could not carry off their prisoners, murdered Herbert and Lloyd. Herbert fell by the yatagan of a brigand, and Mr. Lloyd was shot. The soldiers did their duty well. The chief, Chrestos, and six of his followers were killed."

Colonel Théagénis's account of the encounter is as follows:—

"The villagers and shepherds drew off the moment they had the opportunity, and nobody remained but the prisoners, who were forcibly hauled along. When they approached Dilessi, the prisoners, worn out with fatigue, were no longer able to keep up with them.* The brigands killed, in the first instance, the secretaries of the Italian and British Legations, then the lawyer of the Railway Company, and, a little later, the young Englishman. Exasperated by these massacres, the soldiers fired on the brigands, and slew the chief, Christo Arvaniti, and the brigands Yeroyanni, Elie Stathaki, Verfani, Tzakanica, Katarahia, Sotiri, Zioma, and they wounded Alexi Chimariotti, whom they took prisoner."

This is the true and faithful account of that great calamity, and through the whole course of events we see plainly that being actuated by a mad exultation at having in their power prisoners of such value, and being elated by their success in overawing the English Minister and obtaining from him the promise of almost any sacrifice, the brigands remained stubborn and unreasoning to the end, and when the moment of danger appeared, disregarding the repeated warnings given them, they rushed into the arms of the troops, thinking that the troops would melt and vanish before them and their prisoners. If there is anything in the whole matter which can be called an "attack," it is the move-

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* In another place, Colonel Théagénis explains this by saying, "I suppose this, as they had no other motive for killing him (Mr. Herbert), and because, about thirty paces nearer than the spot where he was killed, I myself found his overcoat thrown on the ground, which proves that it hindered him, as he was fatigued by the rapidity of the march."

ment of the brigands. The troops simply followed the instructions of the Government and the foreign ministers, and endeavoured to prevent the brigands carrying off their prisoners to the Turkish frontier. This is the view of the case taken both by Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva. Mr. Erskine, in his minute of Alexander's examination (No. 6, p. 3), gives as his opinion that the

"Immediate cause of collision was the attempt of the brigands to escape from Sykamenos."

In his despatch to Lord Clarendon, dated 5th May (No. 7, p. 12), he says:—

"It is, I think, now clear, that it (the collision) was provoked, if not commenced, by the soldiers attempting to prevent the escape of the brigands and their captives to a part of the country where the former might have held out for any conditions they thought fit to impose.

And Count Della Minerva states (No. 9, p. 14) that

"One thing appears certain, and it is that the brigands, supposing some sort of treachery,* sought to flee, and that after two hours' march from the village of Sykamenos, they saw that Mr. Herbert could not follow them further, and killed him. The soldiers, not far distant, having witnessed this barbarous act, could not be restrained, fired on and pursued the brigands."

And even the captured brigands themselves were constrained to admit in substance the truth of this. Mr. Erskine, in relating the result of their examination (No. 7, p. 5), says:—

"We questioned them very closely as to the cause of the actual collision on the 21st, and they all agreed that, on perceiving that they were being gradually hemmed in by the troops, they were told by Tako to resume their march, which they said was to have been towards the Turkish frontier."

The only one who appears more eager than even the brigands themselves, in exculpating them and blaming the Greek authorities for the collision, is Mr. Noel. In his letter to his father (No. 13, p. 2), he says:—

"It appears, however, the Government, for reasons unknown, had decided on the attack. . . . The soldiers fired from a distance, killing two brigands. The brigands then began to murder the captives."

* They were not justified in any such supposition; they were clearly told they should not be allowed to leave with their prisoners.

In the first instance, if Mr. Noel considers himself justified in asserting that the "Government had decided on the attack," he ought to bring proofs of such an allegation. We have already shown that this accusation is worse than groundless. As to the way in which the collision took place, Mr. Noel's evidence is worthless. According to his own showing, at the time of the collision he was on the other side of the channel, where he could not even hear the shots. How has he ascertained who fired first? In framing this account, Mr. Noel has evidently consulted his inclinations as upon whom to cast the blame more than his personal knowledge of the facts.

But of the accuracy and trustworthiness of Colonel Théagénis's statement we have, besides the evidence already brought before our readers, another collateral proof in the fact recorded by the Italian Minister, that no actual collision took place between the troops and the brigands until "after two hours' march from the village of Sykamenon." This is corroborated by Alexander's testimony, who says (No. 6, p. 2) that after leaving Colonel Théagénis on his way back to Sykamenon—

"During the passage of half-an-hour, he did not hear a single gun-shot."

Adding to this half hour the time that must previously have elapsed, from the arrival of the brigands at Sykamenon, to the moment that Alexander left Colonel Théagénis, after carrying to him the brigand's message, we have the two hours spoken of by the Italian Minister. And the spot on which poor Mr. Herbert's body was found is exactly two hours' stiff march from Sykamenon. The one circumstance, therefore, prove the other. The brigands, as soon as they arrived at Sykamenon, and sent off Alexander to Théagénis, started off again, and after two hours' march, finding Mr. Herbert unable to keep up, and not wishing him to remain on the way and thus be set free, cut him down with their yataghans.*

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* The same fate soon befel the other prisoner. Count Minerva says (No. 9, page 8) :—"The position of the bodies of Herbert and Boyl . . . leads one

After this butchery what followed was natural. The soldiers rushed to the rescue of the surviving prisoners. Had they not done this, Englishmen would have been the first to accuse Colonel Théagénis of imbecility and cowardice. Colonel Théagénis, as a soldier, was bound to follow his orders, which were precise and definite; he was directed by the Government and the Foreign Ministers to endeavour to induce the brigands to accept the terms offered; but failing this, he was to warn them not to leave Oropos, and to invest that place with the troops at his command;* and should the brigands attempt to carry off their prisoners, he was to oppose force to them. These instructions were given with the sanction and approval of the English and Italian Ministers, and this Colonel Théagénis explained to the brigands, for he says (No. 3, p. 11):—

"I endeavoured to explain to them the opinion of the Ministers, who approve of the decision of the Government."

And Count Della Minerva says (No. 9, p. 14):—

"The collision was expressly provided against in the instructions given to Colonel Théagénis, *except in the case of the brigands showing a desire to flee into the interior of the country or to go to Thessaly.*"

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to believe that the brigands killed their prisoners with cutting weapons, when, from want of strength, they became unable to keep up in the retreat." In a P.S., Count Della Minerva corrects the above statement in so much as regards Boyl. The other body was not his, but Mr. Lloyd's.

* Colonel Théagénis has been charged with lack of energy and incapacity for not succeeding to invest Oropos before the brigands attempted to leave. We think it only just to subjoin his explanation of the matter as given in his report (No. 7, p. 15):—

"Si les brigands étaient restés encore une nuit à Oropo, et l'investissement avait lieu, la délivrance des prisonniers ne pouvait pas être douteuse; car on aurait encore permis aux brigands de choisir entre la rançon et le sauf conduit qui leur était proposé, ou leur destruction dans le cas contraire était inévitable. Mais l'investissement du village n'a pas pu être effectué, car nous n'en avons pas eu le temps nécessaires. Le Gouvernement s'était décidé à prendre cette mesure le 8 (20th; see page 49) du mois, et sa résolution m'a été communiquée le lendemain (the day of the catastrophe), pendant que je me trouvais encore à Marcopoulo, qui est distant de cinq heures de Salessi, où les deux compagnies de soldats se trouvaient. Je devais donc perdre le temps en

Well, the brigands did not only "show a desire," but actually attempted to do so, after having been repeatedly and fairly warned that they would not be allowed to effect their purpose. They disregarded these warnings; and what was Colonel Théagénis to do? To fold his arms; to disobey orders; to look on while every power was defied, and every warning scoffed at, and while it was attempted to place the prisoners in such a position as would make it next to impossible to release them? Supposing he had acted thus, and had allowed the prisoners to be carried off to Turkey, what would Englishmen, first of all others, have said? They would again have blamed the Greek authorities. They would have maintained that Tako was allowed, by the inefficiency and perhaps the cowardice and connivance also (for we hear of these things even now) of the Greek officers to escape into Turkey, in order to involve that country in difficulties; that surely Tako would have desisted from his purpose had some resolution been shown, and would have finally accepted expatriation. In fact, the Greek Government would have been made out to be equally culpable in any case. But Colonel Théagénis's

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marches; de plus, M. Liacopoulo était à Schimatari, qui se trouve à trois heures de Salessi, lequel est à une distance de deux heures et demie Oropo; de sorte que, quelque diligence qu'on eût fait, c'est à peine vers le soir que l'investissement aurait pu être effectué. Il aurait été beaucoup plus sûr si la force armée pouvait approcher du village pendant la nuit des différents côtés, et se montrait le matin du 10 du mois sur toutes les positions favorables. Elle aurait eu pendant la journée le temps de rendre l'investissement inforçable.

"Comme l'investissement n'a pu être fait à cause de la fuite des brigands, leur poursuite devenait nécessaire, conformément aux ordres du Gouvernement; mais pendant qu'on la pressait, les obstacles que nous a présenté le passage de la rivière ont malheureusement retardé la marche des troupes, tandisqu'au contraire ils ont favorisé la fuite des brigands. Mais malgré toutes ces difficultés, la destruction des brigands eut été certaine, et le salut des prisonniers ou de quelques uns d'eux probable, si Délium avait été occupé par les troupes."

The whole of this very important document, which throws great light on all the circumstances of the case, has been carefully suppressed by the English press, which has shown much eagerness to publish the most trivial communications, provided they criminated the Greek authorities.

duty was not to argue but to obey. If his orders were mistaken measures, the blame rests upon the English and Italian Ministers, who are as responsible for those orders as the Greek Government itself, and who, moreover, do not express, in any part of their despatches, disapprobation of, or dissent from the measures adopted. Still Colonel Théagénis, even under the most trying circumstances, behaved with great forbearance, and it was only after the murder of one of the prisoners that he in any way put into execution the more stringent measures he was authorised to adopt. There is nothing easier than to argue after the event. Of course, now those measures are blamed because the result has been disastrous. But we maintain, that, judging humanly, it was the only course open. If the brigands were allowed to retreat into some unapproachable fastness, perhaps another, besides Mr. Herbert, would have been murdered before reaching there. For the brigands would be masters of the situation, and even with one prisoner alive they could demand and exact the same if not heavier terms ; and they could, besides, have the advantage of being less encumbered in their movements. And when in their stronghold, they could dictate any terms they pleased. It was, therefore, necessary to follow the course that seemed most preferable at the time ; for the result, however disastrous, cannot be considered as condemnatory of the measure itself. We will remind Englishmen of their own line of conduct under exactly similar circumstances—the Abyssinian expedition. They first employed entreaties ; they offered ransoms ; they sent negotiators ; and when all failed, they deliberately marched against Theodore, in the full conviction that by that movement the lives of the prisoners were irrevocably sacrificed. By a providential interposition they were saved. But had the first expectation been realized, would Lord Napier have been made answerable for the lives of the captives, or even blamed for precipitance ? Certainly not. We know that success has a charm for vulgar eyes, and that it overshadows the means that led to it, however open to criticism they may be. But, in the present case, an attack was not even contemplated, and the collision was provoked by a

brutal act of those who had been all along the aggressors. Therefore, however deeply we may deplore this most terrible calamity, we can only repeat the verdict so justly pronounced by Count Della Minerva, a gentleman whose character and high-minded moderation is evident in all his despatches; namely, that—

"In any case it is certain that the more deeply one looks into the minute circumstances of this sad drama, the more clearly one perceives a sort of fatality which frustrated all the zeal and all the measures used to prevent the catastrophe."*

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* After penning the foregoing pages, it is with a just feeling of revenge that we put into juxtaposition to the above noble verdict of an Italian gentleman, the following scurrilous attacks of the English press, conspicuous for their disregard of truth, their distortion of facts, and which in the face of the plain and unimpeachable evidence we have placed before our readers, appear to us to be simply indecent :—

We all know how that party of tourists was deceived by official representations, was imperfectly guarded, and was made a wilful sacrifice of by the administration, which should and might, beyond a doubt, have saved it from the hands of the brigands. Mr. Vyner and his friends were condemned to death upon the calculation that their death, coupled as it would be with the death of some of the brigands would, redound infinitely to the credit of the Greek Government (*Evening Standard*, 26th April). Mr. Vyner, etc., were murdered by the Greek Government—were deliberately killed by the Greek Government (*Standard*, 27th April). The Greek Government deliberately sacrificed the lives of the four travellers to the ambition of acquiring a little credit with foreign governments for zeal in the suppression of brigandage. This is the most charitable view which it is possible to take of the conduct of the Greek Ministry (*Standard*, 9th May). The Greek Government is every whit as guilty of the blood of our countrymen as Tako and his crew—guilty of deliberate perfidy (*Standard*, 25th May). The Greek Government suffered the murder to be committed (*Daily Telegraph*, 9th May). The Greek Government stand charged with having sacrificed the lives of four gentlemen to their incompetency, obstinacy and bad faith; and with having directly broken a solemn promise given, not only by the members of the Cabinet, but by the sovereign himself. All the humane endeavours of Lord Clarendon were frustrated by a glaring breach of faith on the part of the Greek Government. It is not possible to find even the smallest excuse for the Greek Government. They are responsible for the whole disaster from the beginning (*Morning Post*, 27th April). The lives of our countrymen were sacrificed to the culpable negligence of the Greek Government in the first instance, and to their bad faith in the second (*Morning Post*, 2nd May). Flagrantly and wantonly violated their word (*Morning Post*, 21st May). Their guilt may be passive or active, but we must pronounce the Government the accomplices

Before dismissing this part of the question, we wish to call our readers' attention to three more points.

The first of these relates to the impediments which it is alleged the Nomarch of Eubœa threw in the way of Mr. Noel's return from Chalcis to Oropos, on the day of the disaster. The facts are these. It appears that on his first journey to Oropos, Mr. Noel crossed the channel in the Chalcis Custom House boat, without obtaining the requisite permission. After returning to

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moral and actual of the brigands (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 26th April). It is evident that the employment of troops was not merely an error of judgment on the part of the authorities, but a distinct breach of faith. They have provoked the murder of British subjects by a deliberate violation of their own solemn promise (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 27th April). Greek vanity and weakness are proved clearly guilty of the deplorable massacre (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 28th April). We know that two prominent members of the Cabinet deliberately broke faith with a foreign envoy. We should insist on the degradation of the two members of the Cabinet who were the immediate cause of the crime by the violation of their promise (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 30th April). The death of the captives was the consequence of your (the Greek Government's) breach of faith. The execution of the brigands now in custody, even supposing that they constituted the whole band, would be no compensation for the escape of Colonel Théagénis, etc. (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 24th May). So the *Pall Mall Gazette* demands the execution of Colonel Théagénis also—Colonel Théagénis, the chosen emissary of Mr. Erskine! Really, the *Pall Mall Gazette* has surpassed itself.

We add another extract from the same paper of the 28th April :—

"We have Mr. Erskine's word for it that the King and the President of the Council gave him pledges the most solemn that the Constitution should be ignored as it often had been before, and that the brigands should go for the thousandth time unmolested. And thus, by adding guilt to guilt, they ensured the murder of men whom they were bound to protect, and whose lives they must have known were jeopardised by their breach of faith"

This statement, that the King and the President promised to ignore the Constitution is simply false. Mr. Erskine no where in his despatches says anything of the kind.

"L.L.D.," writing to the *Standard* of May 10, suggests that "some might imagine that there might be an understanding between the patrols, the robbers and the ministry"; and, adopting Tako's line of argument, adds:—

"Had Mr. Erskine intimated to the brigand ministry of Greece that the refusal of a free pardon would involve the hauling down of his flag and an immediate visit from the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Station, the result would soon have been evident."

Chalcis at noon of the 21st, and communicating by telegraph with Mr. Erskine (see p. 52), Mr. Noel wished to avail himself of the same means of conveyance as before; but the Government boat being required for coast-guard duty, could not possibly be allowed to take Mr. Noel to Oropos again; the Nomarch, therefore, addressed the following document (No. 5, p. 6), to Mr. Noel, and advised him to have recourse to the usual mode of crossing the channel—a private boat:—

"M. MICHALOPOULOS TO MR. NOEL.

"(Translation.)

"Chalcis, April 9—21, 1870.

"Sir,—The boat Methoni cannot possibly take you to Oropos, because it is intended for the duty of patrolling during night time the two harbours and the neighbouring coast. It is therefore requisite that you should have recourse to a private boat.

"I am, &c.,

(Signed) "TH. MICHALPOULOS."

Mr. Noel, complaining of this, wrote to Mr. Erskine on the 22nd April:—

"Had the Nomarch, whose note I enclose, been more active, I might have been back in time to prevent the collision with the troops. As soon as I returned from Oropos yesterday, my boat was arrested and boatmen threatened with being fined by the Telones, because I had departed last Tuesday without his leave."

Now, the accusation and complaint contained in this letter is simply gratuitous. In the first place, we see no reason why, because Mr. Noel happened to be an Englishman engaged in negotiating the release of his countrymen, he should override the laws of the country and disregard its regulations. We can find no fault with the authorities for detaining the Government boat and employing it to its legitimate use, especially as they indicated to Mr. Noel the course he had to pursue. But we would like to inquire of Mr. Noel if there was no other boat to be had. From our knowledge of Chalcis, we should say that in a port of its importance there were ample means for communicating with the coast opposite. Why did not Mr. Noel avail himself of such means? This is passed over in convenient silence here. But

even allowing for argument's sake that Mr. Noel's inability to return to Oropos was due to the Nomarch not being "more active," how can that affect the case, after our knowledge of the events that were taking place on the other side of the channel? In giving the telegrams exchanged between Mr. Noel and Mr. Erskine (p. 52), we requested our readers to pay particular attention to the hours marked on each. The first was despatched by Mr. Noel at 1.40 p m.; Mr. Erskine answered at 3.30; and Mr. Noel's second message was sent at 4.13, when Mr. Noel said he was about to start for Oropos. He now says he was prevented by the Nomarch from going. Granted; but had he started at a quarter past 4, he would have reached the Scala of Oropos at 6, the village of Oropos at half-past 7, and Sykamenon at 8 p.m. at the earliest, and this is making no allowance for any stoppages, &c. Now we know positively (see p. 66) that the brigands started from Oropos at half-past 2 of the same afternoon, and the collision must have commenced at about half-past 4, the time that Mr. Noel would have left Chalcis. In what way is Mr. Noel justified in blaming the authorities whom he treated with contempt, and in asserting that but for their want of activity he "might have been back in time to prevent the collision with the troops." Even with no other proof before us than his above-mentioned letter, we find his allegations baseless. But, in a subsequent letter to his father (No. 13, p. 2), Mr. Noel exposes his own inconsistency. Referring to the incident we now treat, he says:—

"As there was a heavy sea I could not find a boat that evening, so I was obliged to put off my return till next morning. Of course all this was too late—the tragedy had already been complete.

How can this be reconciled to his former outbursts of anger against the Nomarch? Really, out of consideration for a gentleman whom we esteem, and whose good qualities we value, we will not dwell any longer upon this point. For it is evident to us that our young friend's zeal had got the better of his judgment throughout the whole affair. He was from the first captivated by the brigand chief's "cordial greeting," and became a

staunch advocate of conceding all the demands of the brigands. Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No 3, p. 9):—

"Noel may be of great use to us, but he seems to think that all the demands of the brigands ought to be complied with."

Mr. Herbert's words evidently express a dissent from Mr. Noel's way of thinking.

After this Mr. Noel allowed himself to be most cruelly tricked by Tako's "private" confidence, to the effect that he would accept expatriation. We then find him casting the whole blame of the collision with the troops upon the Greek Government; and now he makes another groundless and irrational accusation against the Nomarch, and finally damages the value of his evidence most irreparably by contradicting himself. The young gentleman had evidently no better qualification for the arduous task he undertook than excessive zeal.

The next point is whether the Greek Government was or was not disposed from the very first to pay the ransom. It has been repeatedly asserted as an accepted fact that they had not the least intention of doing so, that they "refused to pay it,"* and, in fact, that the "attack" by the troops was ordered in hope of saving the ransom.† This calumny is so infamous and so thoroughly unscrupulous—there being nothing to justify even a suspicion of such an atrocity—that we only pity the blind rage which prompts men into such contemptible tricks and unworthy devices for

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* *Standard*, 25th April, &c.

† *Pall Mall Gazette*, 27th April, &c. E. A. writes to the *Morning Post*, April 28th:—

"Mr. Erskine wrote that, on behalf of the British Government, he reserved the right to claim the repayment of the ransom money. Would that he had concealed his thoughts! Immediate attack before the money could be paid by the captives' friends must have appeared the only chance for the Greek pocket. There was no other call for such haste, while every consideration of humanity urged delay. The Greek Government have thus announced to the world that they valued their word of honour and the lives of the four prisoners at something less than £25,000.

A. G. S. writes to the *Standard*, 5th May, "that the order to surround the brigands was given 'with malice aforethought, probably in order to save a future demand for the ransom to be paid.' We repeat these contemptible calumnies so as to show to what lengths men blinded by passion can go."

the furtherance of their ends. Englishmen may, to acertain extent, be excused for measuring the acts of others by the standard of £ *s.* and *d.*—with them everything is reduced to a question of money. But this most tragic event might have been made, for decency's sake, an exception to the rule. We have already shown that the Government used every possible means at its disposal to conciliate the brigands, and that there was no "attack" whatever, but a strict adherence to the wishes of the foreign ministers. But even in the absence of such conclusive proofs of honest intentions, we have the best of evidence by which to establish the readiness which the Government evinced from the very first to pay the ransom. Mr. Erskine, in his despatch to Lord Clarendon, dated 14th April (No. 1, p. 5), clearly says :—

"I cannot as yet say very positively by whom the ransom will eventually have to be paid; but I have had the honour of an interview with his Hellenic Majesty, at which he said that he had desired M. Zaimis to take any sum that might be necessary from the bank or elsewhere to pay for the ransom."

Notwithstanding this, on Dr. Domett Stone venturing to remind his countrymen of the fact, Lord Muncaster, then in Paris, flew at this gentleman, upbraiding him for his inconvenient indiscretion. The following correspondence appeared in the *Times* of the 10th May :—

"Hotel Westminster, Paris, May 6.

"Sir,—I have just seen in *The Times* of the 5th of May a letter in which you state 'that it ought to be known that when the ransom (of £25,000) was demanded, the Greek Government immediately offered to transmit that sum.' As I brought the intelligence into Athens on Wednesday, the 13th of April, immediately after my release, that the sum to be paid had been finally reduced to £25,000, or a pardon, and as within a very few hours on that same evening the money was forthcoming through the exceeding kindness of Mr. Merlin (the English Consul), on the guarantee of the English Minister and myself, I am at a loss to know from whom you received the information that the Greek Government had offered to pay the sum. I may mention that on the evening of the 13th of April I wrote to Mr. Vyner, asking how and where the money was to be sent, and got an answer next day, saying, 'The brigands have changed their minds, and now want both ransom and pardon; dont send the money by itself.' From the time of our capture, on the 11th, to the fatal 21st of April, I was in hourly communication with both the English and Italian ministers, and I am perfectly certain that neither to them nor to myself did the Greek Government even offer to find one shilling of the ransom.

"It was a question we intended to reserve for future consideration in case it was not offered. I hope you will send this letter in correction of yours to *The Times*, or I will reserve the right to publish this correspondence. I hope to be in London to-morrow, and a letter to the Carlton Club will always find me.

"I am, sir, your obedient servant,

"MUNCASTER.

"W. Domett Stone, Esq., M.D., &c."

"Medical Club, Spring-gardens, May 9, 1870.

"My Lord,—In confirmation of the statement contained in my letter which appeared in *The Times* of the 5th inst., I beg to refer your Lordship to Mr. Erskine's communication to the Earl of Clarendon, dated Athens, April 14, 1870, from which it appeared that M. Zaimis expressed to Mr. Erskine the profound grief and humiliation with which His Majesty had learnt the misfortune which had befallen his countrymen, and assured him that the Government were prepared to make any sacrifice in their power to effect the release of the captives. Further on Mr. Erskine states that he has had the honour of an interview with his Hellenic Majesty, at which his Majesty said that he desired M. Zaimis to take any sum that might be necessary from the bank, or elsewhere to pay for the ransom.

"Even supposing that I had not received the information respecting the payment of the ransom by the Greek Government from any other source than the above, I submit that alone would have warranted me in making the assertion, the veracity of which your Lordship would seem to impugn.

"In compliance with the request contained in your Lordship's letter, I forward this correspondence to *The Times*, and remain,

"Your obedient servant,

"W. DOMMETT STONE, M.D.

"The Right Honourable Lord Muncaster, &c."

The noble Lord had nothing to say to this, but we desire to refresh his memory with an extract from one of his own letters to his brother, published in the *Times* of the 29th April :—

"The Greeks say that their Government will have to pay, as we were under their escort, and they ought to be forced to do so. . . . . The king has just come back, and Erskine saw him. He wanted to pay the ransom himself."

So that Lord Muncaster, besides having well sounded public opinion on this matter, was perfectly aware of what passed between the King and Mr. Erskine, although he does not report it with accuracy, and although, for reasons best known to his Lordship, he indignantly denies in public that any such offer had

been made. We were perfectly justified in stating, in another place, that Lord Muncaster's recollections are dim and remarkably conflicting.

As far as money matters were concerned, the bearing of the Greek Government was, throughout the whole course of this disastrous affair, most dignified. And the delicate and generous way with which they at once spontaneously promised a liberal pension to Mrs. Lloyd,* and afforded her the means of meeting her pressing requirements,† at a time when, as we are credibly informed, both the English minister and the English residents in Athens, expressed much sympathy for that lady, but put on a long face, and turned their backs as soon as it became a question of material aid,—the conduct of the Greek Government, under these circumstances, we say, is worthy of all praise, and puts to shame calumnies which only dishonour their fabricators.

By these remarks we do not mean to admit for an instant that

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* Mr. Erskine to Lord Clarendon (No. 7, p. 12):—

"I am assured by M. Valaority that whatever sum may be ultimately fixed upon as a pension for Mrs. Lloyd, a bill sanctioning the arrangement will be submitted to the Chamber. Should the Chamber make any difficulty as to the amount, his Majesty will, at all events, take care that Mrs. Lloyd is liberally provided for."

† "The following is the letter of the Greek Prime Minister to Mrs. Lloyd:—

"Athènes, 15-27 Avril, 1870.

"Madame,—Je remplis un douloureux devoir en vous exprimant au nom du Gouvernement ses profonds regrets pour l'affreux malheur dont vous avez été la victime, et qui a été ressenti par toute la nation comme une calamité publique.

"Le Gouvernement désirant en même temps vous faciliter les moyens de votre départ met à votre disposition, Madame, la somme de mille livres sterlings, que la Banque Nationale de Grèce a été chargée par moi de vous compter en monnaie Anglaise.

"Veuillez accepter, Madame, l'expression de mes regrets personnels et de ma considération distinguée.

"Votre très obéissant serviteur,

TH. A. ZAIMIS."

the English and Italian Governments could have had any just claim on Greece for the reimbursement of the ransom. We will remind our readers that in the case of Mr. Moens and the Rev. J. C. Murray Aynsley, Lord Russell declared to the Italian Ambassador in London that those gentleman had—

"No more right to ask the Italian Government to repay them their ransom, than the Ambassador would have were his pocket picked on London Bridge to reclaim the value from the English nation."

In the present instance we do not see in what way the Greek Government is more responsible than the Italian was then.

The third question which we will submit to our readers is one which Lord Muncaster is best able to answer. It is admitted on all hands that the brigands released Lord Muncaster on his *parole of honour*, that he might make arrangements either for the payment of the ransom or for the granting of the amnesty demanded, and that failing this, he was to return. Why did Lord Muncaster not return?* His Lordship has in this instance maintained a perfect, and, under the circumstances, we should think, a judicious, silence. It has been advanced in his favour that, as the brigands did not hold to their original con-

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* A facetious correspondent answers the question in the *Standard* of the 14th May, in the following conclusive manner :—

"To the Editor of the 'Standard.

"Sir,—In your impression of to-day appears a letter from 'An Attentive Looker-on,' in which the writer asks why Lord Muncaster 'did not return to the brigands according to the parole of honour?' A question akin to those pertinent or impertinent requests for information, as to whether 'we bruise our oats?' 'are in want of money?' or 'double up our perambulators?'

"There is an old law maxim—*Qui facit per alium facit per se.* No doubt Lord Muncaster will have no objection to permit the 'Attentive Looker-on,' to go out to Greece and look up the remainder of the uncaught 'Arvanitekoi,' and to all intents and purposes, stand as his deputy; it will be curious to hear whether he ever returns in safety to this country.

"As for Takos, he will probably survive for many a year yet, after this little breeze has blown over.—Yours etc.,

"A Quondam Traveller in Greece."

ditions, but subsequently demanded both the amnesty and the ransom, Lord Muncaster was *ipso facto* released from his word. This may be so, but why, in that case, is the Greek Government blamed for limiting, for the same reason, the bound within which the brigands could enjoy immunity, and why are they accused, for so doing, of bad faith? But that the non-return of Lord Muncaster exasperated the brigands, and was the principal reason for their subsequent diffidence and hardness in dealing, is perfectly clear from more that one circumstance. In Domenico's deposition (No. 13, p. 6), we find the following very important evidence:—

"While I was there (at the brigand's camp), Alexander told me that they had allowed Lord Muncaster to go away because they had already in their power his cousin Vyner, and that it was Alexander who had advised the brigands to let Lord Muncaster (who could make the arrangements better than the others) go. He told me besides that the brigands had determined that if Lord Muncaster did not return, they would cut off the head of him (Alexander) and of Mr. Vyner."

Can any one doubt, after this, that Lord Muncaster's conduct rendered the position of his friends more difficult and more perilous than ever?

But the Greek Government has been blamed, not only for what they had done, but also for what they had left undone,* and even for such measures as never occurred to them to try. This is in the usual style in which the whole question has been discussed by the English press; but may we not ask here, how is it that it never occurred to Mr. Erskine, or to Lord Muncaster, to send round to Oropos, while negotiations wers still going on, an English ship with the ransom, and invite Tako, with a few of his band, on board—hostages being left with the rest of the band until their return—so as to convince them that the money was there at their disposal? We feel sure that the very sight of such, to them, fabulous wealth, all in sparkling gold before them,

* What was done and what was left undone seems to have been equally fatal to the captives. (*Pall Mall Gazette*, 6th May.)

would have gone much further than any abstract argument that could be brought to bear upon their minds. And even if Tako still hesitated, his men would have forced him to accept the terms.

The dispassionate and impartial investigation of the foregoing incidents inevitably leads us to the following conclusions:—1. That all the measures taken were adopted with the full knowledge, consent, and concurrence, nay, even at the suggestion of the foreign ministers. 2. That they approved of them, and reported them to their respective Governments as part of their endeavours for the release of the captives, and never expressed any dissent from or dissatisfaction with these measures. 3. That the choice of Colonel Théagénis as a negotiator was made by Mr. Erskine. 4. That Théagénis implicitly obeyed his instructions. 5. That the brigands first broke the conditions on which immunity from pursuit was guaranteed to them. 6. That they rejected all offers made to them besides the ransom—a safe conduct out of the country, either by sea or land, and a promise of pardon from the King after trial. 7. That the real designs of the brigands were to carry off their captives to the mountains, thereby endangering their health and life, and rendering their release more difficult than ever. 8. That consequently it was decided upon all hands that more stringent measures ought to be adopted. 9. That the brigands were repeatedly, clearly, and fairly warned not to stir from Oropos, and were promised perfect immunity from attack while there. 10. That Colonel Théagénis was commanded to invest Oropos, and that this measure had the full approval of the foreign ministers, and was considered so justifiable and necessary, that the French minister offered to co-operate. 11. That Mr. Noel was pitifully tricked by the crafty confidences of Takos. 12. That the brigands, in spite of repeated warnings, started from Oropos with intent to reach the frontiers. 13. That Colonel Théagénis even then was prepared not to molest them, provided they remained at Sykamenon. 14. That Alexander's conduct is open to grave suspicion, and is a matter for judicial investigation. 15. That the brigands, by

unorganised and concerted movement, endeavoured to break through the troops. 16. That they first fired at the troops. 17. That they murdered Mr. Herbert before any one of them was injured, and that they did so because their unfortunate victim could not keep up with them. 18. That the soldiers, infuriated at this butchery, only then attacked the brigands, in hopes of saving the lives of the rest of the captives, who were evidently menaced with the same fate. 19. That Mr. Noel's accusations against the authorities are groundless and childish. 20. That his return to Oropos would have been of no avail. 21. That the Greek Government was from the very first ready to pay the ransom. 22. That Lord Muncaster's breach of the agreement, entered into with the brigands, irritated them greatly, and rendered them more diffident in their negotiations. 23. Mr. Erskine omitted to use such measures as were likely to tempt the brigands into accepting the terms offered. 24. In conclusion we may repeat—

"That the more deeply one looks into the minute circumstances of this sad drama, the more clearly one perceives a sort of fatality which frustrated all the zeal and all the measures used to prevent the catastrophe."

ALLEGED COMPLICITY OF POLITICAL PERSONAGES, AND LEGAL ADVICE TO THE BRIGANDS.

We now come to a matter which, to our mind, is the most serious part of the whole question, as it affects, not simply the conduct of the administration, but the honor of the whole nation;—we mean, the alleged complicity of men of high standing and their connivance at, and encouragement of, the brigands.

We will begin by laying down what appears to us to be a self-evident truth, requiring no demonstration, but acceptable by all as an axiom—namely, that no systematic crime can exist unless

it be organised. Pickpockets, burglars, garotters, coiners of base money, and utterers of false notes, live and flourish in the very heart of great cities, and in the centres of civilization, because they are thoroughly organized; and it is to a perfect, elaborate organization, that Fenianism owes its vitality and its ability to brave the strenuous but vain efforts made for its extirpation. In the same way, brigandage exists in Greece, in Turkey, in Italy, in Spain, in Hungary, etc., because it is organised; and any measure which attempts its extinction will inevitably fail if it does not strike the evil at the root, if it does not reach its civil elements, so to speak—those members of the fraternity who live in the towns and villages, to all appearance peaceably, but who are its real strength, its sinews, and its life blood, and without whose help the whole fabric would be paralysed, and would soon collapse. But the great difficulty of the cure lies in this very feature, that the stronghold of the evil is the existence of these accomplices, who by their outwardly peaceable bearing, contrive to evade the law.

Brigandage in Greece possesses such accomplices. We admit this frankly and unhesitatingly, because we desire an open and sincere investigation of the whole matter. But we are convinced that they are men of the same grade in society as the brigands themselves, and other common malefactors. This we think we shall be able to prove.

Before doing so, however, let us clear our way of minor impediments. It has been suggested that the brigands must have received information from their confederates in Athens as to the intended excursion to Marathon, and as to the value of the prey that would be at their disposal. Now, there is nothing to substantiate such a supposition. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that the brigands captured the party without receiving any previous intimation. From the testimony of the captured brigands, it is evident that the band had some days past been prowling about in the neighbourhood with no positive plan of operation, but with a vague and general knowledge that during early spring parties of tourists frequently visited Marathon, and

consequently they expected from day to day to fall in with some such rich game.

The brigand, Lori (No. 7, p. 6), deposed :—

"That the chiefs of the band, who were Christo and Tako Arvaniti, Démos Patzaoura, and some others, knowing that tourists ordinarily visit at this season the neighbourhood of Marathon, had led them thither and placed them in ambush. That, in fact, five or six days before the deed of Pikermi, the band nearly took prisoners some American travellers; that this check did not discourage the chiefs, who decided to prowl in the vicinity, in wait for other tourists, who, they said, would arrive."

And from the evidence of another brigand, Costa by name (No. 7, p. 8), we learn :—

"That they knew that tourists would pass by this place where they were in ambuscade for several days. That six days before the exploit at Pickermi they had come near to capturing other tourists. That they did not know with whom they would have to do:"

i.e., they did not know who their captives were.

Mr. Erskine remarks, regarding this last confession :—

"This is confirmed by Lord and Lady Muncaster and Mr. Lloyd, who describe their dancing and singing for joy when they discovered whom they had taken."

This, to which we have already alluded (p. 23), establishes most conclusively that the brigands had received no information as to this particular party meditating an excursion, or as to the high position of the gentlemen composing it. But what appears to us most probable is that a number of horses having been sent to Pickermes overnight, as is usual, that they might be ready to change when the carriages arrived there next morning, the brigands caught sight of such preparations from their hiding place, and naturally concluded that a large party might be expected; they consequently made their arrangements for entrapping it.

But, it is said, however that may be, there is no doubt that, after the capture, the brigands had communications with men in Athens, from whom they received information as to the doings

of the Government, and advice as to what they might ask, and what they might expect. This we do not question, for as we have said, all organised crime has means of information, and confederates who transact the social part of the business, so to speak. The question we will endeavour to elucidate is, *who* these men were. It is generally accepted here in England that the abettors and counsellors of the brigands were men of high standing, politicians, and "leading members of the Opposition." Englishmen place such implicit trust in their representatives abroad, that it is not a matter of surprise that the most conclusive contradiction has failed to shake the first impression created by Mr. Erskine's memorable despatch of the 10th April (No. 2, p. 1). In it, it was stated that:—

"At one time they (the brigands) seemed disposed to accept a ransom of £20,000, on condition that hostages be given to insure their reaching the frontier in safety; but in the course of the night they were visited by persons from Athens, who are believed by M. Zaimis to have been despatched by some of the leading members of the opposition, and who persuaded the brigands to insist on an unconditional amnesty, not only for themselves, but for all their companions now in prison."

This was the basis on which so many preposterous suppositions were built. Still, on the matter being further sifted, what do we find? Why, Mr. Erskine has to confess, in an indirect manner, no doubt, but still practically to confess, that he must have misunderstood Mr. Zaïmis, and mis-quoted his words. As soon as the substance of Mr. Erskine's despatch was made known at Athens, the opposition delegated four of its most influential members to demand an explanation from Mr. Zaïmis. In their letter to him they said:—

"Being directly interested that the truth should be fully exposed, we come, by order of the opposition, to ask from you explanations on this subject. We take this step as much for the sake of the rights of the opposition, as for the sake of the nation's honour and interest, which are closely tied up with the fair fame of those who play a political part in the country. The opposition fulfilling a sacred duty towards the country in these critical moments, protests loudly against similar calumnies, which have so unfavourably influenced public opinion in the civilised world, and which go to make the whole nation

co-responsible (*solidaire*) for odious crimes, the responsibility for which it would be equally unjust and immoral to allow to be cast upon it."

On receipt of this, Mr. Zaïmis addressed a note to Mr. Erskine, complaining that his expressions were not reported correctly, and demanding a rectification of the misunderstanding. Mr. Zaïmis says (No. 9, p. 20):—

"What I remember is that, after the return of the emissaries whom the Government had sent to the brigands, I told you, in making known to you the result of their mission, that, according to their information, other emissaries, sent by persons who *in a spirit of opposition*, desired to create embarrassments to the Government, went also to the brigands that they might persuade them to insist upon the amnesty for themselves and their companions in prison. I did not name the chiefs of the opposition, and did not allude to any one of them. Your perfect sincerity and your sense of fairness (*loyauté*) will induce you, I am convinced, to rectify this misunderstanding."

Mr. Erskine's reply is a model of diplomatic beating about the bush. He neither insists upon his former statement, nor owns his error. He avoids a straightforward answer to a plain question, and plays with words:—

"In answer, he says, to the letter which your Excellency addressed to me yesterday, I do not hesitate to assure you that in the despatch on which you draw my attention, I did not intend to allude to the chiefs of the opposition, and I quite agree with your Excellency that such was not the sense of your communication. Those who are acquainted with the slight shades of expression (*nuances*) of the English language, can entertain no doubt that the words 'by some of the leading members of the opposition' do not in the least indicate the chiefs properly so-called. An Englishman wishing to point to Mr. Disraeli would certainly not say 'a leading member of the opposition,' but 'the leader,' or 'a leader of the opposition.' Besides, this distinction is so clear, that Lord Clarendon, in a despatch which I am instructed to communicate to you, makes use of the expression 'certain leading politicians at Athens'—a phrase which perfectly expresses the shade (*nuance*) which I endeavoured to convey."

Mr. Zaïmis, in answer to the challenge of the opposition, communicated to them this correspondence, and added:—

"In reading this letter you will be convinced, and this assurance I can reiterate to you, that I neither said nor expressed a suspicion that it was the opposition who emboldened the Oropos miscreants in their pretensions."

The opposition did not seem to have been satisfied with Mr.

Erskine's reasoning, which they declared equivocal and unfair, but demanded further explanations, which, however, were not given. We cannot but participate in their dissatisfaction at a transparent subterfuge, such as Mr. Erskine's hairsplitting. The question was not whether Mr. Zaïmis mentioned the *leaders*, or *some leading members* of the opposition, but whether he spoke of politicians and parliamentary opposition at all. Mr. Zaïmis reminds Mr. Erskine that he spoke of "persons who in a spirit of opposition" —that is animated by ill-will and hatred towards the government —"desired to create embarrassments." Now, if Mr. Erskine believed this not to be a correct repetition of Mr. Zaïmis's original expression, he—the representative of a great and powerful nation —ought to have no difficulty in telling Mr. Zaïmis plainly that his first version differed from the second. In the contrary case, he ought candidly to have acknowledged his error. But instead of this, Mr. Erskine beats about the bush, splitting hairs, playing with words, and making distinctions without differences. What possible difference could it make if it were only the leaders, or leading members of the opposition generally, who were under so serious a charge? The question was either to clear the whole opposition of such an accusation, and this Mr. Zaïmis practically does, or to particularize, and definitely fix the stigma upon, certain persons. Mr. Erskine does neither; and his equivocation is a proof of his having originally misconstrued and misreported Mr. Zaïmis's words. We feel certain that had Mr. Zaïmis been Premier of any other country but of weak and defenceless Greece, or, even in his present position, had he been less burdened with troubles than he now is, he could have insisted upon and obtained a more clear and definite explanation from Mr. Erskine.

The first evidence, therefore, of the inaccuracy of Mr. Erskine's report of the conversation with Mr. Zaïmis is the ambiguity and evasiveness of the English minister's explanation. But a more conclusive proof is this:—All matters concerning this melancholy affair were reported by Mr. Zaïmis equally and simultaneously both to the English and to the Italian Minister, whose narratives of the negotiations, etc., substantially agree on every

point, Count Della Minerva's despatches having the advantage of greater clearness and precision on many points. Now, how does the Italian Minister relate this same conversation with Mr. Zaïmis? He says (No. 9, p. 6) :—

"M. Zaïmis told me yesterday that he had found out that two other messengers, besides those of the Government, had left Athens; that one of them was the bearer of a letter to the chief of the brigands, who, on the receipt of it, changed his terms, and instead of discussing the question of amnesty in the way he had apparently decided on, grew emboldened, and put forth new and more serious pretensions, one of which was that the amnesty should be extended to all brigands. These communications between the brigands and *persons not belonging to the Government, and perhaps hostile to it*, have induced the latter to give strict orders to the leaders of the detachments posted along the roads not to allow any one unprovided with a letter from the Minister of War to pass."

It requires very little perspicuity to see, on the one hand, the perfect harmony between this version and Mr. Zaïmis's letter of explanation to Mr. Erskine; and, on the other, the consequent inaccuracy of Mr. Erskine's report of the matter. The persons described by Count Della Minerva, as "hostile to the Government," and by Mr. Zaïmis as actuated "by a spirit of opposition," are transformed by Mr. Erskine's poetical imagination into "leading members of the opposition."

But, we may be told, although Mr. Zaïmis denies having ever mentioned the opposition, and although it is now established that Mr. Erskine's report was inaccurate, still it is clear that Mr. Zaïmis attributed the obstinacy of the brigands in their demand for an amnesty, to instigations made, if not by politicians, at least by persons ill-disposed towards his government, and desirous to create fresh difficulties for the administration.

We will not endeavour to controvert this; for to those who know Mr. Zaïmis's honest but suspicious disposition, and, above all, the excited state in which political passions are in Greece, this allegation cannot appear the heinous crime and national disgrace into which it has been carefully construed by the English press. The only question is, to what extent is that allegation probable, and how far was it justified by collateral

circumstances. The political temper of a country is as accurately represented by the accusations which are commonly exchanged between political parties, as by actual occurrences, and in all countries where political passions run high, such as the above, and even worse accusations are unhesitatingly exchanged in support of this truth. Need we remind our readers of the terrible charges brought against Count Bismark by the German Liberals before 1866; or of the continual accusations of the most heinous crimes—far worse than any underhand dealing with brigands—indulged in against the Emperor of the French by the whole democratic party—by men honoured, petted, and hospitably received on terms of equality in English society? Was it not officially averred that a plot against the Emperor was concocted in the London residence of an English M.P., and a member of the Cabinet; and was not Lord Palmerston *compelled* to request that member to send in his resignation? How long is it since two Princes of the Royal blood engaged in a deadly fight in Spain, because one was accused by the other of all that is most infamous, mean, and even criminal? Last year in Italy we were all puzzled by one of the most dark and infamous party intrigues ever organised. A member of the Parliamentary opposition, Signor Lobbia, was found wounded at night in a secluded street; he alleged that an attempt was made on his life, and that the assassins were men employed for that purpose by the Government. And one need but open the first American newspaper he lays his hand upon, and he will have ample proofs of the cordial way in which American politicians blacken each other's characters, especially during their eloquent orations in Congress. But why should we go so far when, nearer home, we have innumerable instances of similar accusations prompted by political passions. We do not ask Englishmen to go back to the earlier times of their political existence, where they might find political misdeeds and crimes surpassing anything we have mentioned here; we will be content with recording our own experiences of the last few years. We all remember how, during the American war, the largest and most influential part of the

press and of the politicians of this country, openly accused two eminent Englishmen of sympathising with the North out of interested motives, and of thus betraying the interests of their country. Still, future generations will look upon Cobden and Bright as upon benefactors, not of England only, but of the human race at large, and will place them far above the worldly, time-serving, and not over scrupulous politician, who was their chief opponent and accuser. Nor can we ever forget how, when Mr. Gladstone brought before Parliament his Irish Church Bill, not only that same political party, and that same public press, but also many of the most honoured and revered clergy of England accused him from the pulpit of betraying his Church and his Queen at the bidding of the Pope. And yet, even now, men are already agreed that no English statesman was ever the author of a more just, a more great and more salutary measure. But are these instances of political recrimination as grave as the alleged communications between the brigands and men inimical to Mr. Zaïmis's Government? In their way, and considering the circumstances under which each of the political parties referred to above were placed, they are, and they fully bear out what we have asserted from the first, namely, that wherever political passions are excited, there such accusations are freely exchanged, and are considered legitimate weapons of party warfare. These are certainly bad evidences of want of political morality and political training. But this kind of education is the hardest to acquire, and the tardiest to be engrafted into the habits and the social life of peoples. How long is it since England enjoyed an almost perfect constitutional Government, and a moral legislature? How long since is it that Walpole ostentatiously declared that he knew to a penny the price at which every member of the English Parliament of the time could be bought. Irreproachable public morality, and a perfect administration, are not commodities made to order. It has taken centuries of blundering, of strife, of bloodshed, and of bitter experience, such as Greece is now passing through, to make English institutions what they are. And yet, as we have seen even now, in moments

of exceptional excitement, calumnies against political adversaries are freely indulged in by a press held up as a model of probity by members of a Parliament characterised "as the greatest assembly of gentlemen in the world," and by a clergy supposed to be the most enlightened in Christendom! With all this before us we can unhesitatingly affirm that almost all the nations of the West are as great offenders against political morals, and as thoroughly wicked as we are accused of being. Therefore we do not despair of the ultimate regeneration of our country.

Was, then, Mr. Zaïmis's statement simply the result of excitement, and of political animosity? Was there no real foundation for the belief that the brigands received information and advice from Athens, and that there were others besides the band of the Arvanitaioi, who are implicated in this most heinous crime? Far from denying the possibility of such underhand agencies, we have from the very first admitted their existence. We have shown that, like every other organised species of crime, brigandage possesses its town agents. But we have repudiated the idea that these are men of standing and of social position, and have expressed our conviction that they are to be sought in the same class of common malefactors from which Arvanitaki and his followers sprang. But the first objection to this theory will be this:—"How can such men obtain information as to the intentions and doings of the Government, and how can the Prime Minister allude to them as to persons acting 'in a spirit of opposition to the Government?'"

These are objections which will naturally occur to all those who are unacquainted with the real state of society in Greece. But to us the matter is clear and easy of explanation. In the first instance it must be remembered that these men would naturally make it their business to obtain information and be well posted up in everything relating to the interests of their employers. This is no very difficult task in small towns like Athens, where everyone knows everybody, and can easily make himself acquainted with the most private arrangements of his

neighbour, provided he gives himself the trouble to do so. To this must be added the utter absence in Greece of distinction of classes, such as exists, in a more or less marked degree, in other societies, which have been established for a length of time, and where everything is in a normal and ordered state. With us the long subjugation to a barbarous yoke has had the effects of a heavy roller—it has reduced us to a social dead level. There is also in us that democratic spirit of equality which has always been inherent in the Greek character. In Greece, therefore, all mix upon terms of equality, and there is nothing easier than for a sharp-witted low scoundrel to spy and dog the movements of private individuals, to be thoroughly conversant with the political topics of the day, and even to presume to put himself in opposition to the Government, if he happens to consider himself in any way aggrieved. It is in consequence of this want of a trenchant distinction of classes in Greece, that foreigners have repeatedly fallen into grave errors in framing their estimate of the country and the people, and have confounded the *bona fide* political men with low intriguers who thrust themselves in the whirlpool of politics. With these considerations before us, we can give Mr. Zaïmis's words, "persons acting in a spirit of opposition"—an expression, be it remembered, which was made use of in a moment of excitement and fear—their just and real significance; and we have no doubt but that the legal investigation now going on will show that the advisers and informers of Arvanitaki are no others than the three or four men of whose meetings with the band and mysterious conferences with the chiefs, we have fragmentary, but when carefully examined, most conclusive evidence scattered throughout the whole series of despatches before us. Let us examine this evidence.

The first of the brigands captured and conveyed to Athens, Alexios Tossini, or Tzouni, says (No. 4, p. 2),—

"That the day following (the capture), two men in frustanel dress, having the air of military men, approached the band, conversed with them and departed; that he would recognise them, if he saw them, but does not know who they were."

We must remark here, that no regiment of the Greek army is clad in "fustanel dress." That dress is now almost exclusively worn by mountaineers, and men who, without belonging to the army, have been trained to the use of arms. Consequently, these men were certainly no officers, but as "military looking" as Tako, and such individuals generally are. This is the first we hear of these accomplices. But, in a subsequent despatch of Mr. Erskine's (No. 6, p. 3), we trace the same individuals in the testimony of

"Dionysios, Mr. Herbert's servant, who had been sent out to the prisoners from Athens with provisions, and who stated that he had seen two men drinking and singing with the brigands, one of whom he had subsequently met in the streets of Athens, and who had been pointed out to him as a brother of a brigand."

The manner in which Dionysio had subsequently met these men in Athens is related by the German courier, Gleissner (No. 8, p. 2).

"On the 16th, in buying provisions and other little things, as candles, and rum, and tobacco, and paper, and all those things, and coffee, I and Dionyse met, near to the Hotel d'Orient, in one of the principal streets of Athens, five individuals: one of them shook hands with Dionyse, and so did the others afterwards, and asked him in Greek 'How are you?' (I could very nicely understand those little things)—and he said 'Very well.' So one of those individuals just gave him a knock on the shoulder, and he glanced at me, and I could understand that he asked him who I was; and Dionyse told him who I was, and what we were doing. Whether it was Dionyse who asked him to have a glass of wine, or whether it was he who asked Dionyse to have a glass of wine, I do not know; any how, we went into the next shop and had a glass of wine together, and after we had gone from this shop, we left them in there, and Dionyse told me, 'Do not look back,' and I said, 'No.' He said, 'Did you observe the one with a white handkerchief on his head?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Well, he was up there with the brigands last night at nine o'clock.' I said, 'Oh, indeed; how is it that he walks round here just like anybody else?' They had knives and just a Greek dress. 'Oh,' he said, 'Those are spies; either they are of the same company, or they are spies employed by the brigands; that would be just the same, and there are plenty more of them in Athens.' This little incident was on the 16th."

The truth of Dionysio's statement is borne out by the evidence of one of the brigands, Pericles Lori, who states (No. 7, p. 7)—

"That after the departure of Lord Muncaster, whom they called 'the

grandee'—ὁ μεγάλος—they were visited by a servant of the tourists, who was the bearer of provisions; that on the evening of next day others also, whom he did not know, but among whom he remembers to have seen Captain Gako, Nasso, Seliami, Liaco, came to see the chiefs."

Now, who this Seljami or Seljanni was, who figures most prominently throughout the whole of this evidence, is related by Mr. Erskine (No. 9, p. 22):—

"I learn from M. Valaority that in addition to the three persons avowedly sent by Government to treat with the brigands as to the sum to be paid by way of ransom, there was a fourth, named Costa Seljani. It is, therefore, probable that this was the person seen by Mr. Herbert's servant, Dionysio, amongst the brigands, and apparently on terms of great intimacy with them, and whom he subsequently recognised in the streets of Athens. He is the brother of a well-known brigand, who carried off a tradesman of Athens about a year ago. He is now in custody, and admits that he was close to the brigands, near Pikermes, when the capture was effected, and that he witnessed the whole affair. He appears to have come to Athens about the same time as Lady Muncaster and Mrs. Lloyd, and I suspect that he must have been the bearer of the letter demanding a ransom of £50,000, which was shown to me on the following morning."

And, in his despatch of May 18th (No. 12, p. 2), Mr. Erskine says:—

"There is no doubt that Costa Seljani was present when the capture was effected; but he, of course, pretends to have been on the spot, as a shepherd with his flock."

We see, therefore, that starting in search of politicians and influential members of Greek society, we find ourselves, after an unbroken chain of evidence, face to face with this man Seljanni, a man perambulating the streets of Athens "with a white handkerchief round his head," and refreshing himself in the company of a couple of servants in a wine shop, a "brother of a well known brigand," and an individual avowedly carrying on the peaceful occupation of a shepherd. The other four "individuals" undoubtedly must have been of the same sphere as "Captain"* Seljanni, and employed in the same arduous

* The word "Captain" is used by this class of men to designate any one who either had, or is a fit person to have, the command of a band. It denotes no positive grade acknowledged by authority.

task of furnishing information to Tako and his band. This man is now in the hands of the law, and now that Messrs. Cookson and Allen are watching the proceedings on the part of the English Government, Englishmen will, we hope, feel satisfied that "Captain" Seljanni and his confederates will be dealt with according to their deserts.

But this is not the only individual whom we can trace, out of the mass of documents before us. In No. 5, p. 9, we have two letters found on the body of Christo Arvanitaki, one of the chiefs. The first is dated 15-27 February, and it is signed by "Kolliote," who, after some remarks of no interest as far as this matter is concerned, says :—

"I should like to go to you myself, but I have not the time, being obliged to go to Athens, where Messrs. Koussei have procured for me another post."

The last sentence of this letter has been considered as establishing that the writer was a public functionary. We see no ground for such a supposition. Who are Messrs. Koussei? They are not any of the Ministers, and we candidly confess we have never heard of any man of standing at Athens of that name. Why should the post referred to be a government one? Messrs. Koussei may be the members of some firm of merchants or manufacturers, and may have procured this man, Kolliote, a post either in theirs or in some other business. We really do not see why the post should perforce be a public one.

The second letter is a very important one, and we give it in full :—

"Chalcis, 6th (18) April, 1870.

"Brothers,—We are well, and we hope that you also are in good health. What you have done for the prisoners is well done. In accordance with the information which our friends supply, do not ask for money. You should insist as much as possible on the amnesty. All our friends assure us that this can be done. When they go through a certain pass they will be on foot. Otherwise, take care to send some other person to our compère.* We have

* By the word "compère—in Greek, *κουμπάρος*—are designated those persons one of whom has stood godfather to a child of another, and who, by that means, are considered as bound to each other by ties as strong as those of

also a commission which you should in every case receive. To-day I saw our compère, who sends you his compliments.—I am, etc.,

"GEORGE YANON.

"P.S.—Stick tight to the amnesty as much as you can.

"To Messrs. Demetrius and Christo, wherever they may be found."

Now, who is this George Yanon? In the first place, it must be remembered that this letter was addressed to the two brigand chiefs, Tako (Demetrius) and Christo Arvanitaki, and was evidently forwarded from Chalcis at a time when the brigands were at Oropos. Count Della Minerva, referring to this letter (No. 11, p. 8), says :—

"At present it appears, from letters, that the brigands received advice and encouragement from Chalcis, in the neighbourhood of which the other brothers of the Arvanitaki, who are in the service of rich proprietors, reside."

And Mr. Erskine gives a more full account as to the identity of the writer. In his minute of the depositions of the captured brigands (No. 7, p. 5), he says :—

"One of them mentioned that they were waiting for a brother of the Arvanitaki, in the service of Mr. Noel, with whose assistance from Athens their operations were to be conducted. This man is, probably, a certain Dino or Constantino, who is believed to be now at Salonica, and for whose extradition the Greek Government have applied to the Porte. He was suggested to me by the Minister of War on the 12th of April, as reported in my despatch of the 12th of April, as a proper person to open communication with the brigands; or the statement of the brigands may apply to another of these brothers, named George, also in Mr. Noel's service, who is accused of being the author of the letter found upon Christo after his death, of which a copy was enclosed in my despatch to your lordship of the 28th ult., and who is now in prison at Athens."

The brigand, Costa, to whose evidence the above remarks refer, stated (No. 7, p. 8):—

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blood-relationship. It is a kind of *gossipred*, which establishes spiritual relationship. It is the custom that landed proprietors should thus stand godfathers to children of their tenants, and even of such of their servants as have given tokens of fidelity and attachment to their masters. We believe that Mr. Noel stood in such relation to the writer of this letter, the brother of Takos; and it is evident that Yanon refers to him. As we have seen, Mr. Noel had left Chalcis for the brigand camp at Oropos, in company of this man, whom he had in his service.

"That he does not know if Takos, in insisting upon the amnesty, yielded to pressure from without; but, before the capture of the English, he said that his brother was about to arrive from Athens."

And Pericles Lori, another of the captured brigands, said (No. 7, p. 7):—

"That as after the disaster the remnants of the band reproached Tako for advancing the condition, he answered, weeping, that the blame was not his, but theirs who wrote to him from Chalcis to insist on the amnesty."

To this part of the evidence Mr. Erskine makes the following annotation:—

"See inclosure 12, in depatch of April 28 ('Greece, No. 5,' page 9), that is to say, the letter found on Christo's dead body, and signed by Mr. Noel's man, George Yanon, a brother of the Arvanitéï.—E. M. E."

Now, putting all this most conclusive evidence together, can there exist any doubt as to the real state of the case? We have here an English gentlemen, a "rich proprietor," residing near Chalcis, and having in his employ two brothers of well-known outlaws and brigands, with whom they are in regular correspondence. He is furthermore bound to them by ties considered in that country as sacred. Shortly before the capture, one of them is found to be at Athens, and his brothers, the brigand chiefs, expect him to meet them, evidently for "business purposes," for, as Mr. Erskine says, with his "assistance from Athens, their operations were to be conducted."

The other brother, Yanon, is at Chalcis with his employer, and, after the capture, furnishes advice to Takos and Christos, and informs them of the opinions of their "friends." He directs them as to the precautions to be taken during the journey he is about to make to the brigand camp with his master, and at the request of Mr Erskine, and sends to them his master's (the compère's, Mr. Noel's) "compliments." He, the faithful servant of Mr. Noel, the trusted negotiator, urges the brigands repeatedly to "stick tight to the amnesty," and informs them that "all their friends assure them this can be done." That Yanon knew this to be Mr. Noel's opinion also there can be very little doubt. We have already seen (p. 79) that Mr. Noel was of opinion

"that all the demands of the brigands ought to be complied with," and we cannot suppose that his faithful servant was ignorant of his master's convictions. And although not mentioned in any of the despatches yet published, we have it from the most authentic source, that this man, Yanon, whom Mr. Noel took with him to the brigand camp, to facilitate negotiations, was the chief cause of Tako's obstinacy. Tako, while negotiating with Colonel Théagénis, evinced now and then symptoms of abandoning his demand for an amnesty, but each time, after conferring with his brother, Yanon, he returned more obstinate and more unyielding than before. We ask, then, is it not shown most conclusively that the gentleman employed by Mr. Erskine as a confidential negotiator was the cause, unwittingly, we admit, but still effectually and most disastrously, of rendering negotiations almost impossible, and of harbouring two of the most culpable and the most dangerous of the men implicated in this dreadful crime? Had it been shown that these brothers of the Arvanitaki were in the employ of some Greek landowner, and that while in his service they openly communicated with their brigand relatives, that they gave them advice, that they encouraged them to insist upon impossible terms, and that they were one of the main causes of the failure of the negotiations, we ask what abuse, what imprecation, what curse would not have been poured both upon this man and upon the whole Greek nation? He would have been considered an actual accomplice in this crime. And still not a word has been said, no note was taken of these circumstances, now that the employer of informants and abettors of brigands is an Englishman. We do not wish, for an instant, to cast even the suspicion of an imputation upon Mr Noel, whom we sincerely believe to have acted in perfect good faith, and with extreme, though unreasoning, zeal, but we desire to show by contrast the unfair way in which the matter has been handled all along.

The "leading politicians," therefore, who, according to Lord Clarendon, "entered into communication with the brigands, with a view to their own particular aggrandizement," dissolve them-

selves into—1st, "Captain" Seljanni, "brother of a well-known brigand," and shepherd by profession; and 2nd, the two brothers of the brigand chiefs, late residents at Achmetaga,* Eubœa, and now denizens of the Mendresé,† Athens.

But, it will be said, we have it on the authority of the brigands themselves, that their communications were with men of standing, with "high personages" (μεγάλοι). The matter is extremely plain. We have already hinted (p. 60), that had the ransom been handed over to the chiefs, and the prisoners released, the band would have at once risen against Tako and the four or five trusted men by whom he was surrounded,‡ and would have murdered them for the sake of securing what to them must have been fabulous wealth. There appears to have been considerable dissatisfaction amongst the inferior members of the band, at the way they were treated; § and they were evidently anxious to get, at

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* Mr. Noel's property, near Chalcis.

† The Greek Newgate.

‡ In the deposition of the brigand, Lori (No. 7., p. 7) we read:—

"That Tako exercised over the band an absolute authority, seeing that among its members, besides his brother, there were four of his cousins, Démos, Patzaoura, Lareada, and Elias, by means of whom he swayed the others."

§ In the same document the following passage occurs:—

"That the confidant of Tako and Christo was their cousin, Elias; that, in common with the deponent, others also of the band complained that the chiefs had no great consideration for them; that while the chiefs received from the shepherds milk, cheese, and bread of good quality, the inferior members of the band subsisted on flour, which they baked themselves, and cooked in the ashes."

And Mr. Erskine, in his minute of the examination of the brigands (No. 7, p. 5), says:—

"On my asking Pericles why, if the band generally disapproved Tako's obstinacy on this head, they did not oblige him to take the money and release the prisoners, he said they were much divided among themselves; that Tako was surrounded by a sort of body-guard, consisting of six persons, who were all his near relations or countrymen, whilst he and Zomas were the only members of the band from this part of the country, and that they could not induce the others to combine for any purpose. In short, Tako and Christo seemed to have done pretty much as they liked."

least, their share of the booty, and each endeavour to save himself, without insisting upon an amnesty. Lori says, in his evidence (No. 7, p. 7):—

"That the inferior members of the band, among whom was the deponent himself, advised the chiefs to confine themselves to the ransom; but Tako and Christos answered that they were perfectly indifferent on the score of the money, but attached much importance to the amnesty; that, indeed, Tako and his brother had much money. . . . That if the ransom had been brought, the inferior members of the band would have risen against the chiefs—would have possessed themselves of the money and fled."

And another of the captured brigands (No. 7, p. 8) confessed—

"That Tako acted as master towards the rest of the band, which, however, would have deserted him if the ransom had been paid."

To obtain, therefore, the amnesty was for Takos a matter of the utmost importance; without it the ransom was useless, and worse than useless to him. He was perfectly well aware of the temper of his band, and knew what would follow upon £25,000 being handed over to him. In fact, the surest means of punishing him would have been to hand him the ransom without an amnesty, and while he was still surrounded by his irritated followers. He had no need of "high personages" to tell him this; and he was a far more competent "politician" under the circumstances than any adviser he could find in Athens. He knew the views of his men—their impatience to get their share and have done with it. Amnesty to them was no consequence. Mr. Herbert, writing to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 3), says that the amnesty is "a thing to which few of them attach much importance." But to Tako, the amnesty was the principal consideration. He had, therefore, to humour and overawe his men. It was necessary to give weighty reasons for his obstinacy, and none could go further with the ignorant miscreants he swayed

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All this is confirmed by Mr. Herbert, who, on the 16th April, wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 2):—

"My own opinion is that, if it were not for the persistence of the captain, the band would accept proferred terms."

than to assure them that he was acting on the advice of men of standing, of politicians. This is the whole mystery. He went however further, and assured them that he took the opinion of counsel also. To our mind there is no doubt that this also was a mere artifice on the part of Tako; but, as the matter has been made the subject of serious investigation, we will proceed to examine it more minutely.

Mr. Erskine, in his despatch quoted at the beginning of this chapter (No. 2, p. 1), after recording Mr. Zaïmis's alleged suspicions against his political opponents, says :—

"The brigands told M. Zaïmis's agents that they had every reason to trust their present advisers, but that they had sent into Athens to consult three advocates of standing, and that they would not come to any decision until they were in the receipt of the opinion of these advisers."

Count Della Minerva, referring to the same incident (No. 9, p. 5), adds that the brigands named the lawyers they had sent to consult, but that "Mr. Zaïmis doubted that the names of the lawyers communicated to him were the real ones." Now this proves at once that these names were fictitious, and that the whole thing was a farce on the part of the Arvanitakis.

But how groundless and how unjustifiable is the accusation conveyed in the above extract, must be evident to all those who are acquainted with the gentlemen who constitute the Athenian bar. We have no desire to blow their trumpet, but that amongst them there are to be found some of the most able jurists in Europe, men most honourably known amongst the profession both in France and Germany, where most of them have studied, men of the highest integrity and honour, is a matter allowed by those who can give a reliable opinion upon Greek affairs. As soon as the contents of Mr. Erskine's despatch reached Athens, the bar instituted searching enquiries, the result of which was that, being convinced of the total absurdity of the calumny levelled against them, they addressed to the "Journal des Débats," through a committee composed of Messrs. Saripolos, Eliopoulos,

Ballanos, Damaschino,* and Axelos, a most indignant protest, the sincerity and earnestness of which cannot be mistaken (No. 12, p. 7), they said :—

"Une telle conduite, si elle était vraie, aurait imprimé un stigmate éternel sur le front d'avocats ayant l'honneur d'exercer leur profession depuis de longues années. Fideles à notre serment, nous accordons bien avec empressement l'assistance de notre ministère à ceux qui souffrent et aux accusés qui l'invoquent, parceque dans toute société civilisée la loi garantissant à l'accusé la libre défense comme un droit sacré, l'impose à l'avocat comme un devoir honorable; mais nous repoussons de toutes nos forces l'accusation dont il s'agit, et nous affirmons sur l'honneur de nous tous que, jamais l'un de nous n'a prêté le concours de ses connaissances pour aider à la perpétration d'une action coupable, ou pour soustraire astucieusement son auteur à la poursuite légale.

"L'épouvantable crime commis à Pikermi porte un caractère tellement horrible que, comme Hellènes, et déjà rien qu'en notre qualité d'Hellènes, nous le considérons comme une profanation pour le sol de notre patrie, hospitalier depuis le temps les plus réculés, et nous en portons le deuil avec tous nos concitoyens. Mais nous regarderions comme traître à la patrie celui d'entre nous qui, même de loin et indirectement, serait entré en rapport quelconque avec de tels misérables pendant qu'ils exposaient notre patrie à la réprobation universelle."

They at the same time wrote to Mr. Zaïmis demanding explanations as to the statement imputed to him, and the following answer of the Greek Premier is certainly a most conclusive proof that Mr. Erskine was again so far misled by excitement and an overtaxed mind, as to give an inexact account of the conversation he had had with Mr. Zaïmis. Mr. Zaïmis writes :—

"Voici, je suppose, ce qui a donné naissance à ce renseignement inexact. Lorsque les personnes envoyées par le Gouvernement pour persuader les brigands de ne pas insister sur l'amnestie, revinrent, ils nous dirent qu'ils avaient été chargés par le misérable Arvanitaki de demander, sur la question si le Gouvernement pouvait accorder l'amnistie, l'avis de trois citoyens demeurant à Athènes, dont ils connaissaient les noms de réputation, et qui ne sont pas avocats. Tandis que j'indiquais à Mr. Erskine les noms de deux d'entre eux, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères dit ce qui suit :—'Vous voyez, M. le Ministre, que les brigands ont besoin de conseils juridiques pour croire nos dires.' En effet l'un de ces citoyens, au su du Gouvernement et après s'être entendu avec lui, a

* We request our readers to bear in mind that Mr. Damaschino is the legal adviser of the British Legation at Athens.

écrit à Takos une lettre par laquelle il assurait que le Gouvernement n'avait pas le droit d'accorder l'amnistie. En terminant je vous fais observer que vous auriez dû être persuadés qu'aucun membre du Gouvernement ne pouvait jeter le moindre blâme sur le corps des avocats d'ici, qui honore notre patrie par ses lumières et par son indépendance."

This answer, together with their letter to Mr. Zaïmis, and their protest addressed to the "Journal des Debats," the committee of the bar transmitted to Mr. Erskine, who, in his reply (No. 12, p. 8), said :—

"Permettez-moi, d'abord, Messieurs, de vous assurer que je n'ai point accueilli légèrement la pensée que des avocats appartenant au Barreau d'Athènes, dont plusieurs me sont personnellement connus et dont j'apprécie hautement les qualités distingués, aient pu devenir les instruments coupables d'un chef de brigands.

En narrateur fidèle de ce qui se passait autour de moi, j'ai cru devoir entretenir mon Gouvernement de ce que m'avait été dit par M. le Président du Conseil.

"Si plus tard il y a eu divergence entre ses souvenirs et les miens je ne saurais assez regretter que l'équivoque qui a eu lieu ait pu blesser momentanément la juste susceptibilité du Barreau d'Athènes."

So that in this instance again Mr. Erskine is compelled to admit that his version of the conversation with Mr. Zaïmis may not have been accurate.

But that the brigands pretended to have been in possession of legal advice, and that they feigned a desire to obtain the opinion of eminent counsel as to the possibility of an amnesty being accorded them, is only natural. It is evident that it was to their interest to give as much weight to their pretentions as possible, to show that they were well informed on the legal bearings of the question, and well posted up as to the state of the law, and that it was useless to try and cheat them of any advantage they possessed. Of course, their counsel were men "of standing." Who ever applies for advice to an advocate he does not consider "of standing"? And where is there a matter of life and death where "three advocates of standing" are not supposed to be called in? The brigands, with their characteristic shrewdness, succeeded, it appears, in gaining their

point—at least with the English public—namely, to invest their claims with the weight of legal advice!

But admitting, for argument's sake, that they had actually obtained such advice—what is there to cause this outburst of virtuous indignation on the part of the English press? Are we, of all nations, expected to have amongst us no men wicked and base enough to barter away ability and learning against the fees of villains and criminals? And what calling is so honourable and yet counts amongst its members so many unscrupulous men as the legal profession of every land? Have we not heard of burglars obtaining legal advice, here, in this blessed land of saints, before carrying into execution some neat little job? Has it not been recorded in the most circumstantial manner how a party of enterprising British pickpockets, on repairing to the Continent in order to enlarge the sphere of their operations, took care, on their arrival at Boulogne, and before proceeding further, to ascertain from "an advocate of standing" the state of the French law as to such delicate matters as picking pockets and lifting shops? and were not we told how this very eminent and learned gentleman gave then full and satisfactory explanations and pocketed his fee with a placid countenance and a quiet conscience? Why, then, should brigands not pretend to legal advice as to the possibility of an amnesty being accorded to them? The idea of such an enormity shocks the ideas of propriety of our immaculate Philistine, and his gentle feelings are so ruffled upon the mere report of such an outrage that he cannot control himself.

A careful consideration of the evidence before us convinces us, 1. That the brigands do not appear to have received from their agents at Athens any previous intimation as to the intended excursion. 2. That Mr. Zaïmis's alleged statement as to the collusion with the brigands of men opposed to his administration, was at best a hasty expression caused by exasperation and irritation, and by the excited state of political passions in Greece. 3. That the informants and spies of the brigands turn out to be men of their grade—their own brothers and a shepherd, himself

a near relative of another famous brigand. 4. That there is no proof whatever of complicity of other men of a higher social standing. 5. That the alleged legal advice was a vain boast and a designed imposition of the brigands. 6. That Mr. Erskine was hasty in his assertions and inaccurate in the manner he reported his conversations with Mr. Zaïmis.

It is certainly to be regretted that Mr. Erskine should have fallen repeatedly into such misunderstandings, and have been obliged to recede from his original position and acknowledge the inaccuracy of his former statements. How is it we do not find Count Della Minerva in a similar awkward position? Any statement the Government had to make was notified to both ministers in the same manner and at the same time. We have noticed this all through. The discrepancy, therefore, between Mr. Erskine and Count Della Minerva's versions of this circumstance, and the protests made on all sides against the former, are clear proofs of the inaccuracy of the English minister's reports. We can to a certain extent account for, and sympathise with, the excited state of Mr. Erskine's mind (a disadvantage under which he was obviously labouring when those wonderful and magic transformations of his conversation with Mr. Zaïmis were going on within him) by the fact that he was singlehanded, overworked, and harassed by the most perilous position in which his countrymen were placed. But it is, we think, a matter for Englishmen to consider whether this is a dignified position for their representative to hold—to be contradicted, flatly by the Premier of the Government to which he is accredited, and implicitly by one of his colleagues.

But as far as the Greek nation is concerned, the more we examine the question the more do we understand the enormity of the injustice done to us in this matter. An inacurate report of a conversation, evidently made under the influence of the excitement of the moment, and not borne out by the evidence of another equally reliable diplomatist, a charge made against an honourable body of men by no better authority than a couple of miscreants and murderers, actuated by self-interest, a charge

which was indignantly rebuffed by men eagerly courting investigation—such is the flimsy and untenable ground upon which the most preposterous hypotheses were built, upon which the gravest accusations against a whole nation were framed, and from which the most foul abuse was poured upon us. That the insufficiency of the evidence should have been overlooked, and that no further explanations should have been asked, before such accusations as have been levelled against us were made, may be the result of ignorance and credulity in some instances, of prejudice and exasperation in others, but we unhesitatingly and advisedly assert that in most cases, the determination which has been shown, and which we have already noticed, to make use of any rumour, however unfounded, to press into service any calumny, however unscrupulons, to catch at any straw however flimsy, provided these afforded a fresh motive for vilifying and degrading us, was the result of a well-considered and deliberately planned design of furthering political and other ends. This burning desire to degrade us by any means, fair or foul, was manifested, with but few honorable exceptions, by all the organs of the English press, from the highest to the lowest — from the *Times* and the *Morning Post* to the *Illustrated Police News* and its non-pictorial but equally graphic contemporary, the *Daily Telegraph*. These mentors of public opinion had no need to be told in official despatches that men of high standing in Athenian society had intercourse with the brigands; they had expressed their views upon the subject long before Mr. Erskine's despatch appeared. Nevertheless, its appearance was hailed with the most unseemly outbursts of joy, which it was not attempted to conceal, even for decency's sake. Here was the long looked-for opportunity, the unassailable standpoint from which to vomit mercilessly upon our heads all that exasperation, hatred, prejudice, and passion could design. But has it ever occurred to these good men, that, even for their own sake, more proofs were necessary before proceeding to morally assassinate a whole nation in this most ruthless and cowardly manner? Have they paused for a moment to consider what is the state of society in

Greece, what the position of political parties, and under what circumstances those accusations were made, and to what extent they were probable?

Nothing of the kind. No explanation was allowed to interfere with the savage delight with which the "conclusive evidence," forsooth, was paraded. The unfortunate Greek politicians and lawyers were not given even the benefit of a doubt, but were condemned before they could be heard. Yet with what show of justice can the loud and earnest protest of the Athenian Bar be disregarded in this country, when we recollect how, on a recent occasion, a serious charge having been brought against certain royal and noble personages, they had only to present themselves before a judge, protest their innocence, and be fully and immediately exculpated by the English press? A whole nation now protests its innocence; it courts enquiry and asks for investigation. The King desires it; the Government gladly submits to it; and every Greek is determined that no one culpable person, however high, shall be spared. If Comondouros is found guilty, let him be shot; if Boulgaris, let him be hung; if Deligeorges, let him be guillotined; if any of the smaller fry, let them all be put in a rotten hulk, and let them be sunk in the middle of the Ægean Sea. But, in the name of all that is honourable, just, and equitable, let us have time to consider the matter calmly and dispassionately, and let us give these men the chance of that defence which is accorded even to the most culpable of criminals. We desire that the investigation should, in Lord Clarendon's words, be

> "Thorough, complete and sincere in its disregard of persons, of whatever category, whom it may reach, and having for its sole object the truth."

That it will be so, we have no doubt, and knowing the charges brought against the nation, to be, as we have shown, groundless and frivolous, we await the result calmly and unconcernedly.

PUBLICITY OF INVESTIGATION.

But the desire of the Greek Government for a public and open investigation of the whole affair, to which we have alluded, has been questioned, apparently for no better reason than because they have evinced a natural disinclination to interfere in purely judicial matters and to overstep the limits of the law, which in this instance again, they were asked to do.

In the first place, it is alleged that Mr. Yates, the Scotch engineer of the Greek gunboat "Afroessa," for fear of displeasing the Greek Government, was unwilling to give evidence as to what he saw from the top of the mast of his ship, from whence he watched the collision of the troops with the brigands; and it was therefore inferred that what Mr. Yates witnessed must have been most damning evidence against the action of the troops. This impression has arisen from the biassed manner in which the whole subject has been treated all through. Mr. Erskine, in his despatch of the 28th April (No. 5, p. 3), says:—

"Mr. Yates, the Scotch engineer of the Afroessa, has given me an account of the condition in which he discovered the bodies shortly after he came on shore, but *I cannot recollect any particulars that throw much light on the cause of the actual commission.* I requested him to give me a statement in writing of what he had seen, but, being in the service of the Greek Government, he appeared reluctant to do anything that might displease his employers."

From this, it is evident that Mr. Yates had actually related to Mr. Erskine all he knew respecting the collision, and that what he objected to was to give a foreign minister a written statement of occurrences with which he became acquainted while actually engaged in the official capacity he held under the Greek Government. This is precisely what any honest man would have refused to do. But Mr. Erskine, in his usual indefinite style, manages to mislead those who for the first time read his despatch without much attention, and it is only by a subsequent despatch

that he makes his meaning more clear. Writing on the 16th May (No. 12, p. 1), he says:—

"I have the honour to state, with reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, that Mr. Yates, the Scotch engineer of the Affroessa, has invariably shown the *utmost readiness to give information* with respect to the dreadful occurrences of which he was an eye-witness on the 21st April last, and that he has behaved throughout this sad affair with a manly straightforwardness which is highly creditable to him. He assisted in the removal of the bodies on board his vessel with the greatest care and tenderness, and subsequently *communicated freely* on the subject with Commander Prowse and myself; but on my suggesting that he might perhaps address me a detailed written statement as to all he had witnessed, he seemed to think that, as a subordinate officer in the service of the Hellenic Government, there would be objections to his taking upon himself to communicate in writing with Her Majesty's Legation without the sanction of his superiors."

Had Mr. Erskine spoken clearly from the first, he would have saved us much trouble. Mr. Yates *communicated freely* with the British Minister and the captain of an English war-ship, and still we are told that he knows some wonderful mystery about the murder of the unfortunate tourists, and that the perfidious Greek Government will not allow him to speak out! Is it probable that, after Mr. Yates *communicating freely* with several Englishmen, from the ships of war in harbour, with whom he was in daily contact at the Piræus, we should not have known, only too soon, anything he could have said tending to criminate the Greek Government?

This part of the question, therefore, is soon disposed of. But it is further urged that the Greek Government would not allow the legal representatives of the British Ministers to be present at the examination of witnesses. This charge is founded upon ignorance of the law of evidence as existing on the Continent, and upon a misconception of the objection of the Greek Government. According to the terms of the "Code Napoleon"—the French code upon which the Greek, the Italian, and other Continental codes are based—the preliminary examinations of witnesses, which in England are conducted in an open police-court, are in those countries carried on privately (*à huis clos*) in the presence of the Procureur du Roi and his secretary only. Evi-

dence thus taken can be laid before the court; other examinations have no legal weight.* Whether this is a wise law or not, is a question apart; but what the Greek Government very justly objected to, was to allow the law to be transgressed and the evidence to become invalid by the presence of Mr. Erskine, his representative, or any one else not considered by law as a witness.

This was explained by the Greek Minister to Mr. Erskine (No. 10, p. 4.):—

"Aux termes de la loi, l'instruction criminelle est essentiellement secrète, et elle a lieu en présence de la personne à interroger, du Juge Instructeur, et du Greffier, à l'exclusion de toute autre personne. Cette défense est tellement absolue que la loi ne permet ni à la partie civile d'assister aux opérations de l'instruction. La présence d'un autre témoin n'est pas autorisée, que dans les cas seulement où il s'agirait de confronter ce témoin à un autre (Arts. 72, 126, et 303 du Code d'Instruction Criminelle). Mon collègue au Département de la Justice en conclue avec regret que les termes de la loi s'opposent à ce que, conformément aux instructions que vous avez reçues de Lord Clarendon, vous ou M. Watson vous assistiez à l'interrogatoire des détenus ou des autres individus qui se trouvent impliqués dans le crime atroce du massacre des trois Anglais près d'Oropos."

Lord Clarendon was again ready to pooh-pooh these very just and valid objections, simply on the plea of "English interests." He urged that "in every country the tribunal can control its own procedure." But this was not a question of the procedure of a tribunal, but of obedience to the law of the land. In England, where the "uncertainty of the law" is certainly "glorious," doubts might have existed upon a similar point, and each judge might have given a different opinion. But on the Continent the

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* That this is so in Italy also, we have it on Sir A. Paget's authority, (No. 11, p. 14), who, in giving Domenico's evidence, says:—

"I think it right to mention that it has been explained to me by Count Tornielli that the evidence taken yesterday can only, according to Italian law, be made use of as a *pièce administrative*, and, as such, will be communicated to the Italian Minister at Athens; but that should the Greek tribunals desire to have the evidence of Domenico Roella in any prosecution which may be instituted, this evidence must be taken 'à huis clos,' and on oath, in the presence of the Juge d'Instruction and his secretary only."

w is inconveniently positive. The question we are told was subitted to Mr. Damaschino, the legal adviser of the British egation "an Ionian by birth, who has had an excellent legal lucation at Paris, and who is professor of French law at this thens) university," and his opinion—by which Mr. Erskine says : would "be satisfied to be guided,"—was (No. 10, p. 7) that—

"Strictly speaking, the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was compiled M. Maurer on the accession of King Otho, did not absolutely recognise h a right even in the case of interested parties; but that some latitude was t to the examining judge, and that if Mr. Erskine were examined by the ocureur du Roi as a witness on some point of the case, the judge might sequently, at his discretion, allow him to be present at any of the preinary proceedings."

It appears therefore that ultimately, on Mr. Erskine or his reesentative submitting to be examined as a witness, he was allowed be present at the examination of the other witnesses, and thus ere can now exist no doubt whatever as to the sincere and aightforward manner in which the whole case has been invesated. In fact the Athens correspondent of the *Times* conses that "the judicial proceedings were conducted with perfect ler."

A further proof of the desire of the Greek Government to rd Mr. Erskine every facility for satisfying himself as to the th, is the readiness with which they allowed him to examine himself the captured brigands, as is seen in No. 7, pp. 5 and 6. So much therefore for the alleged aversion to a thorough intigation. We will now enquire,

HENCE DID THE BAND OF THE ARVANITAIOI COME, AND TO WHAT NATIONALITY DID THEY BELONG?

This question, although for obvious reasons passed over unteded and practically suppressed by the journalism of this untry, is one of great importance and worthy of serious consiration, both as affording collateral proofs of matters upon which

we have already touched, and as shedding great light upon the whole question of brigandage in Greece.

That the band of the Arvinitaioi was recruited and organised on Turkish territory, and that thence it entered Greece, is a matter which admits of no doubt. It is known from official information, and is also corroborated by the depositions of the captured brigands themselves, who certainly could have no inducement to falsify this part of their evidence. Amongst others Lori (No. 7, p. 6) clearly states

"That the band of the Arvaniti, of which he has been a member for a year, entered Greece in the month of January of the present year, and that this entry was not due to the advice of any one."

How this band, ever since its entry into Greek territory, was hunted down and often beaten by the Greek troops, we shall see further on.

But the composition of the band is a still clearer proof of its Turkish origin. The same brigand, whose evidence we have just quoted, further on deposed (No. 7, p. 6)—

"That he was not in the confidence of any of the chiefs, seeing that he was a stranger to most of the brigands, who were natives of Turkey."

and Mr. Erskine, in his minute of this man's examination (No. 7, p. 5), says that he elicited from him :—

"That Tako was surrounded by a sort of body-guard, consisting of six persons, who were all his near relations or countrymen, while he and Zomas were the only members of the band from this part of the country, and that they could not induce the others to combine for any purpose."*

The names of all these miscreants and their place of birth are known to the authorities. We prefer, however, to give here Mr. Vyner's own list (No. 9, p. 19) as found in his note book, making some corrections in the spelling of the names which on account of his ignorance of the language he appears not to

* As we shall see presently, not two, but three of the band were natives of the kingdom of Greece.

have caught well, and supplementing them with some information derived from official sources :—

1. Demetrios (Takos) Arvanitakis—Chief, from Agrapha in Turkey.
2. Christos Arvanitakis—brother of Takos.
3. Alexis Tzounis, or Tossini, *alias* Khormovas—lieutenant, called Chimariotes, being a native of Chimara, in Albania.
4. Georgios Katarachias—also from Albania.
5. Demetrios Zarkadias.
6. Serafim Fisekis, *alias* Scamagoulis.
7. Elias Stathakis, cousin of Takos, from Agrapha.
8. Periklis Lori, called Viliotes being a native of Vilia, near Megara.
9. Nikolakos Phloros, nephew of the famous brigand chief Drako, from Albania.
10. Demetrios Bonis, *alias* Tzakanikas.
11. Demos Patzaouras, cousin of Takos, from Agrapha.
12. Yeroyannis or Barbayannis, a native of Lokris.
13. Jannis Verphanis, *alias* Pharmakis.
14. Costas Monachos, called Agraphiotes, being a native of Agrapha, from the Turkish village of Derkli.
15. Apostolis Karavidas.
16. Nassos Trompoukis, called Kontos.
17. Nikitas Manachis.
18. Sotirios Zomas, called Barbatzis.
19. Eustratios Xephloudas.
20. Gudis Scaniouris, cousin of Takos, from Agrapha.
21. Photis Nichitas, *alias* Economos, *alias* Mintzithras, from Agrapha.

Of these Nos. 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13, and 18 were killed during the engagement; Nos. 3, 8, 14, 17, and 21 were captured; and Nos. 1, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 19, and 20 are still at large. Only Nos. 8, 12, and 18 are natives of Greece and Greek subjects; the rest are all from Turkey, and belong to a class of nomadic shepherds,* who exist both in Greece and Turkey, and who form a nationality of themselves. They are known by the name of Koutzo-Vallachs, a tribe which immigrated from the borders of the Danube into Greece during the twelfth century. They have a dialect of their own, but most of them speak Greek. The brigand bands which infest Greece and Turkey are composed and are

* These are the "Wallach Shepherds" whom Mr. Lloyd mentions in his diary (No. 5, p. 4).

recruited almost exclusively from this tribe. Their nomadic habits and their minute knowledge of the country give them many advantages over the regular soldiers; their relations also with the shepherds make their subsistence easy, and the detection of their haunts a matter of great difficulty. But even if all other information was wanting, that these men were not of Greek but of Slav origin,* it would be evident to all who have glanced at the

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* The eminent Athens correspondent of the *Times* who takes a particular pleasure in endeavouring to make out, whenever the chance offers, as black a case as possible, against the people amongst whom he lives peaceably and unmolested, writes upon this subject as follows:—

"A large proportion of the brigands are not of Greek, but of Vallach nationality, and belong to the population which gave the name of Great Vlachia to the south-western part of Thessaly and south-eastern part of Epirus in the twelfth century. It must be observed that many of the benefactors who enriched the Hellenic Kingdom and the city of Athens by their donations of money, by founding charitable and scientific societies, and by erecting some of the principal buildings that adorn Athens, have been of the Vallach and not of Greek nationality. This non-Hellenic race furnished one of its most eminent statesmen in Colettes, and one of its best judges in Clonares."

The Athens correspondent of the *Times* is the author of certain historical works relating to different periods of Greek history, of which generally little is known. These productions have been received in England as works of the highest merit. Men, however, who give themselves some trouble before they accept opinions such as this, and who have gone at some depth into the matter, have not failed, long since, to discover, hid under the cloak of epigrammatic sententiousness, abundant misstatements and errors, such as can be produced only by great ignorance of the subject treated, a vain desire to enunciate a new and paradoxical theory, and a craving to satisfy a natural tendency for saying unpleasant and galling things. The above statement is one to the point. The *Times* correspondent has evidently confounded the Greeks of Epirus, who have undoubtedly shown themselves the greatest benefactors of our common Fatherland, with these Vallach nomads, who, far from having ever produced anything but good soldiers, are proverbial for their inaptitude to intellectual culture and civilisation. Our eminent historian has, as is always the case in similar instances, afforded us the confutation of his own statement. He *would* bring an example, and of all men he has picked Colettes and Clonares. Now, if there ever existed Greeks, these men were such. To endeavour to make out that Colettes or Clonares were Vallachs can only excite the mirth of men acquainted with Greek affairs.

ghastly photograph of the heads of the seven brigands shot during the engagement, which was lately published by an enterprising company, and which has been received, as the *Times* informs us, with "savage satisfaction." Their receding foreheads, high cheek-bones, flat noses, large loose lips, and eyes aslant, as seen in nearly all of them, unmistakably declare them to be of the lowest Slav type. Their names also are sure indications of their nationality. "Arvanitaki" means "little Albanian," and is not a surname, properly so called, but a kind of distinctive epithet, such as most of these men are known by, so as to contradistinguish them from others of the same Christian name. Some of these epithets indicate the province or village they come from (such as "Chimariotes," "Agraphiotes," etc.), and others denote some natural conformation or peculiarity which is distinctive to them (such as "Kontos," "Karavidas," "Mintzithras," etc.).

A further proof that this band had its headquarters on Turkish soil, and that its presence in Greece amounted only to a raid, is the determination they entertained all along (see p. 61) to return, with or without their captives, to Agrapha, "on the other side of Greece," as Lord Clarendon puts it, without mentioning the name of the country "on the other side," out of due regard for Turkish susceptibilities.

At first they thought they would be content only with the ransom and a safe conduct. They thought that, after transacting business on Greek territory, they might, as usual return to their homes, and there, undisturbed and secure, enjoy the fruits of their enterprise. In his despatch of the 16th April (No. 2, p. 1) Mr. Erskine says:—

"At one time they seemed disposed to accept a ransom of £22,000, on condition that hostages be given to ensure their reaching the frontiers in safety."

Hostages were promised, as Mr. Erskine states in a later despatch (No. 3, p. 1):—

"If the brigands will content themselves with the exorbitant ransom which the prisoners have already consented to pay, the Government will give hostages who would accompany the band to the frontier."

But the brigands had, in the meantime, changed their mind, and required, for the reasons we have already explained, a Greek amnesty. This being impossible, they enquired of Mr. Erskine, through Mr. Herbert, whether he could oblige them with a Turkish amnesty, and here is Mr. Erskine's reply (No. 5, p. 3):—

"Turkish amnesty does not appear practicable. I cannot say whether the Turks would or would not agree to it, but it would take time, which we have not at our disposal."

Now, we ask why should they desire a Turkish amnesty for a crime committed on Greek soil, if it was not that they were Turkish subjects, and desired to secure by this means a quiet enjoyment in their native country of their ill-gotten wealth?

The tactics of brigands between Greece and Turkey have all along been the same—organise their band on Turkish soil, enter Greece, capture and ransom prisoners, and when either hard pressed or discomfited by Greek troops, retreat again into that hospitable country, there re-organise themselves and begin *da capo*. Lord Clarendon knew this when he gave Mr. Barron his instructions for intercepting the retreat of the remnant of Tako's band into Thessaly. His language, although very cautious, cannot be mistaken. In his despatch of the 2nd May (No. 7, p. 2):—

"From the brigands' confession it seems probable that the remainder of the band, if it escapes pursuit, may seek refuge in the neighbourhood of Agrapha, in the hope of finding, if hard pressed, refuge within the Turkish territory. I have apprised Mr. Barron of this, and you will take care to keep me informed, as far as you can, of any other road towards the Turkish frontier which may be selected by the brigands."

The reasons for this state of things are twofold—the absence of a frontier line capable of protection, and the persistent bad faith of the Turkish authorities in the execution of treaties. For both these evils the so-called "Protecting Powers" are responsible.

The demarcation between neighbouring countries of a line suitable to their peculiar exigencies and capable of being readily defended is always a matter of the utmost importance; but this is much more so, when there exists deeply seated ill-will and natural antipathy between such countries. The commission which marked out the Greek frontier line was composed of men

ignorant of the country, and consequently sure to fall into grave errors. They also followed the secret wishes of their respective Governments, none of which sincerely desired to see Greece constituted into a compact, strong, and really independent kingdom, but did all they could to make her a sickly and consumptive state. The consequence was that the frontier line was drawn in such a way as to leave us exposed to the tender mercies of the Turks. It is impossible to guard it effectually, but by the employment of such a military force as is beyond the powers of the little kingdom to maintain. Bands of brigands, therefore, and other malefactors can cross and recross leisurely and fearlessly. These are questions thoroughly understood by those who have given any attention to the subject, and we would explain here the matter more fully were we not afraid of wearying the reader by lengthy digressions.

In order to mitigate as much as possible the evils arising from such a state of affairs, the Greek Government, after repeated appeals, succeeded in 1856 in persuading the Turkish authorities to agree to a treaty for the better protection of the frontiers against the incursions of bands of marauders, etc., and for the more effectual pursuit of brigands. It was stipulated that the Turkish Government should entrust the guardianship of the frontier to *regular* troops, instead of the irregular Albanian Bashi-bazouks, who were and are still employed for the purpose, and who have always been the real soul of brigandage. Article V.* of that Convention (20th April, 1856) provided that the military detachments of one State may, when in the track of brigands, cross over and continue the pursuit in the territory of the other State until it meets with troops of that State, when it must

* "Si un détachement de poursuite atteignait la ligne frontiére en suivant la trace des brigands, il pourra continuer à leur donner la chasse jusqu'à ce qu'il ait rencontré un détachement de l'autre état. Arrivé là il cessera la poursuite, après avoir indiqué à ce dernier la direction des brigands, à moins que son concours ne soit demandé par l'officer commandant ce détachement, auquel cas il sera obligé de lui donner son appui."

entrust to them the further chase and eventual capture of the criminals. There could be nothing more just and suitable to the exigencies of the case than such provisions. But in what spirit has that treaty been carried out by Turkey? Regular troops were rarely, and only at the earnest requisition of the other powers, posted at the frontiers. The Albanian irregulars were, as of old, allowed to remain there. The consequence is this, that the Turkish irregulars who, as we have stated, are the real soul of brigandage,* not only tolerate, but actually foster the formation of brigand bands who under their auspices cross into Greece, there perpetrate the most atrocious crimes, and, when pursued by Greek troops, recross into Turkey with their booty. The Greek troops follow, but they are at once met by an Albanian detachment, and, according to the terms of the treaty, have to give up the care of further steps to these Turkish guardians. And well do these Albanians do their duty. They meet amicably the brigands, divide the spoil, and the game is recommenced. These are matters well-known to the English Foreign Office—they have been repeatedly related in Consular reports. But it is considered the interest of the Turkophile policy of this country

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* The Constantinople correspondent of the *Standard*, a gentleman remarkable for his laudable desire to make out the best possible case for the Turks, writes on the 30th May as follows:—

"The frontier line between Greece and Turkey must be a lively part of the world to dwell in just now. It has been generally supposed that since the massacre at Oropos the Turkish authorities had adopted the most stringent measures, not only to suppress brigandage in Epirus and Thessaly, but also to preclude the possibility of any Greek brigands crossing over unobserved or finding refuge in Ottoman territory. It is true a successful bag was made of a band of brigands at the beginning of this month by the authorities at Janina; but letters from that quarter still represent the state of affairs to be as bad, or even worse than ever, the inhabitants living in constant dread both of the brigands and their pursuers, the so-called police or frontier guards, who are nothing but brigands in disguise. The great question among the people now seems to be, who shall preserve them from their guardians, for Abdi Pasha's "lambs," who are recruited in Albania, are not above doing something on their own account in the burglary, highway robbery, and murdering line of business. These gentry lately plundered a shop in the town of Arta of a

to hush up such inconvenient revelations.* The Greek Government has repeatedly protested against the bad faith of the Turkish authorities, but to no purpose. England, when applied to, is always ready to excuse Turkey. During the Cretan insurrection when, by way of retaliation for the alleged help afforded to the insurgents, Turkey actually let loose her own irregular troops in the shape of brigands in the northern provinces of Greece,† the Government of King George appealed to England. What was the answer? That Turkey could not be expected to

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large amount of property; and while at Lesberi, in pursuit of brigands, a party of them robbed and murdered a well-to-do peasant, at whose house they were stopping for the night. It is well that people in England should know that bands of brigands can cross to and fro over the frontier line between Greece and Turkey when and where they like. Notwithstanding the request made by Lord Clarendon that a strict watch should be maintained, it is stated as a fact, on the authority of an escaped prisoner, that the chief, Siotaki, whose band is universally dreaded in these parts, is in constant communication with the Greek brigands across the frontier, and that they have frequent interviews in the mountains of Armiro. Siotaki is doing a most lucrative business in the brigand line with perfect impunity. He has captured twelve prisoners lately, for all of whom he demanded large ransoms, while his cruelties are atrocious. Villages are pounced upon in the middle of the night, their chief inhabitants carried off prisoners, and killed; people returning from neighbouring market towns to their villages are waylaid, robbed, and taken captive, and held to ransom; disbanded soldiers roam about the country committing all kinds of excesses; and the only protectors the unfortunate inhabitants have are Abdi Pasha's Albanian *Houdoudiés*, who are brigands and policemen rolled up into one. It is difficult to imagine that any country professing to have a regularly organised government could be in a condition of greater anarchy; and if only in the interests of humanity, not to talk of civilisation, this plundering cut-throat *régime* ought to be brought to a speedy end."

* The impunity and the security which brigands returning from Greece enjoy on Turkish soil is known to Englishmen who have been in the Levant. Mr. J. E. Hodges, in a letter of the 13th April, written from Athens to his brother at Leicester, and published in the English papers, referring to the negotiations with the Arvanitaki, says:—"The money will have to be paid, and that very soon, as it is an easy matter to escape into Turkish territory where they could be comparatively safe."

† Selim Pasha, then Phrassaris (Governor) of Thessaly, actually took into his employ, *as an officer*, for this very purpose, the famous brigand chief, Kortozelos.

keep its regular troops at the frontier when Greek intrigues made their presence necessary elsewhere. Such excuses are simply trumpery, and only prove what we have said, that England has never been disposed to deal justly between Greece and Turkey. The Greek Government, however, feeling the importance of the question, made it the chief and foremost condition for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1869, that Turkey should promise the faithful execution of the treaty.* Turkey promised, but we know what Turkish promises are worth. Irregular troops were still stationed at the frontiers. It was only lately that the Turkish authorities, after repeated and earnest applications on the part of Mr. Zaïmis's Government, sent only two regiments of regulars to the frontiers, and since the last unfortunate events, a third regiment was added — on Lord Clarendon's representations, we presume. The following extract

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* In his note of 7th January, 1869, Mr. Delyanni, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, said:—

"En terminant, le Gouvernement du Roi soumet à l'application impartiale et éclairée des Représentants des Grandes Puissances Européennes ses propres demandes reconventionnelles contre la Turquie :—

"Il existe entre la Grèce et la Turquie un acte solennel, une Convention conclue et signée entre les deux Etats, pour la première fois le $\frac{8}{20}$ Avril, 1856, ensuite dénoncée par la Turquie en 1861, et renouvelée le 29 Septembre, 1865. L'Article III de cette Convention porte :—

"'Les deux Hautes Parties Contractantes conviennent mutuellement d'employer, chacune de son côté, des troupes regulières pour la garde de leurs provinces limitrophes. Les troupes de chaque Etat doivent être d'une force suffisante, et seront placées sous les ordres d'un commandant supérieur, qui sera tenu de poursuivre activement le brigandage dans toute l'étendue de son ressort.'

"La Grèce a, dès l'année 1855, exécuté cet Article, mais le Gouvernement Ottoman continue à se refuser de s'y conformer. Ce n'est donc point là une demande vague et indéterminée, comme celle que la Turquie fait concernant l'exécution des Traités, sans dire quels sont ces Traités et en quoi le Gouvernement Hellénique y a contrevenu ; mais une stipulation précise que le Gouvernement Hellénique invoque, et sur laquelle le repos de ses provinces limitrophes, aussi longtemps qu'elles resteront exposées et ouvertes faute de limites raisonnables, lui commande d'insister et d'en faire une condition de la reprise de ses rapports avec la Turquie."

from Mr. Erskine's despatch of the 12th May (No. 10, p. 5), confirms all we have said :—

"In Turkey also the authorities are said to be very successful of late. A band of twenty-seven brigands had been formed under an ex-officer of the irregular troops, and composed exclusively of disbanded soldiers, who were said to be about to penetrate into Greece ; but they were attacked with great vigour by the Turkish regular force, *now employed* on the frontier, who killed fourteen of the band and captured seven, whilst only six escaped. The French admiral, who has just returned from Volo, gave me this information, adding that the fourteen heads were exposed at Larissa."

The name of this officer of irregular Bashi-bazouks is unfortunately only too well known for his terrible atrocities, while still a paid official of the paternal government of the Sultan. Youssouf Gavorik and his lieutenant, Djemali, were for a long time the terror of the poor inhabitants of those parts.

As long as this state of affairs lasts, there can be no security for Greece. It is worse than hypocrisy on the part of the protecting powers to abuse Greece for a state of things for which they are entirely responsible. They created this untenable position, and they maintain it. It is all very well to ask us to have our house safe and orderly, but we may very justly retort that if those, under whose auspices this house has been given to our keeping, will not allow us to keep our door locked, they must be held responsible for the consequences.

But, it has been maintained, the Greek Government has never sincerely exerted itself in the extirpation of brigandage. This is a gratuitous charge unsupported by evidence. The Greek Government has done all that any administration, under similar circumstances would have done. The facilities for the perpetration of acts of brigandage are great in Greece, by reason of its territorial configuration, the thinness of the population, the nomadic life of the tribe of Wallach shepherds, amongst whom the brigands find help and succour of every kind, and last but not least, the facility with which bands can cross the frontier and find security and patronage on Turkish soil. To all these matters we will revert in the following chapters. But we will give here the brigands' own evidence as to the amount of

toleration and impunity they obtained at the hands of the Greek authorities. One of the captured brigands, Lori, states (No. 7, p. 6), that the band, after entering Greece, in January last, was first beaten at Levadia, where many of its members were either killed or wounded; that it was then attacked for the second time in Ritzoná, and again at Himadia, where it received succour from the shepherds. In these engagements three of its members were captured and were tried, with the other four captured at Oropos, and condemned to death, as we already know. The severity with which the band was handled is evident from the dread Takos had of the troops, even the smallest detachments, and the readiness he avowed of abandoning his lawless career, in a country which he found too hot for him.

Mr. Herbert wrote to Mr. Erskine (No. 3, p. 3):—

"The captain says he would throw away his gun at once if he could get pardoned."

And to Colonel Théagénis (No. 3, p. 12), the brigand chief

"Repeated always that they wished to save their heads and save them on the spot."

And avowed their belief that

"God had sent them the prisoners in order to save them" (the brigands).

Are these expressions of men who find their occupation an easy and safe one, unattended by the geatest danger, and tolerated by the authorities? The brigands knew that toleration and safety were to be found on Turkish soil only, and consequently made for that country, as we have already seen.

All these facts, although not absolving the Greek Government from as much responsibility as can be attached to any Government for the perpetration of crime on its territory, are nevertheless most important items in a fair consideration of the whole case, and inseparable from it. The conclusions to which we inevitably arrive at this part of our investigation are:—1. That this band was recruited and organised on Turkish soil, whence it crossed into Greece. 2. That it was composed almost exclusively of Turkish subjects. 3. That the band was repeatedly

attacked and severely crippled by the Greek troops. 4. That on account of the insufficiency of the Greek frontier, bands of malefactors can easily cross into that country. 5. That the Turkish irregular troops are the chief abettors of brigands; and 6. That Turkey has never desired to execute faithfully its treaty engagements, but has been instrumental to the vitality of brigandage.

EXISTENCE OF BRIGANDAGE IN GREECE AND IN OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE dimensions which these notes have already taken, and the absence of leisure, compel us to abandon the project we entertained of giving here a brief but comprehensive account of the causes which led to the formation of the first Klephtic bands under the Turkish rule, and of the circumstances which contributed to the continuation in later times of an organisation that ought to have ceased as soon as the chief cause of its existence was partly removed, and which led to the deterioration, into a curse and a source of weakness, of what was formerly a national necessity and a fountain of strength.* Else we would have shown that it was the intolerable system of crapulous tyranny of the Mahomedan barbarians which first forced the most spirited, the most brave, and the most patriotic men of the Greek nation to become outlaws. From the precipitous ranges of Ossa, Olympus and Pindus, the Klephts of old defied their oppressors, and there kept up the traditions of their nationality vivid, and the love for their freedom burning, until the time arrived when those bands became the chief instrument of their country's liberation. Their

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* We refer those of our readers who desire to obtain a faithful and graphic account of the Klephts, as they existed before the revolution, to the Preface of C. Fauriel's "Chants populaires de la Gréce Modérne," Paris, 1824.

life was a wild and lawless one, but there was an element of chivalrous nobility and simple grandeur about them that was admired even by their enemies. The Greeks, as a nation, were then in the position of the unhappy victims of Oropos, whose fate we all deplore; the Turks held the position of a band of brigands many times as numerous, who had seized and bound them; and the Greeks did what the English captives would have done, if it were possible—endeavoured to emancipate themselves by any means in their power. It was thus that the attacks and depredations of the Klephts were then directed against the Turks alone, upon whom they retaliated for every wrong inflicted upon their countrymen of the towns and villages. A raya family which had a son in the mountains was far more secure from the exactions and insults of the Turks than one whose submission was complete. The captain of the Klephts reasoned like "Roderick Dhu," in the *Lady of the Lake*—

> "But in this fortress of the North,
> Think'st thou we will not sally forth,
> To spoil the spoiler as we may,
> And from the robber rend the prey?"

The halo of a national glory encircled, therefore, the existence of these men, who were looked upon as the champions of faith and independence, and who kept alive the hatred to the Turk. They, on their part, justly considered themselves as a superior caste to the common rayas, who trembled at the sight of the Osmanlis. The answer Kolokotronis gave to those who advised him to submit is a characteristic example of the high and independent mind which guided those men; he said—

> "The Turks have murdered other Greeks, and made slaves of many; but we have lived free from generation to generation; our king was killed in battle without making peace; his guard has since kept up the fight, and some of his castles are still unsubdued. We, the Klephts, are his guard, and Maïna and Souli his castles."

Thus lived these men, unconquered and unsubdued, until the day arrived when they freed the land of their fathers of the

infidel pest, and hailed a new king. But the misfortunes of Greece had not yet ended, and the Protecting Powers preferred to the wise and mature Prince whom they might have chosen to reign over us, an inexperienced youth, who was to be represented by a council of stolid, pedantic, and hungry Bavarians. The Regency was ignorant of the men it undertook to govern, and incapable of either understanding or appreciating their quick and fiery, but honest and enthusiastic, nature. These men, elated by victory, ridiculed the pedantic forms and vain regulations to which the Bavarians endeavoured to reduce them, and which were diametrically opposed to their habits, and useless in reality. The Bavarians, instead of humouring, exasperated them by a show of force which the captains of the revolutionary troops knew was of no avail. The Bavarians insisted, and the men who had shed their life's-blood for generations, and had endured untold privations for years past, in order to obtain what they thought would be liberty, and who, by their heroism, obtained undying fame, now found themselves dragged into prison and treated with contempt by men who had no title to power but what chance had given them, and who individually were mere nonentities as compared with Kolokotronis, Gouras, Grivas, and Plessas. The result was that some of these adopted the only way they knew of avenging a wrong, and which they had found to answer—to take to the mountain. Thus the first and best opportunity of eradicating brigandage, by the oblivion which the Eight Years' War had cast over the past, and by the return to peaceable life, which a wise administration, understanding the people, and bearing up with their foibles could have inaugurated—that golden opportunity was irretrievably lost, never to return again. The beginning once made, the evil was not easily to be put a stop to in a country demoralised by many centuries' barbarous slavery, and completely unsettled by many years' devastating war. Henceforth every one who considered himself aggrieved took to the hills.

The traditions of the people were still such as to honour those who bore the name of Klepht; the Klephtic songs of bygone times were still the popular ballads; and the difference between

resistance to alien oppressors and revolt against the laws of one's own country could not be at once appreciated. For many years, therefore, even after King Otho's accession to the throne, the people sympathised with the Klephts. The thinness of the population, the mildness of the climate, and the territorial configuration of the country gave the Klepht additional advantages. A Klepht had undisputed and solitary possession of immense tracts of desert land, uninhabited but by a few shepherds, his own kith and kin. His hardy constitution was not tried much by a short winter; and the rocky mountains, and the thick brushwood gave him shelter, and afforded him hiding-places such as could remain undetected by the soldiery sent in his pursuit. Detachments have been known to pass within a few yards of the crag or shrub that concealed their man, without suspecting his presence. But the brigand found other and more effectual means of asserting his power. Political passions, thanks to the jealousies of the three "protecting" powers, run high. The unfortunate country had been made the chess-board of European diplomacy, and was rent into three great parties—the English, the French, and the Russians, with the respective ambassador at the head of each. Their strength was very nearly equal, and they could not afford to be over scrupulous as to means employed. A great battle was at one time impending, and additional forces were sought from all sides. At this juncture, the ambassador of a certain very Christian and righteous power, which is shocked at the immorality of Greek politicians, proved himself the real *Lion* of the situation. He conceived the luminous idea of taking into the service of his party a certain famous brigand chief, later on a faithful and peaceful adherent of that power; the position of that party was at once rendered far superior to that of its opponents, and our clever diplomat came off victorious. Ever since, brigandage has been made use of more or less for such purposes. Why should Greek politicians be expected to be more moral than the ambassador of a very Christian and law-abiding country? He set the example, he established the precedent; why should it not be followed by men who were taught to mimic the doings of European politicians? This is the whole truth.

It is an unpleasant one, but it must be told. The thing was managed cleverly, but not secretly enough to escape Greek shrewdness. What we have related is a matter of public notoriety at Athens, an accepted and well-known fact. But is Greece the only country where brigandage has been used for political ends? Has not the thing been successfully tried in Italy? Has not His Holiness the Pope employed brigands, blessed and sanctified beforehand, to vent his Christian revenge upon the excommunicated King of Italy; and has not this been done while the presence of French troops at Rome lent an implied sanction to the performance?* Have not brigands done good work of that description in Spain? And yet, when have English papers cast upon any of these countries the tenth part of the abuse heaped upon us now! Let us not be hypocrites; let us acknowledge candidly what is an indisputable axiom—that in every country there exists a certain amount of tendency to crime, and that that tendency takes the direction most favoured by political, social, moral or natural causes. In a thinly-populated country, and cut up by rugged mountains, in an unsettled state of society, and in a land where the peasantry are uneducated, the quota of criminals become brigands, bushrangers and cattle lifters. In a more civilised state of society, where good roads exist, and where there are no ready means of detaining captives, we have the footpad and the highwayman. And lastly, refined and scientific crime is found in countries where railways have superseded the coach, and where the country is a continual town; wherever mechanical art has been brought to a perfection and the population is thick, the criminal classes take to picking pockets, housebreaking, garotting, coining base money, committing gigantic assassinations, and organising trade union and agrarian outrages. Every country has gone through these three stages. Crime exists always and everywhere. It varies only in form. Tastes may differ, and people may prefer having their house broken into, to paying a round sum down; or being garotted or

* We may remind our readers that the famous brigand chief, Gasparoni, was a near relative, uncle we believe, of Cardinal Antonelli.

shot at, as they quietly go to market, to being killed for not paying a ransom, or for not being able to obtain an amnesty in favour of one's captors, but criminals as a rule consult their own convenience, not the predilections of their victims. Crime in this country has gone through the three successive stages we have sketched. Only a hundred and fifty years ago a "gentleman-cateran" was a most honourable member of Scotch society. We are told that "cattle-lifting was an honourable branch of Scottish industry, and all the nobility and gentry in the North are descended from persons who, if they lived to-day, would be called habitual criminals."

Rob Roy was a hero, and there existed a noble spirit of competition between England and its Northern neighbour in the way of outlawry, as we learn from a popular ballad:—

> "A famous man was Robin Hood,
> The English ballad-singer's joy;
> But Scotland has a thief as good,
> She has, she has her brave Rob Roy."

Hereward and Johnny Armstrong must not be overlooked, nor must it be forgotten that all these ruffians—in whom there is nothing of that patriotic feeling which excused formerly the Greek Klepht, and absolutely no redeeming trait as may be found in the more degenerate brigands of to-day—had succeeded in captivating the hearts of many noble damsels of their time, and even now their exploits are fondly remembered by a large class of Englishmen. At a later time Claude Duval, Dick Turpin, &c. were far more complete masters of the English highways, than Arvanitakis of the Pickermes road. And although these instances of violence and outlawry are looked upon by many in the same way as an upstart looks upon his low extraction, we know that they still fascinate the imagination of many an ardent English youth. Coming to a more modern period, we have no less an authority than that of Macaulay for asserting that at the time of William III. there was absolutely no security whatever on the high roads; and only a generation ago no coach taking the northern and western roads from London could feel safe.

We have been credibly informed by Englishmen who remem-

ber the time immediately preceding the establishment of railways, that coaches running through certain parts of the country (Blackheath, etc.) had to be protected by armed men; and considering the amount of garotting that has been going on lately, and which we ourselves narrowly escaped, we have no doubt that the highwayman's occupation has been given up not because it was rendered dangerous by the strength of the law, but because it became unprofitable by the use of the rail. Criminals have now other openings wherein to gain both glory* and profit. Garotting has intermittent fits of activity, just when the public dreams least of it. We remember the time, three years ago, when no one dare venture into any of the more secluded streets of London unless protected by a revolver, and we have no doubt but that we shall soon see a revival in the trade. Garotting is in this country a thoroughly organised industry; and as for burglary, why, that has been reduced to an art. We cannot forget the astounding revelations made by "Captain" Casey, regarding his operations in Cornhill, which he and "his men" leisurely carried on, under the very nose of the police, from a Saturday afternoon to a Monday morning. Burglars are so secure in London that they have given up late hours. They carry on their trade like honest folk—in broad daylight. Here is an unadorned descrip-

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* We use the word advisedly. We have a very vivid recollection of the admiration evoked by, and the compliments paid to, the famous Casey for the cleverness with which he broke into Mr. Walker's shop. This admiration was not confined to "the roughs," but a more genteel class of English society was moved by the neatness of the performance. And here is what the *Daily News* wrote regarding the feelings of some good Christians, who we have no doubt went twice to church on a Sunday, towards the renowned Higgs:—

"It is a suggestive fact that whilst the most accomplished swindler of the present year is covered with obloquy by the press, by his late patrons, and by the general public, he is still a popular character in the neighbourhood where he lately flourished in all the glory of ten thousand a year. Higgs may be a felon in the dock—if he can be got hold of; and, whether he can or cannot, he will be a villain, a rogue, and an impostor in the estimation of directors and the moralists of the hour. But one thing is certain—he is regarded more as a martyr than as a criminal, rather in the light of a hero than a cheat, by certain classes of people on the particular banks of the Thames where he dispenses hospitality no more."

tion of the "institution," lately given by a London evening journal :—

"When one reads the long catalogue of unowned property—from rings set with brilliants, and gold watches, down to petticoats and surgical instruments—found in possession of a remanded prisoner, it becomes at once apparent that the man who can burgle cleverly has a promising career before him. No longer is it done, by the more skilful professors at least, in the old, clumsy, alarming way. Black masks and dark lanterns are out of fashion. You need not fear being awakened at dead of night by a ruffian with a revolver, prepared for murder unless you surrender your property. No ; a burglary is now the pleasant facile work of a vernal afternoon. Man, being reasonable, must dine out occasionally ; the occasion is known beforehand, by means of area gossip. . . . If, as is stated, there are gangs of burglars in full practice in London, all of whom are known, their impunity is as great a disgrace to our Government as the existence of organised brigandage to that of Greece."

And here is the opinion of the *Saturday Review* regarding the state of security in the streets of London :—

"We may as well confess that London is, in a different way, as anarchical as Attica. It is probable that, under a strong escort, a party of tourists might safely visit the plain of Marathon, and ladies may perhaps proceed from the Temple to Westminster Bridge on Sunday evening secure from all annoyance except bad language, provided they are accompanied by an adequate force of policemen. If it be said that Greek brigandage could be put down by well-directed vigour, the same may be said of London rowdyism. The existing police are as nearly as possible ineffectual, and the magistrates would utterly annihilate the force by their absurd suggestions. . . . . Unless the police can catch these roughs, and the magistrates will punish them, it will begin to be truly said that the two most lawless places in all Europe are Attica and the metropolis of Great Britain."

"Habitual criminals," in the true sense of the word, exist only in England, and we have heard no where else of an "Iron Bess"—a wild beast in the form of a woman who had been convicted fifty times during an eventful life of 45 years. And yet Londoners feel themselves compelled to be joint tenants of their city with thousands of such felons, all well-known to the police. We need utter but one name—Broadhead—wherewith to silence those who rave against "organised crime" in Greece. Yet Broadhead is a hero and a martyr in the eyes of a large section of the British people; and he actually received an ovation on his return to Sheffield. Here is the picture of a "*Civis Romanus*," as he enjoys himself at home :—

"Mr. Johnson, master-builder, of Manchester, and one of the most pronounced advocates of the introduction of machinery into brick-yards, has been spied and threatened. His servants wish to leave him; his friends dare not see him; his coachman is afraid to drive him home at night; he alone knows where he intends to sleep. Attempts have been made to burn his premises and blow up his house. His next-door neighbours have been advised to take their repose elsewhere, and the Midland Railway Company were informed that a building just completed for it by Mr. Johnson would shortly explode. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Mr. A. Mault, editor of the *Builders' Trade Circular*, should ask whether this is a description of Tipperary or of the busiest part of the second city of England; or that Mr. Johnson himself should exclaim, "Truly, life is becoming almost unbearable. My friends say I have no right to live in the country. This is a fearful state of things for a civilised country."*

We might go on multiplying such instances until we filled volumes. What we have said in the beginning is amply proved —that there exists in England, this earthly paradise, as much if not more crime than in any part of Greece or Turkey—that it takes that direction which is most favoured by circumstances. Our good friends who are so shocked by the existence of brigandage may be assured that there are hopes of brigands giving way at some future time to other criminals, less savage but more accomplished. For ourselves, we must confess that between the two evils we would prefer brigands, for "it is more possible to reclaim a predatory population than to reform the outcasts of a regular society."

And what need we say of Ireland? Will England, with that appalling spectacle before her, taunt poor Greece? England, who with her enormous power, her centuries of political life and experience, and in the midst of her immense prosperity, has failed ignominiously, not only in making life secure, but even in governing that unhappy country in a decent way. The assassinations committed there were once upon a time considered "agrarian outrages." But now men are "tumbled" even for the dismissal of a servant.

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* The *Pall Mall Gazette* (10th May) remarks:—

"Mr. Johnson falls into the common error of fancying that England is a civilised country—it is a fine, free, savage place; but after the ovations given at Sheffield to that interesting murderer, Mr. Broadhead, no one can accuse us of civilisation."

"A railway station-master was the other day killed for dismissing a porter, and a tradesman for raising the price of butter and eggs; and a justice of the peace has been shot because, in the ordinary course of his duty, he committed a sheap-stealer to prison."

In Cavan, parties of men traverse the country at night, levying contributions on the inhabitants and collecting arms. Gunsmiths' shops, in the principal streets of Dublin, are pillaged in broad day-light; and noses of unoffending citizens are cut off by men with blackened faces, for the mere fun of the thing. Landowners are warned of the day and hour they are to die,* and arson is a legitimate means of redress for alleged wrongs. Nor is this state of things on the decline. Lawlessness spreads to districts hitherto exempt from such violence. The eye-witnesses of murder never give evidence against the criminals, and the whole population breathes nothing but settled hostility to the law. We have said nothing of Fenianism—the most gigantic organisation of outlawry ever witnessed, the result of centuries of injustice and misgovernment, a fraternity of miscreants, who succeed not only in rendering their own country uninhabitable, but in carrying on operations against the English Government from all parts of the world; in blowing up prisons, releasing "head centres," and in making it necessary to guard against their threatened destruction, all the public buildings of the metropolis, and the offices of those newspapers which cry most loudly against "the Brotherhood." Let us hear no more of the holy horror

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* We have a confession to make. During the late merciless onslaughts made upon Greece by the English press, after reading an exceptionally bitter and rabid article, we turned to No. 1589, page 409, of the *Illustrated London News*, and contemplated the picture of a "Meath country gentleman walking in his park." We are told that—

"He seldom ventures beyond the limits of his own park, and whenever he takes a walk he carries a loaded rifle, and is protected by a constable on each side of him, with two more constables behind, all with their carbines at full cock. If he goes along the high road, he is followed by a party of armed policemen in a ear, with a short ladder by which to scale any wall over which the assassins might escape pursuit."

We have not yet come to that in Greece. In a subsequent number, we have the picture of a "Westmeath gentleman farmer attending Mullingar Market" under similar precautions. We feel deeply grateful to the *Illustrated London News*.

expressed as to the condition of Greece, but let Englishmen remember André Chenier's saying, that they are ridiculous detractors of all foreigners, and credulous admirers of themselves.

But what is the condition of other countries? We will not waste time by recording the doings of brigands in Turkey. All men who do not wish to deceive themselves and others, know that brigandage in that country is as rife and rampant as in any part of the world. In England this truth is hushed up for obvious reasons; and there is also this, that the Turkish Government takes good care to silence effectually any newspaper within its territory which dares to make known the real state of affairs. In Greece, on the contrary, the least thing is magnified and trumpeted aloud by Greek journalists themselves, and our good friends abroad take so lively an interest in all our affairs as not to allow any good news to be lost. We have already shown that the most formidable brigands are the ex-officers of the Sultan, and the chief abettors of brigandage, his Albanian Bashi-bazouks. The Father of the Faithful himself was taken, some years ago, while on a hunting expedition, by a band of brigands, and remained in their power for some hours. We will not, therefore, waste shot upon dead ducks.

Nor will we say anything of the state of the American republics, where the most unheard of atrocities are daily perpetrated.* In

* We append the following thrilling account of incredible barbarity:—

"A story of brigandage comes from Chili. Don Gomez y Lagoberon, a famous bandit captain, who, from his fastnesses in the Sierra Profunda, has long defied the Chilian authorities, was pursued, with the brigands under his command, by a body of troops, which succeeded in driving him to take refuge in a cavern near the summit of a lofty mountain. In this cavern he had concealed a female captive, whose husband he had robbed and slain, and whom he had for some time compelled to live with him. The soldiers made several attempts to reach the entrance of this cavern, to which there was only one means of access—a mere mountain-goat track; but Lagoberon rolled heavy rocks down upon them, and succeeded in beating them off, after several men had been severely injured. The officer in command resolved to starve the bandit out. After two days' blockade, however, the soldiers improvised an escalade of the robber-chieftain's stronghold, and succeeded in capturing him. To their horror, they found that Lagoberon had cut off one of his unfortunate companion's breasts, and eaten it. The poor woman was discovered in a dying state, having sustained a fearful loss of blood; and she expired shortly after her rescue from

the remoter regions of the United States, as for instance in Texas, the law is far more powerless than at Pikermes; and Englishmen ought to know what direction crime takes in unsettled, as yet, and thinly populated countries, by their experience of the Australian Bushrangers and the Jamaica Maroons.

But let us come nearer home. We unhesitatingly declare that there is no country in Europe where brigandage has such a hold upon the people as in Italy. We need not give here a detailed account of the fearful prevalence of that crime in the Peninsula. The peasantry sympathise with and foster brigandage, and look up to the chiefs of bands as to the actual rulers of the country. Fuoco, Palone, Gargiulo, and other equally renowned ruffians are heroes for the Neapolitan and Calabrese bourgeoisie.* But all that is now considered a thing of the past, and only two months ago, Signor Lanza, the Italian Premier, told the Chamber of Deputies that brigandage was at an end in Italy. How reliable such information was, the following advices, published in the daily papers within the last month, will amply show :—

Chambery, May 11.

"A despatch from Cagliari, dated 7th inst., states that on the night of the 4th inst., a band of 80 individuals robbed and assassinated the municipal treasurer

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the clutches of her paramour. The butcher was conveyed to Talca, where he was promptly tried and condemned to death by the garotte. In South America, execution follows sentence with startling rapidity; and Gomez was straightway conducted to the scaffold, guarded by a strong escort of mounted gendarmes. While the executioner was engaged in adjusting his "*toilette de mort*," the convict drew a whistle from his pocket, and blew it sharply; whereupon about sixty of his men, who had introduced themselves amongst the crowd, surrounding the scaffold, rushed upon the gendarmes, and massacred them ere they could offer any resistance. They freed Lagoberon, and garotted the executioner; after which they escaped to the mountains."

* The Paris correspondent of the *Times* wrote some time ago (29th August, 1868) as follows:—

"At Naples General Palavicini has arrested or killed 130 brigands, but he has not yet succeeded in laying hold of the chiefs, Guerra, Fuoco, Pace, and Ciceone, who have been there for eight years. As to the Romagna, a certain Gaget, or Gagino, a scamp from Bologna, still keeps the whole province of Ravenna in a state of terror. He himself, single-handed, attacks diligences and whole bands of peasants. It is related that the other day he stopped eighteen persons on the high road. He held his revolver in his left hand, and rummaged their pockets with his right. Everybody paid him compliments."

in the village of Silano, notwithstanding the resistance of the carabineers and inhabitants."

The naïve designation of brigands as "individuals" is charming.

"Florence, 17th May.

"Letters from Naples announce the re-appearance of brigands in the neighbourhood of Castellamare, under the chief, Palone."

"Ravenna, May, 19th.

"Highway robberies are increasing in this province, and the stations of gendarmes have been reinforced by troops."

"Ravenna, May 30th.

"Robberies by bands of armed men are still frequent in this province. A rich proprietor was captured on the 27th instant, near Fusignana, and compelled to pay a heavy ransom."

In the *Morning Post* of May 17th, we read:—

"BRIGANDAGE IN ITALY.—The 'Oriente' of Naples has received the following details as to the capture of three individuals by the brigand, Domenico Fuoco:—'Ten young men, belonging to Venafro, went on an excursion into the country. On returning, seven of them avoided passing through a wood which has a bad repute, but the other three, who made the attempt, were taken prisoners by Fuoco in person. One of the captives is a notary, a second, a clerk in the telegraph office. The National Guard has gone in search of the party, and as the young men in custody are not wealthy, fears are entertained for their safety, the ransom demanded being considerable."

The following is from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 15th instant (June):—

"A French paper gives some curious details respecting the Italian brigand, Faccione. This celebrated captain of banditti has his own particular method of providing for his wants or fancies at the expense of his neighbour. He does not ask for your money or your life by holding a knife to your throat. He seems to carry on his business by haunting the high road, and prefers to make the postman run on his errands. If he wants a new toy or an embroidered cigar-case, he sends for his secretary, and dictates such a letter as the following:—

"'To Signor Saverio, Proprietor at Perugino.

"'My dear Brother in Adam,—It is written that men should help each other. I am poor, and you are rich; be so kind as to forward to me the following articles, of which I stand in need:—Two musical snuff-boxes, with gold mechanism; six double-barrelled revolvers, with carved butt-ends; six silk neckerchiefs, to protect me against the chills of evening; a pair of Russia-leather boots; an English telescope, with morocco case, bearing my initials, P. F. That is all for myself; you see my tastes are simple. For the worthy persons who do me the honour of serving under me, you will be so good as to add—A hundred yards of velvet; twelve dozen shirts, longest size; six Calabrese hats (not forgetting the medals of the Madonna); six hampers of your best wine, at twelve bottles to the hamper; fifty bundles of cigars, and twenty pounds of tobacco.

"'N.B.—I forgot to mention a little pocket money (200 marenghi) for my own use, and that old cook, Teresa, who dresses 'ravioli' so well for you; I will return her to you in a month. Prospectively and gratefully yours,

"'POPOLO FACCIONE.

"'P.S.—I know you are a good Christian, but this letter may find you in an unsuitable frame of mind, and you may hesitate to gratify me. I must then inform you that when I draw at sight on my neighbour, it is essential to me that my signature should be honoured. If my bill is dishonoured, I shall find myself under the cruel necessity of regarding you as a 'mauvais riche.'"

"Signor Saverio proving intractable, notwithstanding this touching letter and its agreeable postcript, his 'brother in Adam' surrounded his house with banditti, and insisted on receiving the value of all the articles he had demanded in money, only requiring a gold watch from Signor Saverio in consideration of the trouble to which he was put by his obstinacy. A price is set on the head of this considerate person by the Government."

This sort of thing has never been equalled in Greece.

In the Florentine *L'Italie* of the 7th May we find the following information:—

"On mande de Campagna (Principato Citeriore) au *Piccolo Giornale* de Naples, que, le 2 au soir, trois brigands ont capturé, sur le territoire de Capaccio, deux propriétaires, MM. Salvatore Meola et Alfonso Marandino. Les captifs ont été conduits d'abord vers Poestum, puis sur les montagnes du Cisentino. M. Meola a été chargé de demander au père de M. Marandino 85,000 f. pour la rançon de son fils."

This band appears to have been the same one which four or five years ago had captured Messrs. Moens and Murray, and which had, since then, been carrying on its profitable trade with leisure and security.

The doings of brigands in Spain were long since known, but it was necessary that two Englishmen should be captured under the very frown of the Gibraltar batteries, before public attention was directed to the matter. Regarding the general state of security in that country, a Madrid letter, published in the *Droit* of Paris, gives the following interesting particulars:—

"Two persons have been carried off at Alamed, two others at Alora, and one of the wealthiest inhabitants of the town of Archidona (all three places being situated in the province of Malaga) was also carried off in open day while within a short distance of his own dwelling. These events not having been followed by the capture of the criminals, have caused great consternation in that portion of Andalusia, but, unhappily, authority is weak and the country people are afraid to reveal the names of the bandits, who are well known to them. At the beginning of May, a young man, son of M. Reina, a rich landowner at Arahal, was seized at the gates of the town by a band of five miscreants,

the chief of whom bandaged his eyes, and, mounting him behind himself on horseback, carried him about the country for three days. The unfortunate young man was confined for 24 hours in a dark cavern, ill-fed, and ill-treated, and constantly threatened with death, if his father should refuse to pay the ransom demanded. It is supposed that the demand was complied with, for young Reina was found on Sunday last upon the road in a state of almost idiotcy. On Saturday last the diligence travelling between Villajoyosa and Alicante was stopped by four bandits. The conductor was killed, and the passengers were robbed of everything, after undergoing great maltreatment. The prisons of Spain do not appear to be very closely guarded, for the day before yesterday 22 convicts escaped from the bagne of Barcelona. Formerly the convicts escaping from the bagne of Ceuta were accustomed to seek refuge with the Moors, but now they find it more convenient to come to Madrid, where the police are so powerless that they can arrange their robberies without hindrance. The rendezvous of these gentry is usually, from noon till three o'clock, in the very centre of the capital, at the Puerta del Sol. A number of persons have been pointed out there as convicts who have been condemned to hard labour for life."

Another correspondent writes as follows (*Standard*, 9th June):—

"It is useless attempting to conceal the fact that the whole of Andalusia is in a most disturbed state, and the whole of the Sierras from Malaga to Cadiz are infested with robbers. Hundreds of men throughout this mountainous district are engaged in smuggling, and the recent energetic measures taken by government to suppress this illicit traffic has, as a matter of course, deprived a wild, lawless, and daring body of men of their only means of existence. It is no matter of surprise, therefore, that many of these men have taken to a way of living which promises so far to be highly remunerative. The neighbourhood of Gibraltar was the scene of another attempt at brigandage on the 31st ult. Don José Maria, a well-to-do farmer of Los Barrios, was attacked by three men; fortunately he was well armed, so he shot down one of the bandits, and spurring his horse, he was enabled to gallop free of the two others with no further damage than a couple of bullet holes through his hat. It is even doubtful whether the road from here to San Roque is safe for solitary riders."

As to the capture of the Messrs. Bonell, all we can say is, that it surpasses in boldness and in organisation anything ever heard of in Greece. The captives were taken *within four miles of a strong English fortress*, at a country inn and in an open part of the country. A few minutes after the capture, the Governor of Gibraltar, accompanied by a lady, and followed by a groom, passed outside the "ventorillo," and spoke to one of the gang, little knowing whom he was addressing, and what had happened. Evidently the brigands had no notion of the rank of their inter-

locutor, otherwise Sir Richard Airey might have shared the adventures of Messrs. Bonell. The brigands then set out with their prisoners on horseback and with bandaged eyes, and were soon lost in the Sierras. We are then told that the person selected as most suitable to be sent in search of the band was "a celebrated contrabandista of the name of Gabarron, whose "relations on the Rock are *highly respectable* in their class of life," and who is considered by "all the inhabitants of Andalusia a perfect hero of romance, and the bearer of a charmed life." He placed himself in communication with another celebrated smuggler, Andrea Benitez by name, and between them they managed to find the brigands.* The terms were arranged, and as these Spanish gentlemen were not as particular to an amnesty as the Messrs. Arvanitaki, there was no difficulty in complying with their requests. In the meantime, the band and their prisoners perambulated the country with their prisoners blindfolded, remained in farm-houses without any fear of the police, and paid visits to such large cities as Cadiz and Xeres without any apprehension of danger. The ludicrous convoy of five bandits with their captives on horseback and bandaged, must have been enjoyed by the populace. Mr. Bonell senior was then allowed to proceed to Gibraltar and procure the ransom, leaving his nephew in the hands of the brigands. Shortly afterwards he returned to Cadiz with a friend, M. José Varrese, and with the 27,000 dollars which were demanded by the brigands, and which

"Were deposited at the English consul's residence, and Mr. Bonell and his friend proceeded to the Fonda de los Tres Reyes. M. Varrese was then told to put a peculiar mark on his hat and to parade the town till he found a man with a similar sign. Unsuccessful in his search, after some time he returned to the hotel, and on entering the room in which he had left Mr. Bonell, he

* The Greek authorities were blamed for not being aware of the presence of the Arvanitakis in Attica. Here is what we read in the *Impartial* of Madrid:—

"It is said these bandits had been hanging about the place for some days, according to their own account they were waiting for smugglers. The two Englishmen had had negotiations with them in Gibraltar, respecting the purchase or sale of a horse. A few days before the event some civil guards asked them to show their passports, which they did, and it appeared they belonged to la Hoya de Malaga.

was followed in by a stranger, who proved to be the captain of the brigands. Three other men, the subordinates of the party, very shortly after also came into the apartment. The money was now sent for and handed over to the captain, who directed his men to dispose of the amount in their fajas, or those red sashes which form so distinctive a feature in the costume of the men of Andalusia. This being done, Mr. Bonell was told that his nephew would be sent very shortly to Puerta Santa Maria, and that he was to go there to meet him. The bandits then left the hotel, and must have started at once for Xeres, where young Mr. Bonell was in the keeping of the fifth of the gang; for, on arrival of the four men, the captain of the robbers ordered him to count the money and to divide it into five equal shares. This he did. He was then told where he was, for up to this period he had been in utter ignorance of his whereabouts, and directed to proceed by a certain train to Puerta Santa Maria, at which place he would find his uncle and other friends."

Now, we ask, is there any incident, in the whole history of the Pikermes affair, as bold and as astounding as the perfectly matter-of-course way in which this business was transacted in broad daylight in the largest cities of Spain; and can there exist any doubt that these men had confederates, not only amongst the peasantry, but amongst the police and the officials? And yet the English press have not uttered a single bitter word against Spain or its people, and have not showed any of that virtuous indignation manifested in the consideration of the unfortunate events in Attica. True, the prisoners were not murdered in this instance, but neither did their captors put forth inadmissible demands. The point, however, is not this, but whether brigandage in Greece is more tolerated, and finds more support at the hands of the people, than in Spain.

There is, however, one country in which no one ever expected to hear of brigandage,* but in which, nevertheless, the institution

* As far back as the 17th August, 1868, we had read in the *Pall Mall Gazette* the following interesting little narrative :—

"Brigandage seems to be now becoming almost as formidable in Hungary as in Southern Italy. The Hungarian papers give alarming accounts of the depredations of banditti in various parts of the country, and especially of the feats of a brigand chief, named Youhash, who is the terror of the district of Samogyi. Wonderful stories are related of this chief's reckless courage. Once he kept a patrol of soldiers at bay for more than an hour by shooting at them from the window of a country inn, where he had taken refuge, every now and then throwing them a bottle of wine 'to keep up their spirits.' At last the soldiers threatened to set fire to the building, upon which he said he would come out. He kept his word, but rushed out at them so suddenly that before

—for such it is, in fact—flourishes luxuriantly. Here is what we read in the daily papers:—

"The Banat and Dalmatia, as well as other so-called frontier lands attached to the Austro-Hungarian realm, are peculiarly well provided with bands of brigands, admirably organised, and enjoying the *agréments* of general popular sympathy and an excellent understanding with the peasantry. Count Gideon de Raday, Royal Commissary in the Theiss Provinces, who was sent down some time ago to the Banat and Baczka by Count Andrassy to put things straight in those exceedingly barbarous regions, has published a report, from which we gather, among other interesting facts, that the kingdom of Hungary is something remarkably like a brigand's paradise. During his mission in the south-eastern counties of Magyar-land, Count Raday had to deal with four hundred and fifty-four criminals directly guilty of brigandage, and with eight hundred and thirteen cases of complicity in brigandage. He also discovered that the brigands had correspondents or business connections in all classes of society, to a far greater number than their own; indeed, the result of his investigations goes far to prove that the whole body of police and government employés has a share in the spoils earned by robbery, murder, and arson. He laments in earnest language the "deep moral degradation" of the whole race inhabiting Lower Hungary, and states that he was obliged to consign such brigands as were captured to the custody of German-Austrian troops, who were not susceptible of corruption; while Hungarian Honveds could not be trusted to resist temptation. It should be remembered that the gentleman writing this report is a Hungarian magnate! Strongly illustrating the state of public morality in these outlying districts is Count Raday's further statement, that he was obliged to set at liberty 308 criminals found guilty of first-class offences, because the prisons were so full that there was no room for them. In the matter of brigandage it is clear that Hungary can give points to Greece, and win easily."

We are further told that Count Raday proposes that in the province of Szedegin alone 110 additional prisons should be erected; and from later intelligence we learn that it is anticipated that fully 200 of the above criminals will be condemned to death.

All these incontrovertible facts need no comment; they speak for themselves, and prove what we have stated in the beginning of this chapter about crime in general—that it exists all over

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they could seize him, he escaped into an adjoining wood. Shortly after a Jew came to the patrol complaining that Youhash had just robbed him. The soldiers hastened to the spot, but as they were passing through the wood they were shot down one by one by Youhash, who was lying there in ambush, and only one or two of them escaped. On another occasion he attacked a gamekeeper, and robbed him of his gun, but returned it a few days after with a letter, in which he said he had since provided himself with plenty of arms, and he feared the gamekeeper might be mourning the loss of his favourite weapon."

the world, and takes that form which is most favoured by circumstances. We maintain that there can be no just opinion expressed upon any such matter, unless analogous cases are compared; there is no absolutely good or absolutely bad government, as there exists no absolutely righteous or absolutely sinful men—all is relative in this world. If, therefore, brigandage and crime of every sort are rampant and all-pervading in countries which have enjoyed the benefits of a civilised and Christian Government for centuries, it can certainly be pardoned and accounted for, though not overlooked or neglected in Greece—that unfortunate land, that Prometheus of nations, which, after being allowed by the peoples of Europe, whom she so nobly benefited, but who remained deaf and unmoved by her cry of anguish, to be overrun and trampled upon by the barbarous hoards of the Osmanlis, has risen again from her ashes, to re-commence that great and noble task of civilisation which has ever been her mission. We may stumble, and falter, and hesitate in our first endeavours; we may have to bear the jeers, and hoots, and envious calumnies of interested detractors; but we can look upon the ugly sores of these men, and tell them—"There is not one of you who may take up a stone and throw it at us. You began from worse, you are thoroughly sickly and immoral now; it is only your rich attire that hides your gaping wounds, and the vantage ground you occupy that lends respectability to your hypocrisy. We, therefore, who are no worse, but whose great sin is poverty and weakness, will not despair, for, with the help of our God, we will accomplish our great task."

THE DEBATES IN PARLIAMENT.

Having endeavoured to the best of our abilities to elucidate one by one the different questions evolved by this most calamitous affair, we think it not out of place to examine how the same matter has been treated by that high court, at the hands of which,

it is believed, that every question of public importance meets with a fair and impartial consideration.

We think we need not dwell long upon the question raised by Sir Roundell Palmer—that the diplomatic character of Mr. Herbert renders the offence more serious, and furnishes peculiar ground for demanding redress. This argument has so completely collapsed as soon as it was touched by Sir Roundell Palmer himself, and has been shown to be so thoroughly untenable, that we will abstain from making here any lengthy remarks on the subject. Lord Clarendon declared that he would not for a moment think of taking that standpoint in his demands upon Greece :—

"I cannot think, he said, that a sacred halo attends the Minister, his secretaries and attachés wherever they travel about the country."

The sanctity of the persons of ambassadors and their following cannot be conceived to protect them in every possible circumstance and under all conditions. Ambassadors, as other functionaries of the crown, have a dual character. Their persons are sacred while engaged in the discharge of their duties, but they can lay claim to no exceptional protection when they are in their private character either of citizens or of alien sojourners. The person of a judge is truly sacred when he is employed as such, but he ceases to enjoy any extraordinary advantage as soon as he leaves his chair. Members of legislatures in all countries are guaranteed immunity from arrest that they may be uninfluenced in the discharge of their duties from all exterior coercion ; but as citizens they are amenable to the common law of the land. A soldier may carry arms when on duty, but must deposit them at his barracks as soon as such duty is at an end. Anyone assaulting a policeman while in the discharge of his functions, is liable to a far more severe penalty that he would be if he had committed the same offence on the same individual when not invested with the character of an officer of the crown. The same common-sense principles apply to ambassadors. It is impossible to conceive how, if an ambassador in his private capacity ventures in a perilous excursion, the state to which he is accredited is

answerable to the sovereign he represents for the protection of his person. If a Foreign minister while walking in Piccadilly is knocked down by a rough, and robbed, he cannot hold the English Government responsible for an international offence. It cannot be alleged that Mr. Herbert and Count Boyl were engaged on official business when they took the road to Marathon; they went there as simple tourists. There is nothing in Mr. Erskine's request for a military escort to show that he attached any other importance to their visit than is customary in the case of foreigners of distinction who visit Greece for their pleasure about the same time of year; and in the despatch of the chief of police giving orders to the gendarmes, the words, "English tourists are proceeding to Marathon to-morrow," clearly exclude the notion that the travellers were guaranteed any other protection or security than that which Greece owed to Lord Muncaster as much as to Mr. Herbert.

But there are abundant instances parallel to the present one, which prove that no exceptional protection can be demanded for offences committed against ambassadors by common malefactors. Three years ago the Emperor of Russia, during his visit to Paris, narrowly escaped assassination at the hands of a Pole, who was not condemned to death for the offence. The Russian Government never thought of holding France responsible for an attempt at the life of her sovereign who was accepting the hospitality of a friendly power, nor were complaints made as to the inefficiency of the French police. A few weeks ago the military attaché of the Austrian embassy at St. Petersburgh, Prince Louis d'Arenberg, was assassinated in his own house. Austria never thought of making representations as to the insecurity of life in the Russian metropolis, far less as to the indignity committed on the person of one of her representatives. The Americans never made an international question of the burglary committed in the London residence of their minister, and if the burglars had aggravated their crime by the murder of any member of the Legation, investigation and punishment would still have belonged to the ordinary tribunals. We might furnish

innumerable instances of this kind which would all establish that it is both unreasonable and unjust to speak of the gentlemen who fell victims to the peril in which they placed themselves as being under the protection of their ambassadorial character. The Greek Government could be held responsible only if it was shown that it had refused to extend to the foreign tourists the same protection which it affords to its own subjects. Sir R. Palmer's argument collapses as soon as it is touched; and it is significant that Sir Henry Bulwer, who, owing to his long diplomatic service, would certainly not be disposed to underrate the privilege of a member of the diplomatic corps, rested his motion upon a totally different basis.

As regards the other points of Sir R. Palmer's speech, we have but few remarks to make after the exhaustive way in which we have endeavoured to treat every question separately. His allusion to the alleged complicity of Greek politicians and the construction he put upon Mr. Zaïmis's explanations were characterised by absolute incorrectness, so much so that both Sir Roundell himself had to endeavour to explain away his original statement as it appeared in the papers, and the Greek Premier considered it his duty to write to Sir R. Palmer and protest against the construction put upon his words. Sir R. Palmer was equally obliged to admit the inaccuracy of another statement, namely, his allegation that it was Mr. Valaority who had nominated the writer of the letter, found on one of the brigands, to a public post (see p. 99). Respecting the payment of the ransom, Sir R. Palmer said:—

"The enormous ransom of £25,000 was ready to be paid, thought it was not the Greek government that said, "We are ready to pay it" (hear, hear.) That they would have had to pay it in the end there is no possibility of doubt (hear, hear). It would, however, have been more honourable to them and gratifying to us, if they had accepted at once the responsibility of all the conditions required, and have furnished the money demanded"

Now we have shown (p. 80) that the Greek Government was from the very first quite prepared to pay the ransom—the thing is expressly stated in the despatches of which, we are assured,

Sir R. Palmer's speech denoted a thorough study and minute search.

But this is not the only instance of disregard to the contents of those documents. His assertions that the brigands had received "an absolute and indefinite guarantee of non-molestation," and that the measures taken by the Greek Government were only "to a *certain extent* communicated to Mr. Erskine, and to a *certain extent* received his sanction," are both diametrically opposed to the conclusion one inevitably arrives at after a careful and impartial study of those documents. As in the foregoing chapters we have in substance answered the other points raised by the learned gentleman, we need follow his speech no further.

To Sir Henry Bulwer's remarks, although characterised by a bias against the Greek Government, we can but render that homage which is due to his great talents and his experience in Eastern affairs. But it is precisely from such a statesmen that we would least have expected the vague and general charge brought against the Greek Government, namely, its "incapacity of satisfying the ordinary requirements of a civilised state." If this charge is made simply on account of the perpetration of a crime by a band of miscreants, having regard to the contents of the foregoing chapter, we may very justly ask whether the Spanish, the Italian, or the Austrian Governments "satisfy the ordinary requirements of a civilised state?" Nay, we think that Englishmen had better begin to ask themselves this very important question.

It is with much hesitation that we now proceed to notice the debate held in the Upper House, not owing to any fear of finding ourselves compelled to relinquish and retract any of the arguments we have hitherto maintained, but because the speech of the noble Earl who opened the debate is so great a monument of injustice, and so striking an example of the extremes to which passion may lead even the best of men, that we are afraid lest we should be tempted into giving vent to the just feelings of indignation which that speech cannot fail to evolve whenever carefully examined. Our disinclination to commit ourselves thus, is not due only to the respect we entertain towards that august assembly,

but principally to the sympathy which we feel most sincerely for one who has been perhaps the greatest sufferer in that awful calamity, and to whom it would be heartless indeed to grudge one grain of the condolence every one must feel for his heavy bereavement. The sincerity of our sympathy is evident from the fact that, even under the greatest provocations, it still remains lively. In framing, therefore, these brief remarks, we will endeavour to follow those principles which the noble Earl had promised at the outset of his speech to observe, but which he very soon lost sight of. His Lordship promised that he

"Would appeal to no argument which he did not believe to be strictly fair, and would press no fair argument to an unfair conclusion.

We will follow the noble Lord as near as time and space will allow us. At the very outset he states that "the Greek Minister addressed a direct communication to the brigands . . . assuring them of this solemn engagement" (immunity from pursuit). Now we know, as positively as can be, that this communication was from Mr. Erskine, and not from any of the Greek Ministers. Regarding Mr. Noel's "judgment, courage, and ability," of which it was "impossible to speak too highly," we have already allowed his acts to speak for him. The noble Earl expatiated on the "marvellous forbearance" of the brigands, and the *Times* informs us that this "does great credit to Lord Carnarvon's impartiality." We could have participated that opinion if the whole tone of the speech did not betoken a set purpose to make out the worse possible case for the Greek Government, even by exculpating the brigands.* We are again told that the Government gave

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* His lordship is responsible for this and for many other views adopted after him by the English press. The *Saturday Review* says :—

"Lord Carnarvon, not without a show of reason, was disposed to hold that the actual murderers were the only parties to the transaction who showed a trace of honour or of compunction."

And the *Standard* (9th May) adds :—

"No one who fairly looks at the matter can avoid coming to the conclusion that the brigands, actual murderers as they were, were less guilty than the Greek Government."

"assurances of safety." A conscientious perusal of the despatches explodes, as we have already shown, this notion; and regarding the assertion—

"That through the Legation inquiry was twice made to the Greek authorities whether or not the road to Marathon was safe,"

We can only say that the grief and emotion under which the speaker was evidently labouring, must have induced him to make a statement, which, on reconsideration, he would certainly have found to be unsupported by facts. The Legation simply asked for an escort—it made no enquiries as to safety. It is triumphantly asserted that Lord Clarendon had

"Most effectually disposed of the frivolity of the objections entertained to granting an amnesty."

Without taking any credit to ourselves, we may be allowed, after what has been written at the commencement of this pamphlet, to say that it is the levity of Lord Clarendon's argument for granting an amnesty that has been most effectually disposed of. And when we find that a member of the House of Lords takes upon himself to declare that

"Successive Ministers have been notoriously concerned in brigandage, and have been accused of sharing the plunder,

We can only say that to characterise such assertions as "utterly frivolous," is to use a mild term. In reference to the steps taken by Colonel Théagénis, to assert that

"Though I shrink from saying it, there must have been criminal intention,

is an unworthy device for blackening the character of absent men, who have shown the greatest zeal, even at personal risk, to save the lives of the countrymen of their traducers. Another instance of rigid adherence to dates and facts is the question asked immediately afterwards:—

"Will it be believed that when Colonel Théagénis tried to surround the village, he absolutely refused the offer of 300 French marines, who probably would, at all events, have made the attempt successful?"

We submit whether it is even decent to undertake the exculpation of red-handed murderers, for the sake of intensifying the animous felt against a foreign government.

It will not be believed for the simple reason that it is not the fact. The French Minister offered (as we have already shown, p. 63) to co-operate long before it was decided to invest Oropos, and it was not Colonel Théagénis who refused; but as Mr. Erskine says (No. 3, p. 2),

"The Hellenic Government have not as yet accepted this offer, because they do not wish unnecessarily to alarm the brigands."

Respecting Mr. Erskine's consent (and, as we have shown, approval also) of the measures taken, the noble Lord said :—

"Now, I regret that he should ever have given any consent, however qualified. I believe that consent was guarded by many restrictions, which were subsequently set at nought by the Government, and that it was wrung from him by a multitude of considerations and by urgent entreaty."

There is absolutely nothing in the despatches to show that consent was "wrung" from Mr. Erskine by "urgent entreaty." Indeed, we have proved that he went so far as to suggest measures, and we have shown that to say that the Greek Government "set at naught" its promises, is a gratuitous accusation. There is no doubt that there exists in this country a great disatisfaction against Mr. Erskine's conduct, but as he happens to be an Englishman, and the present is a favourable opportunity for a merciless onslaught upon Greece, the best face is put upon the matter.* His Lordship, starting from an erroneous basis, goes

* Here are some of the opinions of the English press upon this subject:—

"Mr. Erskine acquiesced more in the views of the Greek Ministers than did the Foreign Office at home, and more than the British public is likely to do."—(*Times*, 3rd May.)

"It is possible that Mr. Erskine may furnish a satisfactory explanation of his apparent backwardness, and it will be still more indispensable that he should account for his concurrence in the breach by the Government of its obligation to abstain from the use of force."—(*Saturday Review*, 7th May.)

"As soon as the constitutional objection to the amnesty was suggested, it was admitted by the English Minister as conclusive; and he was afterwards guilty of the far more blameable weakness of assenting, in violation of his own personal pledge given to the brigands, to the employment of the troops. There is nothing more lamentable in the published correspondence than a letter in which Mr. Erskine tells Mr. Herbert that he really cannot discuss with Takos Arvanitaki the question whether faith has or has not been kept with the band."—(*Saturday Review*, 28th May.)

on to explain by what motives the Greek Ministry were actuated in ordering "the attack":—

"They must have felt that they would be discredited; that the moment the Legislature met they would lose their places, and, on the other hand, that they would recover their reputation if, by a sudden stroke, they succeeded in restoring the prisoners to liberty, while they would avoid the payment of money under any circumstances, even if they failed, and even if the prisoners fell victims to the brigands. (Hear, hear.) These are strong inducements to men who are actuated by no high principle."

When we bear in mind the conclusions to which we arrived after a minute examination of the facts of the case, we realize the enormity of the injustice done to these men by such allegations.

We can appreciate the strong inducements his Lordship had in seeing everything in the worst possible light, but we were justified in expecting from a gentleman of his high principle a strict adherence to his promise to appeal to no argument which is not strictly fair, and to press no argument to an unfair conclusion. We leave it to our readers to decide whether this has been done in the present instance. Regarding the payment of the ransom the noble Earl adds:—

"Though I have seen it otherwise stated in the newspapers, they (the Ministry) never offered to provide a halfpenny of the ransom."

The assurance that his Lordship had made a careful study of the despatches is conflicting with the above statement. We have shown (p. 80) on Mr. Erskine's authority that the Greek Government was willing to pay the ransom. Lord Carnarvon repeats

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"It appears certain that between the date when Mr. Erskine was first informed of the capture of the travellers and that of his last communication with Lord Clarendon, there was an absence of that vigour and alertness which we had a right to expect would be displayed in the matter by the representatives of this country. . . What was Mr. Erskine about during the ten days which intervened between the capture and the murder? If he endeavoured, as we are willing to believe that he did, to keep the Greek Government to its original pledge, how is it that we have no proof in this correspondence of his activity." —(*Standard*, 2th May.)

"It is painful to be compelled to say that Mr. Erskine does not appear to have made the best of his opportunities for enforcing his demand upon the Greek Ministry, that above all things they should procure the safety of the travellers."—(*Standard*, 12th May.)

Mr. Noel's childish complaint of the refusal of a Government boat to convey him from Chalcis to Oropos. We have seen (p. 78) that Mr. Noel contradicts himself, on this as on other points. The futile assertions about Mr. Yates' reticence are repeated; these also have been proved to be groundless and worse than groundless. Still his Lordship, by some clairvoyant process, we suppose, informs us what Yates was the witness of:—

"He saw that which it is the object of Colonel Théagénis to conceal. He saw that the troops attacked the brigands before the brigands murdered the prisoners."

Poor Mr. Yates is quite innocent of such visions. As to "the significant fact that not one soldier was killed," we will refer his Lordship to passages in those despatches of which he had made such good use. Mr. Erskine in his minute of the examination of the brigands (No. 7, p. 5), relating the incidents of the collision, says:—

"Owing to the distance from which the soldiers fired, and the inferiority of the brigands' arms, they knew that their (the brigands') fire must be ineffectual."

His lordship is also disquieted by the fact that "a great many persons who are said to be brigands" were being executed, and enquires most anxiously "whether, according to a fashion so common in the East, innocent or quasi-innocent persons are not sacrificed."

This suggestion was eagerly taken up by the press, who at once explained the matter and opined that the heads, the photograph of which was lately to be seen at the shop windows, were those of innocent soldiers and sailors, butchered by the Government, so as to make a show at catching brigands. They went further still and asserted that this was done in order to close the lips of men who could give evidence against the ministry. We can only pity men whose reason deserts them to such an extent. In the first place, Greek soldiers and sailors are not allowed to wear a beard, whereas the heads exposed had beards: and can any rational individual suppose that it was possible, especially in a country like Greece, where no secret can be kept, for soldiers to be torn from their comrades and be put to

death without being missed by them, and without the whole matter transpiring? Really the accusation is so infamous that w feel degraded by consenting to notice it. This wonderful speech was brought to a close by a fervid tribute being paid to our king, who "was worthy of his position as a Danish gentleman." We have no doubt this compliment was well meant. But we can assure the noble Earl that in wishing to divide the "Greek king" from the Greek people he has totally mistaken the views of both. King George is our king because he has made up his mind to identify himself with his people, and to consider himself a Greek, and no longer a Danish, gentleman, and we feel sure that King George must have been the first to decline accepting a compliment thus invidiously conveyed by the same speaker who loaded his people with infamy, and at the same time that his government was accused with all that is most repulsive.

Such is the speech which was hailed as "moderate and eminently impartial," "temperate and dignified," "free from the blindness and heat of passion," "characterised by statesmanlike moderation," "admirable." We were told that the noble lord "was equally generous and wise," that he "did not say a word dictated by mere passion, or suggested a demand inconsistent with the severest justice," that he "forbore to embarrass the ministry with specific suggestions," that he placed matters "in their true and intelligible light," that he "carefully and minutely unravelled with patient skill" the facts, that "his feelings, though fitly expressed were subordinated to a just consideration of the whole case," in fact it was said that it was a speech "which did him great honour," and which "afforded a singularly clear and complete review of our present information." If after what we have endeavoured to show, these same opinions hold good, we are ready to endorse them most humbly, but although we acknowledge that there was every desire to make it so, we cannot accept that this speech was "a terrible indictment" against the Greek Government; and if "one of the greatest orators and lawyers this country boasts of" can not make out against the Greek Government a case that can stand better the ordeal of minute examination, the Greek Government are certainly innocent.

But there is still balm in Gilead; and we can turn from these uncontrollable effusions of indiscriminating passion to the calm, dignified and noble words of a great and just man, from whom even the most severe reprimands proceed with the tenderness and yet the authority of a father; we can look to this "Hellenomaniac" and listen to his "theological and sentimental prejudices" and feel assured that the acts of a great nation will be guided by higher principles than the dictates of unreasoning passion.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The investigation of the proposals put forth, for the satisfaction to be demanded from Greece, and for the remedy of existing evils, is both edifying, and tends to prove the utter groundlessness of the charges which it has been sought to establish against the Greek Government and the Greek people. The most wild and ridiculous measures were proposed, always in a general and indefinite manner. Some counselled the English Government "to exact the sternest retribution and to enforce our demands, if need be, at the cannon's mouth." Others asked that "the brigand ministry, the knaves and brigands' friends at Athens," should all be given up to England that they might be duly dealt with. The *Telegraph* hoped "that the protecting powers would find some just and proper mode of branding the Greek Government." The *Standard* thought that England ought to deal with Greece "as we have dealt with Mexico and with Abyssinia," and that "there can be no time so good as the present, and no process too rough and ready for bringing to a conclusion this outrageous farce of a Greek constitutionalism;" it would not "separate the people from the Government of Greece," but hoped for the "extirpation of the whole existing generation of Greek statesmen." The *Morning Post* opined that "a temporary occupation of the country would, under the circumstances, seem to be not only justifiable but called for;" and, considered the

matter already so sure, that it added that "the principal question which will arise is whether that occupation should be joint or individual;" in any case it concluded that "the Government of Athens may be certain that one way or another they will be strictly called to account for their share in the matter." From another side it was urged that "the wretched Hellenic kingdom should make the fullest reparation in blood and money." The *Pall Mall Gazette* advocated a similar course—"Sting them (the Greeks) in their pride and their pockets—make Greece do penance before the world for an act of scandalous barbarism" It went off into hysterics about the loss of "England's glory," and wailed the past when "the prestige clinging to an English diplomatist would have protected him from outrage even at the hands of Greek brigands, whereas now in their behaviour in the matter, the Government of King George have shown no more consideration for England than they would have shown to Portugal or Mexico."

It protested against "Mr. Gladstone's avowed Hellenic sympathies, and the pious kiss which he imprinted on the hand of that most reverend father in God, the Archbishop of Naupactus, or of some other harbour of klephts and murderers;" and recounted how Oliver Cromwell would, under a similar provocation, have "despatched a regiment of cavalry to the Piræus, so that when our representative and the gentlemen of his staff leave their houses, they might have a suitable escort."* The *Times* evinced an exceptional anxiety to retain its position as "the leading journal," and, consequently, considered it its duty to suggest remedies. It certainly proved itself fertile if not judicious in suggestions. Every article put forth a new scheme. The *Times* flew frantically from one form of *panacea* to another, from an occupation to a "western administrator," and from the suspension of the constitution to a joint executive council; and at last

* The *Pall Mall Gazette* is, of course, the best judge what would be the best escort for its representative, but, judging from what we have read in English books about Oliver Cromwell's troopers, we doubt whether people would have much to choose between them and the Messrs. Arvanitaki.

it settled down with the conviction that "our Government is completely justified in dismissing scruple and punctilio" in its dealing with Greece. This deluge of abusive and indefinite advice proves nothing but what we have maintained all along, that the absence of any legitimate and tenable ground for complaint is most evident; and the desire to take, by fair means or foul, advantage of this opportunity for dealing a blow on Greece is painfully manifest. All the press allowed itself an unbridled licence of language in its criticisms upon us, but the moment they came to substantiate their grievance or suggest a practical remedy, they were hopelessly at sea.

What is the complaint against Greece? A gross crime has been committed by a band of alien malefactors—a crime such as take place in every country under sundry and different forms. The Government did all in its power to avert the calamity; but most justly refused to break the laws of the land at the bidding of a stronger power. It has hunted down the criminals and meted out to them the severest punishment; it has shown every disposition to investigate the matter thoroughly, and has offered any reparation it could afford to the relations of the victims. For what then is it rated? For the absence of precautionary measures? We have shown that such a charge cannot stand. For the abortive issue of the negotiations with the brigands? We have proved that if the blame is to rest with any one, it is with the English Minister. For refusing an amnesty? All honest men applaud that refusal. For the "attack" of the brigands? But such an accusation is unfounded. Are Greek politicians accused of having connived at the perpetration of the outrage? We indignantly repel the charge, and, calling upon Englishmen to prove it, we give them every facility to investigate the matter themselves, and we say to them—We hold you responsible for designed defamation if you do not succeed in substantiating your allegations. Such accusations cannot be allowed to rest on suspicion or inference. Do you make the Government responsible for the crime because of the official position of two of the victims? But you have acknowledged such a ground to be

ntenable. Do you make the existence of brigandage the basis f a general complaint? Where is the country, we ask, in which o crime exists? We charge you with the responsibility of having reated and of maintaining a state of things between us and the eighbouring State, which is simply unbearable. Do you complain against the general condition of the country? The less ou mention the subject the better. You have designedly eated a consumptive State which you knew could not prosper. ou discouraged and prevented from accepting the throne the ly prince that could do any good as a king; and you have nce aggravated the position by making the unhappy hingdom e battle-ground of your jealousies. Of what do you complain? pecify your charge. It is either for this particular crime, or for e general state of affairs. If the first, you can only complain if ou show that the Government either refused to adopt all the easures it could for the release of the prisoners, or that it denied punish the culprits, and put obstacles in the way of a thorough vestigation; but, as we have seen, no complaint can be founded pon either count. As to the perpetration of the crime in itself, o government can be held responsible for acts of violence ommitted by common outlaws. If you bring against us a general harge of misgovernment, we repeat that you have to answer it ourselves. You heap before us the benefits you have rendered s as aggravating the crime committed. You forget that criminals re not as a rule conversant with modern history, nor are they especters of persons. As for us, we confess that although we el the greatest love and respect for *individual* Englishmen, we annot bring ourselves to believe that the *policy* of the English overnment towards our country has ever been actuated by any entimental attachment to Hellenic traditions and ideas. Indeed e know only too well, that from the very first English policy was verse to the constitution of an Hellenic kingdom, and strenuously pposed it as long as it could decently do so. France was the nly power that sincerely desired it. The loan your Government uaranteed in conjunction with the other two protecting powers as contracted by the pleasure of these powers without our

being so much as consulted upon the matter, and it was squandered by the Bavarian Regency, into whose hands you entrusted its use.*

Lastly, the cession of the Ionian Islands, of which it appears we shall never hear the last, was considered here all along as a relief, not a sacrifice. Indeed, a favourable opportunity was long looked for to disembarrass this country of a protectorate over a people whose oft-expressed unwillingness to submit to English rule divested your representations to Russia, Turkey, and other oppressing powers of all weight and significance. An evening journal spoke of the "moral support accorded to the Cretan Insurrection." Really this is preposterous. We all know that of all the diplomatic influences brought to bear upon that unfortunate question there is none to which we can attribute more justly its failure than to that of England. We are far from underrating any obligation we owe to you, but history cannot be distorted to suit the exigencies of the moment. From the very first England has been insincere in her professed love for

* The Athens correspondent of the *Times* is no Philhellene; no man has spoken harsher words of the Greek nation, or words more hard to bear than he. Yet what does he say of the manner in which England has performed the duties of her position as one of the Protecting Powers? He says:—

"In that capacity England supplied the Greek Government with large sums of money without any authority from the Greek nation, and that money was employed to destroy the municipal institutions of the Greeks, and create a despotic central administration, which has goaded the people into two revolutions and a change of dynasty. Hitherto England, as a Protecting Power, has not protected the interests of the people against the oppressions of the Government. Some good would be done, even at this late hour, if the British Government would require from the Government of Greece monthly reports of the criminal statistics of the kingdom. Protection ought to be something more than a right to protest at untimely moments against prudent financial operations, as was done lately; it ought either to do good to Greece, or to cease altogether."

This last sentence refers to the obstacles which the English Government repeatedly put into the way of Greece when she proposed to settle the claims of the bondholders of the 1824 and 1825 loans. We trust to be able to give at some future time a minute account of those loans, and we will then show that their non-recognition is due to the desire of England to keep Greece excluded from the money markets of Europe.

Greece. For reasons of policy, and actuated by financial rather than moral motives, England has long sustained Turkey through thick and thin, and did all she could to lower Greece in the estimation of the world. But this combination of interestedness and insincerity is all the more repulsive when we examine what is this people which is petted, and in every way protected and succoured by England. Wherever it has set its foot, there it has brought ruin and devastation. From the confines of India and China to the borders of the Mediterranean and the Adriatic, its withering blast is manifest. The finest lands of the universe have been turned into deserts; and the most intelligent races have degenerated under its sway into nomadic tribes and errant outlaws. Cities have fallen into dust, and arts and sciences have fled before this wild herd of savage debauchees. This is the people for whom England sacrifices justice and humanity. The much-abused Goths and Celts, and the despised Chinese and Tartars, will leave behind them some noble trail, some small benefit to the world; but these cowardly villains, who, if they are not butchers, are nothing, will record their national life on the page of history by a big, black blot of blood and infamy; and England's name will be known as that of their protector.

The poor Greek people have often shown their sincere regard for this country, and their readiness to espouse its friendship and goodwill. No power has ever been more thoroughly popular amongst Greeks of all classes than England. Yet we were spurned and browbeaten. No prince ever obtained a people's choice more spontaneously and more unanimously than Prince Alfred. Yet, even that unmistakable sign of sincere admiration was construed into a result of designing craftiness. England, by her short-sighted political love of Turkey, is playing the game of Russia. It is England's interest, and our interest, that this should be understood; for we have no greater enemy than Russia. The Greek people are now convinced of this. We have sense enough to see a plain fact—that no friendship can exist between two nations aspiring to the possession of the same and

identical object. It is well for England to reconsider her policy, before it be too late. For—

> "Even-handed justice
> Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
> To our own lips."

We have heard much of the "Protectorate" and the "Protecting Powers." What is this thing? In what way has it been manifested? In a systematic interference in the affairs of the country, thus paralysing the Government, debasing it in the eyes of its subjects, and rendering it subservient to foreign interests. Dr. Hirzberg, in his history of Greece, says :—

"It was a permanent and constantly increasing evil, derived from the circumstances of the war of independence, that the youthful state was incessantly controlled by the three Protecting Powers. As the interests of these three states, in consequence of the growing prominence of the 'Eastern question' in European politics, were constantly in strong collision, and Greece was much too important a point not to be closely observed, Athens became, like Madrid in earlier days and under different political relations, a seat of ever-active diplomatic agitations and intrigues; and the course of the Greek Government was incessantly counteracted through the interference of the Great Powers, and especially through the jealousy entertained by Russia of England and France."

The sooner we have an end of this state of affairs, and the sooner we are allowed to remain "unprotected," and to look after our own affairs, the better for all concerned; and, unless we are very much mistaken, this will be the result of the present political dead lock.

THE ENGLISH PRESS.

And what shall we say of the tone and bearing during this lamentable affair of a certain section of the English press? There is no necessity more bitter than that which compels us to throw off the respect which we willingly rendered to those we considered worthy of our esteem, and no task more thankless than to have to expose the errors of those whom we suffered to guide us

for a long time. When we first became acquainted with English journalism, we felt that there was something elevating, and a most precious privilege, to be guided by a press above the common run of newspaper scribbling, a press true to its convictions, calm in the hour of danger, inflexible in the cause of justice, unflurried by public excitement, inaccessible to private interest, and above all suspicion of corruptibility. Although not English, we gloried, for the sake of humanity and civilisation, in the existence of such an institution. The gradual disenchantment was slow but unavoidable. It is said that familiarity breeds contempt; but we think that this is the case only when there exist grounds for the loss of esteem. At all events, such is the result of our experience. The conduct of the English press during the Italian War—its violent and unjustifiable opposition, and its appeals to traditional alliances, whilst success was yet doubtful, and prevention possible; but its affected sympathy, and its ludicrous outbursts of manufactured enthusiasm, when Italian unity was an accomplished fact; the unseemly proceedings during the Southern rebellion—the railing, the slander, the gratuitous abuse heaped on the Northerners, when their cause seemed hopeless, and the unblushing readiness to repudiate former convictions, to denounce the interests of the South, and to rebuke its leaders, the abject prostration and the toady-cringing readiness which the *Times* evinced to propitiate Americans, by eating any amount of humble pie, when General Grant cut the Gordian knot in Virginia; the bravado in favour of Denmark, as long as there was a chance of imposing by words, and the ignominious caving in when there was a show of fight; the opposition to Prussia when her superiority was yet unknown, and the forbidding adulations with which her success was greeted; the periodical laudations and reproaches heaped upon the French Emperor in proportion to the success or the failure of his policy;—all these things, which we could not reconcile with our first impressions, drove us to the conclusion that there was, after all, only an outward varnish of high-mindedness in the best part of the English press, and that success-worship was its cardinal article of faith. The scanda-

lous misrepresentations, the suppression of truth, and the distortion of facts during the Jamaica massacre, further convinced us that there was no guarantee for fair play. During the Cretan insurrection, the designed and combined misrepresentation of the real state of affairs, the palliation of every Turkish enormity, the exaggeration of every Greek error, and the manifest and open hostility shown to everything Greek, and the unscrupulous way in which Turkish interests were forwarded, proved to us that the weak and poor had no chance of justice, when they happened to be unsuccessful, and when their opponents had managed to contract large loans in the London Stock Exchange.

On all these occasions, we confess it candidly, it was with deep regret and great unwillingness that we were forced to abandon, one by one, all the high opinions we had originally formed. We considered it a misfortune to be thus deceived, and we were striving to regain our first impressions. At this juncture this most lamentable national calamity broke upon us. We knew that the security and inviolability of Englishmen abroad was jealously cared after by their countrymen at home, and we were prepared for a severe lecturing. We were aware of the power exercised upon Englishmen's minds by the position of "Lords" and "aristocratic connections," and we expected that our misfortune would be aggravated by this circumstance. We also took into consideration the "Turkish interest," which was sure to make political capital of an act of brigandage. We had therefore made up our minds for a very severe storm. But the result surpassed anything we could imagine as possible. We could not believe that, even to a weak and much-abused people, such unsparing insult, such huge injustice could be offered. We did not conceal from ourselves that the atrocity of the crime, although possibly paralleled in other instances, could certainly not be attenuated, and that it would be heartless indeed to grudge one grain of the sympathy which the fate of the unfortunate victims evolved; we were therefore quite ready to make ample allowance for any exaggeration of feeling, and to account for the weakness of mankind when moved by pity. We also knew that it was un-

popular to plead the cause of moderation and forbearance before men justly exasperated at a heinous crime, and therefore did not expect from any quarter an immediate appeal for a more calm consideration of the case. But the appalling and fearful outcry of savage ferocity which burst forth from every part bore the unmistakable traces, not of heartfelt pity, not of feelings of sorrow at the fate of the victims, but of a spirit of bitter hostility hankering after bloody revenge for reasons far different to those considerations which were but a pretext. The savage satisfaction with which each successive apparently criminating point was snatched at, the yells of wild delight with which each fresh accusation, however flimsy or baseless, was greeted, the greedy precipitance with which each mad suggestion of revenge and punishment of the unfortunate little state was adopted—all go to prove that there was no sincere grief, but a set purpose to make the best of a rare opportunity. The moderate and wise counsels given in some exceptional instances were spurned with derision, and characterised as "sickly pseudocosmopolitan philanthropy and trading parsimoniousness," and it was said that "it is inconceivable that educated men should be found in any country to defend the conduct of the Hellene Government" (*Morning Post*, 29th April). These men were not to be baulked of their purpose by such mere trumpery considerations as justice and truth, nor cheated out of this rare opportunity by such trifles as facts.*

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* Here are some specimens of the language used against us:—

"With anarchy as their political system, and brigandage as the staple industry of the country, they have not ceased to be otherwise than a discredit to the sentimental European policy to which they owe their existence as a nation." —*Morning Post*, 26th April.

"It is high time that an end be put to such a state of things. Greece cannot and must not be permitted to disgrace Europe as she has for the last forty years. The offspring of the generous sympathy of Christian powers, she has never ceased to bring discredit on those to whom she owes her political existence. Ungrateful, bankrupt, and dishonest, she has long forfeited the sympathies of all right-thinking persons. With literally no capacity for self-government, but with a surprising amount of vanity and arrogance, she has contrived to play a contemptible and mischievous part in contemporary history. . . . The minds of all thinking men were made up as to the

In their strenuous endeavours to lash the public into a state of unreasoning vindictiveness, some of them displayed the passion

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unworthiness of Greece and the Greeks; but it required this fearful tragedy, brought so directly home to us, to awaken the general public to a full appreciation of the character of the country which we and other European powers have committed the folly of calling into existence. Thanks to the outrageous conduct of the Greek government, the eyes of this country have been opened to the truth.

"The fact is that the kingdom of Greece has proved to be a miserable failure, and worse than a failure, it is a positive nuisance to Europe." —*Morning Post*, 28th April.

"Every card-sharper who is not a Jew is a Greek, and every Greek is supposed to be a cheat and a swindler."—*Morning Advertiser*, 29th April.

"The nuisance of a Greek kingdom. . . . Let us show these degenerate people that we have borne long enough with them. Let the voice of Europe exclaim, 'Beware of that country; it is the home of ruffians—a den of assassins.'"—*Observer*, 1st May.

"Since its independence, Greece has been a nest of robbers and pirates." —*Morning Post*, 5th May.

"The Hellenic Government, far from evincing anything like energy in the performance of this duty (the suppression of brigandage) have suffered brigandage to go on and develop itself until it has formed the most profitable industry the country has to offer."—*Morning Post*, 28th April.

"Brigandage is one of the permanent institutions of the country. . . . . The only prosperous industry Greece has known."—*Morning Post*, 26th April.

"Greek Parliamentary Government, if it cannot be exercised in legitimate filibustering, must assume the shape of brigandage."—*Standard*, 28th April.

"A mere brigand's den."—*Pall Mall Gazette*, 24th May.

"This swindle of an affected independence."—*Standard*, 26th April.

"This rickety bantling of our adoption."—*Standard*, 28th April.

"If any consolation can be found for this deplorable event . . . . it is that it will wake men at length from their idle dreams about a Greek renaissance. . . . Among the questions raised, whether the kingdom of Greece should continue is certainly one."—*Globe*.

"Creature of an untoward sentimentality."—*Standard*, 28th April.

"The toleration, nay, the complicity, of the wretched Athenian junta of prattling peculators, plunderers and pirates with the brigands is proven. . . . Greece is notorious only for bankrupt bonds, Cretan insurrections, for lying fabrications by telegraph and letter, for piratical plundering, and now for brigand butcheries."—*Morning Advertiser*, 29th April.

"The stress of the force of the country's indignation must fall on the Government of Greece rather than upon the brigands."—*Globe*, 27th April.

"A constant source of trouble and annoyance in Eastern Europe, a home of unprincipled political propagandism, and the standing obstacle to the civilisation of the Levant. It has not only been barbarous itself, but the cause of barbarism in others. Society is disorganised, and foreigners are murdered,

and rage of schoolboys, others acted like tragedy queens, and most went off fairly into hysterics; and they all with one voice

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just as they would be in Murzuk or Khiva, because these half Slav, half Greek demi-savages are busy about the pan-Hellenic empire of the future instead of about actual Hellas."—*Pall Mall Gazette*, 3rd May.

"The St. Giles's of Europe, the Ratcliff Highway of the whole world. . . . Geographically, it is part of Turkey; morally, a continuation of Hades; socially, an offshoot of Soho Square! Who would care to be conqueror of this Herne Bay of Europe? . . . . The land is in the hands of the brigands; the only law observed is the law of pillage; the only king recognised is King Death."—*Tomahawk.*

"R. R." writes to the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 19th May:—

"In the Eastern nursery of Christianity, assassins are raised in the rough, and are finished off afterwards as wanted—either as brigands, filibusters, venators, or simple footpads. . . . . Forty years long have we been grieved with this generation of bastard Hellenes."

"L. L. D." expresses a doubt, in the *Standard* of the 1st May, if "Europe intends longer to tolerate this political nuisance—this Cave of Adullam—this *refugium peccatorum*—this centre of agitation—this Mediterranean convict settlement—this curse of the Levant."

And after all this—a small collection taken at random from the heaps of such extracts now before us—the *Pall Mall Gazette* (29th April) has the unblushing impudence to assert that, "the absence of passion and excitement with which the question has hitherto been discussed is probably the best guarantee against any reaction towards undue leniency in regard to Greece." The *Pall Mall Gazette* and its contemporaries took very good care that no such mistake was made.

This journal, always assiduous in its chief duty, collected all the unfavourable criticisms upon the Greek nation made by different men within the last century or so, and paraded them in its columns with evident delight. It was not stated, however, what and how much has been said in favour of the Greeks. The *Pall Mall Gazette* has not done much, after all. We can supply it with volumes full of the most bitter and the most damaging verdicts, pronounced by men of the highest authority against its countrymen.

As for the satires of M. About which have been repeated *ad nauseam* during this discussion, all we can say is, that jocose as they appear to be, they were penned under the smarting reminiscences of a well deserved sound flogging which their author underwent in public for the insult he attempted to offer to a poor but honoured Greek young lady.

We wish to compare with the above specimens of English journalism the following extracts from the Italian press. Comment is useless:—

"We do not wish to exaggerate the responsibility of the Greek Government. If the dreadful death of Count Alberto di Boyl has filled our mind with indignation, it has not obscured our reason."—*L'Opinione*, 29th April.

"In the field of international law, it does not appear that England and Italy

cried out "*Delenda est Carthago.*" They seemed to wish the whole Greek nation to be converted into one man, that by one fell swoop they might descend upon him and throttle him with their claws. A more disgraceful and more humiliating spectacle it has never been our misfortune to witness. We do not speak of certain prints only too ready to take up any sensational topic, and pander to the lowest tastes of their morbid readers, and whose services to Turkey are due to the same motives which secure their fulsome adulations of the French Emperor; we will not notice the rabid calumnies of others, whose attachment to Turkish interests is no longer a mystery, and whose periodical laudations of the statesmanlike qualities of the Turkish Ambassador are evidently made on very substantial proofs of his diplomatic insight into human nature; neither are we surprised at the furious onslaught of others again; for the high positions held in the Turkish service by near relatives fully warrant their

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can demand any indemnity or reparation from the Greek Government, which cannot be required to secure the life of foreigners any more than it secures the life and property of its own citizens. The Italian Government certainly never admitted that it was under any such obligation to foreigners. Nor does the diplomatic quality of our compatriot, and of one of the English victims, make any change in the case, or create in the Greek Government a responsibility which it would not otherwise have. On the contrary, from their very position the two diplomatists ought to have known, better than any other travellers, the disturbed state of the country, so that they might and ought to have been the last to venture on undertaking the excursion. Nor is it to the purpose to say that the Ministers were asked and replied that the road was safe. They may have been mistaken without the State being therefore obliged to pay for their mistake. And if they refused to grant an amnesty, and pursued the brigands instead of letting them alone, they cannot thereby have caused the State to incur a penalty. Every Government has a right to understand its own dignity as it pleases, and to follow for the suppression of criminals the rules which it considers most efficacious and best. It would be impossible, without making an abuse of one's strength, to demand from the Greek Government what would never be demanded from a Government strong enough to refuse. And if there is one thing more unworthy than another, it is to be exacting towards the weak, while one is humble towards the strong. And if people in England may for some days seem inclined to act in this way, we ought not to be deceived as to the issue."—*La Perseveranza*, 30th April.

Almost all the Italian papers spoke in the same way.

attacks upon us. Englishmen themselves have repeatedly warned us against mistaking the self-interested onslaughts of prints such as these, for a *bona fide* expression of English feeling. But our grief is great indeed, and our indignation just, when we see the almost unaccountable hostility and the pre-arranged and concerted way in which every incident of this most lamentable case has been treated by journals which pretend to guide public opinion, and are supposed to reflect the feelings of the most intelligent section of English society.*

What, for instance, shall we say of the *Times?* Its first leader upon the subject gave us hopes of a chance of fair dealing. The very next day, however, it repudiated all idea of moderation and justice, and it headed its contemporaries in the way of violence and invective. Was this the result of its usual uncertainty of purpose, or was the *Times*, in this case again, carried away by what it conceived to be the tide of public feeling, instead of leading and conducting it in the path of honor and of truth. These articles seem the product of two different pens, the suggestions of two different minds. We do not endeavour to explain the mystery; we will simply submit to our readers the opinions of

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* The Athens correspondent of the *Times* has for the last four years contributed more to lowering Greece in the estimate of men than all our other detractors put together. We believe that this gentleman, at least, is not insincere in his caustic criticisms of Greek society and Greek politics. He has no reason to entertain any animosity against the Greek people. During his long residence amongst them, he has received many tokens of friendship, of hospitality, and of a remarkable forbearance in the face of his systematic attacks upon them. In any other country he would have found to his cost that men, as a rule, resent acrimonious attacks from those who enjoy their hospitality. He has also good reasons to admit that some progress has been made by that country, the backwardness of which he blames; the value of the property he acquired in Athens shortly after the war has since increased fifty-fold. The severity of his criticisms, therefore, is due partly to the causes already referred to (p. 118), and especially to the natural acerbity of his character. We are sure he would have been as merciless a critic of his own country, if he was writing from Edinburgh. But no such criticism can be fairly applied to Greece, until the *Times* discovers a similarly constituted correspondent, and sends him to Constantinople.

a serious journal on two successive days upon one and the same subject :—

25th April.

"The horrible nature of a massacre thus complete and cold-blooded, the distress and agitation of the survivors who have suddenly had their friends cut off at a stroke, the bereavement of the widow and the fatherless, must not hurry us into a false judgment of the events that have, perhaps, tended to produce the catastrophe. Assuming it to be true that the impetuous pursuit by the Greek Government occasioned the massacre of the captives, there is a temptation, almost irresistible, to condemn their impetuosity. Such a conclusion would be hasty, if not unjust. There are a thousand situations in which a regard for the consequences compels us to follow but one course, whatever may be the hazards immediately arising from it. If the Greek Government had in this case permitted the ransom of the prisoners and the immunity of the brigands to be negotiated, they would have legalised brigandage in Greece. Their negligence in the past had gone far to sanction the idea that the crime might be committed without fear of punishment; had they been passive again, the belief would have been conclusive. If we apply the case to ourselves, we shall see that the fault of the Greek Ministers has lain in past supineness, and is not in their present resolution. Suppose a party of tourists to have been seized on the mountains of Kerry, and their release promised on payment of a certain sum, with the threatened alternative of their murder in case of an attempt at a rescue, what should we have done? We should have refused to permit the impunity of crime, even if in our attempt to seize its perpetrators we should put innocent lives in peril. This is the line the advisers of King George have adopted. The consequences have been most lamentable, but we cannot blame the Ministry for them."

26th April.

"This murder of our countrymen has been committed in a European country, among men calling themselves Christians, within a few miles of a capital the name of which is associated with all that is highest and noblest in our recollections. Greece is a country whose very existence as an independent State is in great part the work of England. . . . .

"It is in this Greece, to which we have given independence, protection, a reigning House, and one of the fairest portions of its territory, that three of our countrymen, including the Secretary of the British Legation, have been foully murdered within a few miles of the capital. . . . .

"We believe this massacre will prove to be a great political event. It has filled up the cup of Greek misgovernment. It has exhausted the patience of Europe. At this moment it would be useless to talk of Greek regeneration or Greek advancement; no one would listen to the advocates of a nation whose soil is infested always and everywhere with unpunished crime, and whose historic sites are almost as inaccessible to the intelligent traveller as the cities of Tartary. We have no hesitation in saying that the time has come when this scandalous misgovernment should be brought to an end. The Three Protecting Powers did not intend to create within the limits of Europe a petty State

which should be a disgrace to themselves and to civilisation. But what else can Greece be said now to be? There are few of its friends who will deny that its advancement must depend on the control which statesmen wiser than its own rulers exercise over it. Safety of life and property at least must be assured, if the tutelage of the Great Powers is not to be a mockery. Foreigners on their legitimate business must not be captured and murdered in a country which enjoys our protection. If its rulers are powerless, then authority must be exerted by other hands. In 1854, Athens was occupied by a French and British force to check the warlike propensities of the Court, and we do not fear to say that a similar step would be equally justifiable now. We spent nine millions on an expedition to Abyssinia, undertaken at less provocation. We should have no such difficulties as awaited us there to encounter in Greece. Three or four regiments, under an efficient commander, such as our Indian army or the French army of Algeria rears, would make the tracks of Attica as safe as the high roads of England, before many months were over."

Such was the example set by "the leading journal," and we must own that the lead was followed with commendable alacrity. The whole press, with but few, and therefore most honourable, exceptions, fell upon us as the pack of hounds falls upon the unfortunate stag. Curses and imprecations were heaped upon our head, and the extirpation of the whole nation was demanded for a crime which cannot be laid to the Greek Government, much less to the Greek people, and which was committed by men of an alien race, not by Greeks. Time even for defence was not allowed. God himself has said, "I will descend and see;" but the English press would not even wait and hear.

What then shall we say of these men who have given judgment before hearing the defence; whose rage no reparation can satisfy; whose thirst for vengeance no expiation can quench; whose cry for blood no sacrifice can silence; who have shown no mercy, no pity, no regard for truth, no wish for fair play, no desire for justice, no respect to common decency; who have distorted evidence; who have clung to falsehoods; who have suppressed every favourable instance; who have disregarded every attenuating circumstance; who have propagated calumnies; who have morally assassinated a whole nation? We lose ourselves in this deluge of slander, of Pharisaism, and of injustice, and ask in amazement—Where to begin, and where to end; what to notice first, what last; which head of this hydra to cut off? And yet

we are asked to believe that these men direct the public opinion of a great nation, that in their hands are entrusted the dearest interests of their country, that they are as uncompromising as justice and as incorruptible as heaven! Let us hear no more of this. If it ever was, it is a thing of the past now.

It is a vain and clumsy device to endeavour by such tactics to make us believe that the English press is actuated only by a sense of justice and a love of order in browbeating every aspiration, in ridiculing every effort, in exaggerating every misfortune, in trampling upon everything most dear to the Greek people; and in upholding and bolstering up Turkish interests, in white-washing Turkish infamy, and in applauding every silly and apocryphal speech of the Sultan. The thing has been going on far too long, and will hold water no longer. Let them make a clean breast of it; let them tell us honestly—"Our policy and our interests in the East are such as to make it imperative for us to uphold Turkey at all costs, and as long as we can. We desire to have there a nominal power strong enough only to keep up the semblance of an independent State, and weak enough to be our obedient tool. We do not wish a progressive people who would soon mark out their own destiny, and would break loose from our tutelage. We want a people who are indolent and extravagant in their barbarous habits. We want them to take off our hands all the Manchester goods and Birmingham ware for which we can find no market elsewhere, at the price and on the conditions we see fit to impose. We want them to contract periodically, and at usurious rates, loans, the major part of which will remain in our hands, in return for material and moral support. We want them to give employment to our dockyards and to our gun factories. We want them to take over the bankrupt captains of our navy who cannot conveniently remain amongst us for fear of duns, and make them Pashas and admirals. Their ambassadors in London, Paris, etc., are men of the world. They give first-rate parties, and are always ready to befriend gentlemen of a literary turn of mind, and inspire them with pure and poetic affection for a maligned race. When we visit them at Constan-

tinople we are treated like princes—even the meanest of us; we are allowed to carry away gratis any antiquity we can lay our hands upon, and—witness our Museum at Bloomsbury—we have already transported entire temples and almost whole cities to London. In fact, one of our great men in that line of business has undergone such an astounding change in his views regarding the East in general, and Turkey in particular, after a journey to Babylon and a certain visit to the Grand Vizier, that we really cannot let such very sensible friends have it out with you alone. We were once feeble enough to allow ourselves to be carried away partly by the entreaties of some really generous and noble men, and partly by a jealousy of other powers, and to aid you in your endeavours for liberty; but we have since deplored the event. You see you Greeks are too sharp for us; and if you are allowed to have your own way, you will soon sweep our commerce from the Mediterranean. Even now, weak as you are, and struggling, your merchant marine is the seventh in importance in the world. We cannot afford to allow you to go further at present. We must look after our own interests. Therefore we give you a fair and honest warning, we will favour the Turks through thick and thin, and oppose you."

If Englishmen had spoken thus, we would certainly still be grieved, would regret their determination, and would deplore a policy which is shortsighted, if not also unjust; but we would allow that we were treated fairly, and would give them credit for sincerity and straightforwardness. But to endeavour to convince us that all this clamour is the result of virtuous indignation, that there is a real desire for the progress and welfare of Greece, and that therefore the beloved child is chastised, is simply preposterous. We say, *We know what is going on.*

Such transparent inconsistency will not necessarily wait exposure at the hands of the New Zealander who, it is prophesied, centuries hence, resting on the broken arch of London Bridge, will moralise upon the fall of this great country. A future and not very remote Macaulay may justly stigmatise the present generation of his countrymen as one which with

one hand distributes Bibles, but with the other sows misery amongst poor and weak nations; which deputes missionaries to preach peace to African heathens, but which commissions officers to guide the arms of the infidel against his Christian victims; which sends umbrellas and night-caps to Australian savages, but which puts Snider rifles and Armstrong guns into the hands of Mohammedan butchers; which establishes societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals, but which organises committees for rendering national honours to the greatest slaveholder in the world—one before whom Brigham Young is an angel of chastity and a model of decorum.

Let it not be said of Englishmen, what a Roman poet said of one of his contemporaries—

> "Mel in ore, verba lactis
> Fel in corde, fraus in factis."

CONCLUSION.

The reader cannot have failed to remark that in bringing proofs of our arguments in the investigation of the different charges against the Greek people and the Greek Government, we have restricted ourselves almost exclusively to evidence contained in the official despatches laid before Parliament. We thus wished to prove (1), that there existed in these same despatches enough to satisfy an impartial investigator of our innocence of the charges brought against us. This was ignored by those who had no other aim in view but to criminate the Greek people by fair means or foul; they disregarded and suppressed such exculpatory evidence. And (2) that every unjust attack can be repelled by the very means used in furthering it. In this instance we have used the weapons we were attacked with. We will leave to the reader's discernment to decide how far these objects have been attained.

There is, however, one explanation that in a moment of calmer reflection we feel that we owe both to those who have borne

with us patiently through this long and tedious investigation, and to ourselves; and that is, that if in reviewing the foregoing pages we have any regret or any cause for repentance, it is that we should have allowed ourselves to imitate, even partially or momentarily, the example of those very men, whose unbridled license of language we have reprobated. But we trust that the position we found ourselves in will not be forgotten—namely, the necessity of rummaging and wading through a sea of the most bitter injustice, the most galling abuse—and that, consequently, if heated by honest anger, we have made use of expressions which in a calmer mood we would have avoided, there will be found for us an excuse in this consideration. Our remarks concerning the policy of England cannot be taken as applying to the whole English people unexceptionally. Not that a great and powerful nation will be mindful of what a poor, unknown, unbefriended Greek has to say about them; but we have daily met amongst them with men so noble, so patriotic, so upright, and yet so highminded, and so charitable in their views concerning us, that we would not rest with an easy conscience were we not to give expression to a word of sincere regret, if we have said anything calculated to grieve those men. Indeed, no vindication of Greece would compensate in our eyes for a wrong done to men whom we admire and justly honour. It is to them we address these words of excuse, and we feel confident that they will appreciate our motives and magnanimously pardon our impetuosity.

But there is a far sadder and still more solemn duty incumbent upon us—a duty dictated by a heartfelt sorrow and by a humiliating misfortune. Amongst us from the remotest times, there is no institution more sacred than that of hospitality. That this should now be sullied fills us with grief unutterable. No national calamity, no invasion of our country by an enemy, no loss of a great battle, no devastation of our towns, no ruin of our homes, could have called forth a louder wail of grief and anguish than this most awful tragedy has evolved. From the king to the lowest peasant, the Greek nation has given loud and unmistakable expression to a

general and sincere contrition. If tears and mourning could compensate for a terrible calamity, this crime has been atoned for bitterly, ay, only too dearly! The relatives, the very mothers of the unfortunate victims could not have shed more abundant or more sincere tears than Greece.* And it was but their due. For

* Mr. Brailas-Armeni used no exaggeration when he wrote to Lord Clarendon :—

"I fulfil a very painful duty in interpreting to your excellency, by order of his Majesty the King, my august Sovereign, and of his Government, the profound grief and painful regrets which they, as well as the whole nation, experience at the horrible catastrophe at which one of the Secretaries of her Majesty's Legation at Athens and two of her subjects have been the victims. Greece will long mourn this terrible event, which she feels as a great national calamity."

The truth of this was corroborated by all who witnessed the contrition of the people in Greece. "Oriens" writes to the *Daily Telegraph* (7th May) :—

"The indignation of the people here is very great. Almost everybody considers the thing a cause of national mourning, and all the daily papers appearing on the day, and containing an account of the dreadful tragedy, appeared with a deep border of black."

A correspondent from Athens in the *Standard* (12th May) relates :—

"The people seem overwhelmed with shame and sorrow, and are indignant with the ministers. It is said that if it had not been Holy Week, there would have been a public demonstration of their anger. . . . There were thousands of people assembled outside the church, and all looked as if they were mourning for their nearest relatives. . . . The Archbishop of Attica and three other bishops also attended; and not only did they go to the church, but walked in the procession, a thing unheard of before. . . . All present were much affected, and the ladies were weeping . . . and such silence reigned amongst the crowd as I could never have imagined possible."

Poor Mr. Herbert had, by his gentlemanly and frank manners, gained the sincere esteem and the love of all the Greeks who knew him at Athens. Still, this is the unmanly way in which, even after that dreadful event, the *Pall Mall Gazette* (3rd May) makes use of a dead man for the furtherance of its political ends :—

"Meanwhile the indignation excited all over Europe against the 'craven, crouching slave' will bear fruit. If, as may well be the case, the crime of Marathon shall strengthen the hands of the Sultan, the friends of poor Edward Herbert will mark with peculiar interest how in his death, more perhaps than might have been permitted him in life, he advanced the cause to which he was so much devoted."

We refuse to believe this unworthy expression of a blind passion. We do not believe that Mr. Herbert ever desired to advance the cause of the Sultan.

nobler souls never breathed than those of poor Mr. Herbert, Mr. Vyner, and their companions in misfortune. They now sleep in peace—three of them next their sires, to whose honoured names they have added new lustre by a life full of merit and a death the most heroic; and one on the banks of the Illisus, a solemn and everlasting warning to the people amongst whom he died. Their names will ever be associated with one of the most sad, but perhaps, also, one of the most eventful, periods of our country, and long years will pass before we cease, in imploring the Almighty's aid for poor Greece, to join in our prayers a devout and sincere supplication for the souls of the much lamented victims of Asopos.

P.S.—The foregoing pages had been sent to the printer when No. 14 of the Parliamentary Papers concerning these sad occurrences was published. We give expression to no self-satisfaction, but to a justifiable sentiment of relief, when we say that the perusal of these despatches was a recompense for the many sleepless nights we have spent, after a hard day's work over these notes. Nothing could confirm and substantiate more positively the views we expressed than Mr. Erskine's later despatches, which exculpate the Greek Government fully and thoroughly. One of his despatches is an answer to an anonymous memorandum sent to him by Lord Clarendon. There was no signature required to a document which is a faithful representation of the mind and the animus of its author. The Earl of Carnarvon, while from his seat in the House of Lords, he "entreated Parliament and the country to suspend their judgment," was

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It would, besides, have been treachery on the part of the English Government to employ in its representation at a friendly Court, one who devoted his life to the advancement of the cause of its bitterest enemies. We again say, we refuse to believe in schemes which only the *Pall Mall Gazette* could conceive and execute."

busily engaged in making his private convictions and suspicions known to journalists, in writing stirring epistles to the Mayor of Southampton, and in formulating charges based upon no better ground than a chance phrase in a stale document. We have too much respect for the noble Earl to think that he was actuated by anything but the highest of motives — such as command our sympathy. But we doubt whether he may not find reason to regret the last step he took. Mr. Erskine's answer is a most damaging demonstration of the noble Lord's unreasoning subjection to grief.

We give some extracts from Mr. Erskine's letters to Mr. Herbert, and the whole of his explanatory despatches :—

MR. ERSKINE TO MR. HERBERT.

"Athens, 15th April.

"The Government will be but too happy to guarantee the safe departure of the band, who I trust will satisfy themselves that the Government have not the power to grant an amnesty. Let them read Art. 35 and 39 of the Constitution, and not listen to designing advisers. You can explain to them the bearing of these articles."

"16th April.

"Government cannot legally grant the amnesty, and if they did so illegally they might be out of office to-morrow; and then what security is there that their successors would respect an act they were incompetent to do? Mind you say this to Arvanitaki, and let him reflect on it himself. . . . .

"Undoubtedly, I have been assured more than once, and do not doubt it, that if Arvanitaki would give himself up he might be tried and sentenced, but the King would pledge his royal word to me to pardon him after all formalities had been gone through. But how could the King send a letter either to me or Minerva promising pardon for past offences, which would be simply an amnesty? Now, nothing of that sort can be valid without the signature of the Minister or Ministry, and I have already said that I should not advise Arvanitaki to trust in the validity of an illegal amnesty, which might be set aside by a new Ministry, and Ministries in Greece are notoriously ephemeral. Now, however, for the real point. You say that the chief of your friends is the real obstacle, that the others would be content with an understanding that they should not be molested whilst escaping with their booty. It has occurred to me that A. might be glad to go on board an English vessel of war for conveyance to Malta, and of course taking his share of the plunder with him."

19th April.

"I was not able to write to you last night, as there was no time, and do so now because General Church tells me that he is about to send off a man to

Théagénis. Every one assures me that a better selection could not have been made. ——— says that there are plenty of men who know the country, but are not honest, and that there are, perhaps, a few honest men who do not know the country; whereas Théagénis is both honest and knows the country.

"In my presence all the Ministers authorised him to grant any terms, short of the two impossible ones, which might be demanded, and he spontaneously undertook to go out to the brigands as a hostage, should they require one, and to prevent them from insisting on dragging you to the frontier. . . . .

"I think you understand that the two impossible conditions are precisely those which Tako insists on, viz., the amnesty, and free pardon after trial and sentence by default; the former has been so often discussed that there is no necessity to revert to it; but I may mention, with respect to the latter, that M. de Privilegios, the Procureur-General, and probably the soundest lawyer in Greece, has given it as his opinion that under no circumstances has the King the power to pardon a man until he has been tried and sentenced in person. . . . . .

"I have also omitted to say that Valaority told Théagénis in the Council of Ministers, in my presence, that, if necessary, he would go to Oropos and assure them in the King's name that if they would consent to come in and be tried they would, after conviction, obtain the royal pardon. Surely this is a good deal when the pledge is taken to a foreign Minister."

20th April.

"Théagénis's instructions are still the same, and you may say to Arvanitaki that I vouch for their faithful execution, as far as I can vouch for anything a Greek Minister promises me. They are, then, to discuss with the band as much as they like, and to promise them to the last moment the ransom agreed upon, and liberty to remove it to a place of safety, with hostages to insure their not being molested in the meantime. But neither amnesty nor pardon after judgment by default are admissible.

"They will not be attacked unless they attempt to carry you off, but neither will the troops allow them to do so. Let them, therefore, take the money while they can. It would be a poor consolation to the band for being killed to kill you first. Were they allowed to march across the country with their prisoners, you might all of you die *en route*, or catch the seeds of some incurable malady.

MR. ERSKINE TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received, June 2.)

"Athens, May 23, 1870.

"My Lord,—With reference to your lordship's despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith an answer to the memorandum enclosed in that despatch, embodying my opinions as to Colonel Théagénis's conduct during the most difficult mission with which he was entrusted.

"When it became necessary to select some person to negotiate with the brigands on behalf of the Government, as suggested by Mr. Herbert and his fellow-captives, MM. Zaimis and Valaority and I had a most anxious discus-

sion as to the fittest person for such a task; and, after several names had been proposed by M. Zaimis, and to which for various reasons I objected, I at last thought of Colonel Théagénis, who appeared to me peculiarly fitted to conduct a negotiation on the success of which the safety of our countrymen depended. He was, and is, universally respected; he is a military man, and the aide-de-camp of General Church; he speaks Italian with great facility (a language with which two of the captives were familiar); and he is quite unconnected with any political party.

"M. Zaimis at once admitted on my mentioning his name, that a better choice could not be made. He was sent for by the King, and consented with the greatest readiness to do what was required of him.

"I have in several of my subsequent despatches described how Colonel Théagénis discharged the duty he had undertaken. I was at first disposed to think, on the representation of Alexander, and after perusing his two first hurried reports, that Colonel Théagénis had given more of his attention to surrounding the brigands than treating with them; but after reading his detailed report, enclosed in my despatch of the 5th inst., after a long conversation with him as to the cause of the collision, and after hearing his evidence in court, I am bound to say that I believe Colonel Théagénis to have acted as a man of feeling and of honour, and that he did his best to avert a catastrophe which was brought on by the panic caused amongst the brigands by the sight of the troops. If the latter had reached the Asopos in time to occupy it its left bank so as to intercept the communication with Sykamenon, or is Alexander had been able to overtake and reassure the brigands, they might have been persuaded to remain quietly at Sykamenon until terms could have been arranged for the release of the prisoners. But Colonel Théagénis was instructed to prevent the escape of the brigands to the north, and when once the troops came up with them, and they would not stop, it is quite conceivable the soldiers should have made use of their arms without permission from their officers.

"I have heard all that Mr. Noel has to say on this subject, and I do not believe that he is in a position to prove that there was any deliberate intention to attack. He was not present at the engagement, and only says, as I have already mentioned to your lordship, that an officer of his acquaintance was ordered by Captain Liacopoulos to attack the brigands at Sykamenon, but he had not the order in his possession, and so far as I know, the soldiers engaged were those who had accompanied Colonel Théagénis and Captain Apostolides from Sialessi in a totally opposite direction from the place at which those spoken of by Mr. Noel were stationed, namely, Dilessi.

"All that Mr. Yates knows of the affair is what he saw from a vessel which was then at some distance from the shore, as he did not land until the firing was over and the prisoners murdered. But it must be admitted that he and most disinterested persons who have looked closely into the matter, are of opinion that the troops fired first.—I have, &c.

(Signed) E. M. Erskine."

ANSWER TO A MEMORANDUM IN THE EARL OF CLARENDON'S DESPATCH OF THE 12TH MAY, 1870.

"I certainly understood that 'a reasonable time will be given for negociation,' and not only 'a reasonable time,' but ample time. In fact, as far as I was concerned, no argument that could have been used would ever have induced me to acquiesce in the brigands being attacked, which, as it appears to me, is a totally different thing from consenting to M. Zaïmis's proposal that they should be surrounded by a cordon of troops, which would have rendered escape difficult, if not impossible. Doubtless there would always have been the danger that when, the brigands first perceived that they were surrounded, they would commit some act of violence, but after all they were human beings, and likely to be actuated by human instinct, and would not, I believe, wantonly slaughter their captives when they could count upon a ransom exceeding the wildest hopes of such people, with every facility for carrying it off to a place of safety, and beyond the reach of either of the Greek or the Turkish authorities.

"The Greek Government and my Italian colleague and I unquestionably had in view not only Colonel Théagénis's mission, which might fail, but what we hoped to do subsequently if time were but afforded us. The archbishop would have gone—I would have gone myself; even the King would unhesitatingly have placed himself in the brigands' hands, rather than that any harm should have befallen our poor countrymen.

"I will not undertake to defend all that Colonel Théagénis did, as I do not feel sure that I am sufficiently acquainted with his proceedings to constitute myself his apologist. He may have made mistakes, and circumstances were against him, but I certainly believe he had the purest and most unselfish intentions; and, at all events, I fully acquit him of the diabolical conduct of which he has been accused. He declares in his letter of April 25th (inclosed in my despatch of the 5th instant) that after several hours' discussion he left the brigands, without having made any impression on them; and I doubt whether anything would have been gained by his attempting to re-open negotiations until he had received fresh instructions from Athens, or until the brigands again intimated a wish to treat. His sole interview with them took place on the 20th, and the fatal encounter was at about five o'clock p.m. on the following day. It is quite certain that Colonel Théagénis left no doubt on the brigands' minds that they would not be allowed to carry off their captives from the neighbourhood of Oropos, as not only does he say so in his report of April 25th, paragraph 4, but Mr. Herbert, in his letter of April 20th, states that Tako was aware that he was being surrounded, and wanted to know where he would be safe. Even at Sykamenon they would not have been attacked; the collision occurred after they had left that place.

"With respect to the colonel's alleged omission to offer to accompany the brigands as a hostage, I would refer to paragraph 4 of his report of April 25th, in which he states most distinctly that he had done so. But even if what the Colonel says is not believed, my letter to Mr. Herbert of the 19th of April, of which a copy is sent in my preceding despatch, would show that Mr. Herbert must have been aware of the offer, and it is highly improbable

that he would have failed to mention it in conversation with Tako. I no more doubt that the offer was made to Tako than I do of my own existence.

"There is no reason to suppose that on leaving the brigands, Colonel Théagénis had definitely broken off negotiations with them; they might at any moment have been resumed by him or others, if the brigands would but have remained where they were. It was known that they were thinking of escape, and one of his objects certainly was to make this as difficult as possible.

"In moving to Sialessi on the 21st, his object was obviously to get to the north of Oropos and intercept the brigands before they carried off their captives to some more distant and impenetrable part of the country, as they were constantly threatening to do.

"If he had meant to attack them, it would have been far simpler to do so from Marcopoulos, where he then was. It is stated in the memorandum which I am now answering that Colonel Théagénis 'fully expected that they would attempt to move on that day (the 21st), although at a later hour than was really the case, and knew that the result of the collision,' etc.—a statement which may be true, but of which I find no evidence in the papers before me, and which would appear to be in direct contradiction with Colonel Théagénis's avowed object of surrounding them at Oropos, all the measures he was adopting being calculated with that view. He even declares that he did not know of this intention until about three p.m. on the 21st.

"Mr. Herbert's note of the 20th April shows, in my opinion, that the brigands did fully understand that they must not leave Oropos.

"But Colonel Théagénis was surely not bound to tell the men who were about to be surrounded the exact position of the troops employed in the operation.

(Signed) "E. M. ERSKINE.

"Athens, May 24th, 1870."

MR. ERSKINE TO THE EARL OF CLARENDON.

(Received June 2nd.)

(Extract.)

"Athens, May 25th, 1870.

"Although I have endeavoured to keep the Government fully informed as to the details of the late catastrophe, I am painfully conscious that I have been able to convey but an inadequate impression of all the circumstances which may have contributed to it. In accordance, therefore, with the instructions contained in your despatch of the 12th instant, I will now attempt to give a more connected account of the whole affair.

"The band of the Arvanitéï consisted originally of twenty-eight brigands almost exclusively natives of Turkey.

"It broke into Phthiotis about the middle of January last, and I can well remember the consternation with which the news was received at Athens. The subsequent history of its proceedings up to the period of its entrance into Attica is so fully told in the indictment, of which copies are herewith annexed,

that I need not encumber this despatch with any further details on the subject.

"The exact day of their arrival in this neighbourhood has not, as far as I am aware, been yet ascertained.

"The indictment mentions the 9th and 10th of April (28th or 29th March, O.S.) as that on which the band appeared about Pentelicus, but it is almost certain that it was lurking somewhere on that mountain for several days before the 11th of April, when the capture was effected. There is no reason to suppose that the Government were aware of the proximity of the Arvanitei until that morning, although it is certain that their presence must have been known to many persons for some days previously.

"The statement now made to me by the Greek Government is that M. Avierinos, the Acting Minister of the Interior, first heard that the brigands were concealed near Daon, on the road to Marathon, 'towards noon' on Monday, the information having been derived from Captain Canellos, the officer commanding the flying column in Attica, who was on leave at Athens, and who had learnt the fact from a peasant. But it is so difficult to get at the truth in this country that Captain Canellos only acknowledges to have received this information at two in the afternoon, although the Minister himself admits that it reached him towards noon through this very Captain Canellos, who had ceased to take any active part in the command of his detachment because he was on bad terms with General Soutzo, chiefly owing to the latter's refusal to employ more than twenty-five men on a duty which in former times required two hundred.

"M. Avierinos's letter to M. Valaority on this subject will be forwarded to your lordship by this mail; and I think that abroad it will be thought somewhat strange on the part of a Minister entrusted with the public security that he should have put off informing his colleague, the Minister of War, that the Arvanitei were at two or three hours' drive from the capital until the next meeting of the Cabinet Council, which doubtless was not held until our unfortunate countrymen had fallen into the hands of the brigands. He denies, and no doubt with truth, that he knew that a party of strangers had gone to Marathon; but, unless I am mistaken, the Minister of War was apprised of the fact at latest at 10 a.m., and if M. Avierinos had taken the very natural precaution of letting his colleague know that the dreaded Arvanitei were close to Athens, one would have expected that immediate measures would have been taken to avert the disaster. As it was, one Minister knew that the brigands were in the neighbourhood, and the other that the strangers had gone to Marathon; but each Minister kept what he knew to himself. The deplorable result is too well known for it to be necessary that I should recapitulate the details.

"There is not the least reason for believing that the brigands really made the famous night march of 40 or 50 miles on which General Soutzo lays so much stress. They were probably a week on Pentelicus, receiving bread, and perhaps intelligence, from the convent on this side of the mountain, which is so well known to travellers visiting Athens. But as all this is now a matter of judicial investigation, I trust that your lordship will excuse my not entering into particulars which it would be wrong to divulge. For the same reason I

say nothing as to the persons who are suspected of having encouraged the brigands to enter Attica, nor as to their advisers in the matter of the amnesty. Messrs. Cookson and Allan are now fully aware of all that is known here on these points, but they would not be justified in communicating the evidence which is being taken until the persons implicated are committed for trial.

"The brigands would probably have seized the travellers on their way to Marathon; but, according to their account, they did not notice the carriages until it was too late, and they knew that they could always take them on their return.

"I have not yet heard that the band of the Arvanitei were connected with any other: on the contrary, that of Spannos, which looks upon Bœotia and Attica as its especial prey, is known to be the rival of the other, and would probably have attacked the Arvanitei if they had obtained the ransom, and if Spannos's band could have obtained a sufficient force to do so with any chance of success.

"It was natural that the Arvanitei should look to Agrapha as a refuge, as they mostly belonged to that district and had come from there.

"With respect to the question of an amnesty being granted to the brigands, I would observe that, on first hearing of the demand, I felt persuaded that it could not legally be granted; but as it was not my business to uphold the Greek Constitution, but to get my countrymen released, I sounded General Soutzo, the first Minister I happened to see, as to the possibility of complying with the demand put forward by the brigands. To my great relief and surprise I found him disposed calmly to consider the matter, and he added that he had always been of opinion that, mainly on grounds of expediency, it would be advisable to make large use of the royal prerogative of pardoning brigands, as after all, they were not worse than many persons who were reputed honest, whilst a brigand was far more dangerous on the mountain side and as an outlaw, than he would be if allowed to lead the life of a peaceful citizen—a doctrine in which there may be some truth.

"On the following day, however, General Soutzo seemed to have changed his mind, and would not admit that he had ever contemplated the possibility of an amnesty being granted for any but political offences.

"M. Valaority, the next Minister I saw declared to me that an amnesty would be a direct breach of the Constitution, and I have not heard two opinions upon the subject since.

"I did not receive your lordship's first telegram expressing a hope that the brigands might be pardoned until after the captives had all been murdered. It would, therefore, be useless now to enquire whether any amount of pressure would have induced the King and his ministers to commit what they all considered an unconstitutional act, and I only mention the subject to explain why no serious attempt was made by me in this sense. Without positive instructions from your lordship I do not think that even the very difficult circumstances in which I was placed would have justified me in requiring the Greek Government to violate the constitution. It is always with the deepest pain that I approach the question as to the attempt to surround the brigands at Oropos; it is difficult, now that all is over, fully to realise the various motives

by which Count della Minerva and I were influenced in this matter. Those who blame us perceive only that the one course led to a fatal result, and they do not take into account what might and probably would have occurred if the Greek Government had been prevented from moving a soldier.

"If, as was quite possible, the military measures had been more prudently and skilfully planned, and the result had been the liberation of the captives, there can be no question that the steps taken would have been generally approved.

"Mr. Noel says on the 21st that the brigands were about to come to terms. But if so, why did they attempt to move off? Is it not likely that they were seeking to mislead Mr. Noel, in order to give time for their escape?

"Mr. Noel was unquestionably acting in good faith, but it is no less certain that his man George Yanni, the brother of Tako and Christo Arvanitaki, was the agent employed in the intrigue about the armistice, and that the letter found on Christo after his death was written with George's knowledge and assent.

"Colonel Théagénis assures me that there were moments when he thought that Tako was about to give way, but that after a fresh conversation between the brothers, in which George sought to dissuade him from accepting the terms offered, Tako would come back more obstinate than ever.

"Is it conceivable that Mr. Noel's attempts at persuasion can have had much effect, when they were being counteracted by the very man through whom any influence could be exerted?

"M. Zaïmis worked upon my fears by telling me that this state of things could not last; that a body of men under a certain Leonidas Bulgaris was preparing to attack the brigands at Oropos, with the purpose of effecting the release of the captives at whatever cost; and that with every disposition to avoid a collision, the Government might be unable to prevent it: that even at Oropos the peasants were combining to put an end to a state of things which they deemed disgraceful to the country.

"On the other hand, the brigands were constantly threatening to kill the captives unless their terms were complied with immediately; and although it is now said that these were mere idle threats, I did not feel at all sure that they would not be fulfilled. Count de Boyl and Mr. Vyner were much depressed, and I felt confident that Mr. Herbert's health would have given way under prolonged exposure to damp and fatigue.

"M. Zaïmis did not object to send a person of standing to negotiate on behalf of the Government, but he insisted on some understanding being come to in the event of every attempt at conciliation proving unsuccessful; and I own that at length both I and Count della Minerva considered that the chances of success so much outweighed the risk, that we reluctantly acquiesced in M. Zaïmis's suggestion, that in the event of Colonel Théagénis's mission not succeeding, the Government should be allowed to dispose the troops around Oropos in such a manner as to render it impossible for the brigands to escape, when they would, it was thought, be obliged to accept the magnificent terms which would still have been offered to them. Count della Minerva's recol-

lection of our understanding with the Government is, that a cordon was to be drawn round Oropos at the distance of about two hours. I cannot be sure of this, as I felt that much must depend upon the nature of the ground; but it was certainly agreed that the troops should keep as far away as was compatible with the attainment of the object in view, namely, the prevention of the escape of the brigands.

"I think it cannot be denied that in what the brigands said to Mr. Noel they were either trying to deceive him, or, if they were in earnest, they were beginning to feel the effects of the message conveyed to them by Colonel Théagénis.

"If they had been allowed to carry off their prisoners without interruption, from the comparatively accessible situation they were then in, and if the captives had dropped off miserably one by one, or been murdered at a later period by the brigands in some chance encounter with the troops, it would equally have been said that we were to blame, and that we ought never to have consented to their removal from Oropos; that a little firmness would have forced the brigands to accept the terms offered to them; in short, any misfortune to the captives would always have been attributed to our mismanagement.

"These, my lord, were some of the arguments which induced me to acquiesce in the course proposed by the Greek Government, which was not to come into operation until after the failure of Colonel Théagénis's conciliatory mission.

"I do not pretend that I was right, as I now see that anything would have been better than a plan which has ended so fatally. But who can undertake to say with certainty which is the best way to deal with brigands, or how much of what they threaten is meant to be carried into effect?

"Nor do I perceive how faith was broken with them; they surely could not expect to be allowed to wander about indefinitely with impunity. And yet it would have been as dangerous to put an end to the armistice at the end of ten months as it proved to be at the end of ten days.

"I have repeatedly assured your lordship that there was never the slightest intention on the part of the Government of attacking the brigands; and they must have well known this, as they trusted any engagements taken by a British agent, and Mr. Herbert was in a position thoroughly to enlighten them on this head.

"In Mr. Lloyd's letter of the 20th of April to Lord Muncaster, he says, 'They cannot believe that they are safe even here, and they require some assurance from Erskine that they will not be molested in Attica, fixing the time they will wait here till to-morrow evening for an answer.' This answer, consenting to their removal to Sykamenon, was given without one moment's delay, but they left Oropos without waiting for it; had they done so it might easily have been settled that they would not be molested in Attica.

"I have, in a note of which a copy is enclosed herewith, requested the Valaority to inquire into the Nomarch of Chalcis' refusal to lend the Government boat Methoni to Mr. Noel, and I shall not fail to acquaint your lordship

h the explanation that may be offered by the Nomarch in reply; but I ık Mr. Noel makes more of the circumstance than it deserves, as the Meni is not, I imagine, a steamer, and Mr. Noel was not ready to start for ›pos until a quarter past four o'clock on the afternoon of the 21st of April, ɜn the brigands had already left Sykamenon and the conflict had begun.

'Having now, to the best of my ability, answered in this or in other patches all the points adverted to in your lordship's despatch, I must leave ; most distressing case to the indulgent consideration of her Majesty's vernment."

All these documents were ignored by the English press with t one exception. It would have been common honesty and fair aling, after publishing in full the former despatches upon which many serious accusations were based, to find room for what is tually the exculpation of the Greek Government. But the ıglish press would not undo the work accomplished at so much ins. The Greek nation was, in their estimation, fairly stigıtised, and nothing ought to disturb the satisfactory result. An ıinous silence followed these despatches. The English press ıy hide its head in its feathers, and think, like the ostrich, that › one is looking on. But they may rest assured that even they nnot smother truth.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has given notice that on the 27th stant he would move :—

"That an humble address be presented to Her Majesty that the House continues to regard, with the deepest grief and horror, the late atrocious murders perpetrated near Athens, by a band of organised brigands, on the persons of several of Her Majesty's subjects, including the Secretary of Her Majesty's Legation; to thank Her Majesty for the ample and early accounts thereof, which it has pleased Her Majesty to communicate to the House, to submit whether there be not grounds for apprehending that the lives of the the lamented victims were mainly sacrificed to parties acting more or less in secret understanding with the brigands; and to express an earnest hope that such further steps as Her

Majesty may please to take with reference to these matters will be directed, not only to the immediate suppression of brigandage in Greece, but more especially to the removal of its real causes, be they what they may, in discharge of the obligations virtually contracted by Her Majesty and Her Majesty's allies, as the constituted protectors of that kingdom."

In plain language, their Lordships, notwithstanding the ample explanations given by their own Minister at Athens, which clearly establish that the Greek authorities behaved throughout with perfect good faith and sincerity, will repeat, in an official form, the exploded accusations with which the Greek nation was charged. Their Lordships can please themselves; but let them rest assured that the Greek people will not be overawed by any demonstration of an unjust animosity. We are fully prepared to acknowledge our shortcomings, but we will not submit to unfair attacks. The only result of such a policy will be to hasten the great reaction in our favour, which will inevitably follow a long period of unmerited wrongs.

ADDENDA

TO

NOTES ON THE RECENT MURDERS BY BRIGANDS IN GREECE.

We have just received the following copies of letters addressed by Mr. Zaïmis, the Greek Premier to Sir Roundell Palmer and by Mr. Th. P. Délyannis, a Member of the Cabinet, to Sir Henry Bulwer, which we are authorised to publish. We will not diminish their eloquent force by attempting a translation :—

Au très honorable Sir Roundell Palmer.

Monsieur,—Je viens de lire dans les journaux le discours que vous avez prononcé à la Chambre des Communes dans la séance du 20 Mai.

Mon intention n'est pas, Monsieur, d'entamer avec vous une discussion sur la manière dont vous appréciez les faits, qui ont abouti à la sanglante tragédie d'Oropos. Cependant, malgré la réserve qui m'est commandée par la position officielle que j'occupe, je faillirais à l'honneur, et à ce que je dois à moi-même, si je ne m'empressais de réfuter les assertions inexactes qui me touchent personnellement. Ainsi, malgré la correspondance échangée entre moi et l'honorable M. Erskine, et dont vous faites mention, vous continuez, Monsieur, à affirmer "qu'il est hors de doute que le premier ministre Zaïmis a exprimé la conviction que de personnes politiques d'Athènes, engagées dans une opposition politique au Gouvernement, se sont mis en communication avec les brigands, et leur ont conseillé de faire des demandes que le Gouvernement ne pouvait admettre." Telle, Monsieur, n'a jamais été ma conviction, et je répète ici textuellement ce que j'écrivais le 5 Mai à M. Erskine, "ce dont je me souviens, c'est qu'après le retour des émissaires que le Gouvernement avait envoyés aux brigands, je vous ai dit, en vous entretenant du résultat de leur mission, que d'après *leurs informations*, d'autres émissaires expédiés par de personnes, qui, dans un *esprit d'opposition*, voulaient créer des embarras au Gouvernement, s'étaient aussi rendus auprès des brigands pour les engager à insister à l'amnistie pour eux-mêmes et pour leurs compagnons en prison. Je n'ai pas nommé *les chefs de l'opposition* et je n'ai fait allusion à aucun d'eux."

Il résulte clairement de ce qui précède que loin d'avoir émis une idée personelle quelconque, je n'ai fait que répéter à M. Erskine ce que mes émissaires m'ont rapporté. Leur dire d'ailleurs, n'incrimine nullement l'opposition politique, car les mots "personnes qui, dans un esprit d'opposition, veulent créer des embarras au Gouvernement" s'appliquent tout naturellement aux réceleurs et autre agents que les malfaiteurs ont partout et en Grèce aussi, et qui sont en hostilité permanente contre tout Gouvernement établi.

Par conséquent, je ne saurais, Monsieur, protester assez haut contre une interprétation donnée à mes paroles, dont on pourrait s'autoriser pour mettre en suspicion l'honorabilité de mes adversaires politiques.

Je me borne à cette rectification, sans relever les expressions dont votre honorable collègue, Sir H. Bulwer, s'est servi dans le discours qu'il a prononcé après vous, pour dépeindre les hommes qui sont à la tête des partis politiques de la Grèce. A de pareilles expressions aucune réponse n'est possible, et si j'en fais mention, c'est pour reconnaître que, malgré le caractère hostile de votre argumentation, d'insinuations semblables n'ont pas trouvé place dans votre discours.

Agréez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma plus haute considération.

ZAÏMIS.

Au très honorable Sir Henry Bulwer.

"Athènes, le 28 May (9 Juin) 1870.

Monsieur,—Dans le discours que vous avez prononcé à la séance du 8/20 Mai dernier de la Chambre des Communes, vous faites mention de quelques faits dont les uns ne sont que purement imaginaires, et d'autres se sont passé d'une maniére bien différente que vous ne l'avez fait voir.

D'abord, vous soutenez que les gentlemen qui ont été assassinés se sont rendu à Marathon, sur une garantie spéciale, malgré laquelle, ils ont été faits prisonniers par les brigands : La vérité, c'est que la moindre garantie n'a été donnée à ces nobles victimes par aucune de nos autorités.

Vous soutenez ensuite qu'on a promis au brigands de ne pas les poursu- vous vous indignez même contre le Gouvernement hellénique d'avoir ma- à cette promesse. Ce qu'il y a de vrai, c'est que le Gouvernement hellén- a promis de ne pas poursuivre les brigands, (et la lettre qui leur a été adre- par M. Erskine, Ministre d'Angleterre à Athènes en est la preuve:) tant q- resteraient dans les maisons de campagne des environs de Kéramidi où restation a eu lieu, afin d'y continuer les négociations pour la délivrance captifs. Il n'a jamais promis de suspendre toutes poursuites contre les gands, même dans le cas où ils auraient quitté les environs d'Athènes auraient voulu se rendre en d'autres provinces ou sortir du pays.

Vous avancez que ces négociations allaient aboutir très heureusemen- lorsque l'envoi subit des troupes a changé la face des choses: Les négociatio- commencées, après le retour de Lord Muncaster, n'ont jamais paru approch- d'une fin heureuse, elles n'étaient pas même propres á inspirer de l'espo- les brigands, dès le lendemain du départ de Lord Muncaster ayant demanc- une amnistie, et y ayant persisté jusqu'à la fin.

Vous soutenez encore que les brigands avaient promis à quelqu'un de consentir, à défaut d'amnistie, à la proposition de l'Angleterre d'être transportés à l'étranger: Jamais, rien de semblable n'a eu lieu, jamais les brigands n'ont fait de pareilles promesses.

Vous affirmez même que tout allait bien, jusqu'au moment où M. Théagènes a eu une longue entrevue avec les Ministres: M. Théagènes désigné par M. le Ministre d'Angleterre en Grèce pour se rendre auprès des brigands, et agréé par le Gouvernement, une fois parti avec cette mission, n'est revenu à Athènes pour s'entretenir avec les Ministres, qu'après la sanglante catastrophe.

Vous soutenez enfin que, tout en ayant permis aux brigands de passer à Sycamino, on a envoyé l'ordre écrit de les arrêter s'ils s'y rendaient: Où avez-vous trouvé cela?

Vous voyez bien, Monsieur, que les données qui ont servi de base à votre argumentation ne pêchent pas par trop d'exactitude. Vous ne serez pas donc surpris d'apprendre que les conclusions que vous en avez tirées ne sont pas plus justes.

En vous adressant ces courtes observations, je n'ai pas cédé à un premier mouvement naturel à l'homme qui se voit l'objet d'injustes et gratuites injures; mouvement que ne pourrait manquer de faire naître en moi la lecture des qualités que vous avez cru devoir attribuer au Gouvernement hellénique dont j'ai l'honneur de faire partie. Tout au contraire, en vous écrivant cette lettre, j'oublie complètement ma position de Ministre de S. M. Hellénique. Les termes dont se sont servis Lord Carnarvon à la Chambre des Lords et Sir R. Palmer aux Communes, en parlant de ma patrie, sont trop forts, pour qu'on puisse faire attention à vos attaques contre les membres du Cabinet actuel. Plusieurs même journaux anglais ont accumulé tant de griefs contre la Grèce et les Grecs en général, qu'on ne saurait se méprendre sur mon compte d'avoir voulu faire une exception dans le pays contre lequel on s'est déchaîné avec une extrême violence. Si j'ai cru à propos de vous adresser ces observances, c'est que vous ayant personnellement connu, je m'étonnais qu'un homme de votre esprit ait pu s'abuser à ce point dans ses opinions sur la Grèce.

Ceux de vos compatriotes qui auraient eu soin de comparer l'état où se trouvait ce petit coin de terre que l'Europe finit pas ériger en royaume petit et cachechtique, après neuf ans d'une guerre désastreuse, à son état actuel; de mettre en regard les budgets des recettes en 1833 et en 1870, la production de la terre, le mouvement du commerce, le nombre des maisons des plantations et des navires, les statistiques des personnes sachant lire et écrire à ces deux époques; ceux-là pourraient décider si ce Royaume Hellénique remplit ou non sa mission. Aussi, tous ceux qui ont cherché à déterminer la raison d'être du brigandage eu Grèce, et les causes qui font que ce fléau toujours combattu et anéanti reparaisse après des intervalles, sans pouvoir être déraciné, ne rejetteront pas tous les torts sur cette pauvre petite Grèce qui emploie une bonne partie de ses revenus à se guérir de ce mal

Quant à ceux, qui ne prénant rien en considération, se laissent emporter par leur colère, à l'occasion du dernier désastre que les Grecs et la Grèce déplorent plus que personne, et dans l'accès de leur emportement oublient jusqu'au choix des termes destinés à exprimer leurs idées au public, ceux-là commettent une grande injustice. Ils peuvent bien le faire: ils appartiennent à une nation forte et puissante. Ils n'en sont pas moins injustes.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, etc.

Votre trés-humble et très-obeissant serviteur,

THÉODORE P. DÉLYANNIS.

In the course of our remarks, we have said nothing with respect to a certain letter from "an English Protestant Churchman," who, writing from Smyrna to the *Times* (30th May), accused the archbishop of Syra and Tenos, of having attended in state the funeral of an escaped brigand chief from Asia Minor. His Grace, when on a visit to this country, two months ago, received from the clergy and from all classes of Englishmen the most flattering marks of good-will and esteem such as his great personal qualities and his high office warranted. The accusation therefore becomes a most serious one. As we understand that his Grace will himself soon give a full and most complete refutation of the charge, we abstain from making any remarks upon the subject. But we consider this again an example of the unreasoning way in which the most preposterous charges, made in the most cowardly manner, were eagerly snatched up and unhesitatingly relied upon. Such accusations, and such impossible stories were chiefly furnished by those bastard Levantine Franks whose hatred of the Greeks (whom they find far better men of business than themselves) is intense, and of whom Lord Byron justly said that he never met with more vile and treacherous serpents.

In conclusion, we would recommend to our readers an article in the last number of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, treating of brigandage in Greece generally, and written by M. Bournouf, the director of the *Ecole Française*, at Athens — an institution maintained by the French Government and destined for the perfection of French University graduates in the study of Greek antiquities and literature.

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